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Preface – The national interest, pro-Israel advocacy and 
anti-Semitism
This report examines the Britain Israel 
Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), 
a prominent pro-Israel public relations group. 
Like most public relations companies, indeed like 
most companies, it is an opaque organisation 
that carries out much of its work beyond public 
scrutiny and accountability. Our hope is that this 
report goes some way towards developing a 
better understanding of what BICOM does and 
whose interests it serves.
Since BICOM is a UK public relations company 
seeking to cultivate ‘a more supportive 
environment for Israel’, this study could have 
examined its activities through the lens of 
divergent British and Israeli national interests. 
This type of approach has been adopted in 
some prominent examinations of what is broadly 
referred to as the ‘Israel lobby’, but seems 
misguided to us; too often leading to accusations 
of ‘dual loyalty’ or an implication that domestic 
organisations are serving foreign powers.1 
We reject it, though, not because we are 
uncomfortable with its conclusions, but because 
we do not accept the assumption of an objective 
‘national interest’.
Though politicians and academics often use 
this term, in reality the people and institutions 
that make up nations rarely share the same 
interests or perspectives. Indeed, the contest 
over how the national interest should be 
understood, and therefore how it can best be 
served, is the very stuff of national politics. It 
follows that to understand an organisation like 
BICOM, we must start not with abstract and 
subjective notions like the ‘national interest’, 
but rather with an examination of the ideas and 
interests of the individuals and groups involved, 
as well as their broader political networks. 
What we discover is that BICOM is not some 
alien organisation trying to impose its agenda 
on the British political establishment. Rather its 
staff and donors, and their networks, are parts 
of that very establishment. Though their interests 
and perspectives inevitably conflict with other 
factions, equally they have found natural allies in 
pre-existing political networks – most obviously 
in older pro-Israel groupings, but also notably 
on the right of the Labour Party, which has been 
shaped by years of Atlanticist, Cold War thinking 
and more recently by the War on Terror, which 
revived elements of those older political networks 
and ideas.2
To some, our attempt to situate the various 
players within the ‘power elite’ may have an air of 
‘conspiracy theory’ about it. But the similarities 
are superficial. Conspiracists allege that secret 
groups, organisations, or even races, wield total 
power over society, whilst remaining hidden 
from public view.3 This is far from what we 
are suggesting. 
The countless lobbying scandals of recent years 
make it clear even to the casual observer that 
powerful interests routinely push their agendas 
‘behind the scenes’. But there is no grand 
plan or conspiracy afoot. Powerful people and 
institutions may have considerable resources 
at their disposal, but they cannot see into the 
future, and nor can they exercise total control 
– the 2008 financial crash and the so called 
‘Arab Spring’ remind us of that. Like the rest of 
us, those with power often react to events as 
they unfold and with considerable uncertainty. 
Nor do ‘power elites’ always agree with one 
another. Whilst many powerful individuals 
and organisations share basic interests and 
perspectives, their interests also often diverge 
and there is not necessarily consensus on any 
given issue. 
Furthermore, no single organisation, individual or 
grouping is all-powerful. Even the banks, which 
are probably the most powerful institutions in 
contemporary Britain, have to make compromises 
with other powerful groups and, albeit indirectly, 
with the rest of society. 
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Finally, though many powerful individuals and 
institutions are highly secretive, they are not 
secret. When it comes to political influence, we 
know quite a lot about who funds our politicians 
and their think tanks and who meets with, and 
are consulted by, ministers and civil servants. 
The domination of our politics by corporations 
and wealthy individuals is no secret, even if to 
acknowledge it remains taboo in the mainstream. 
There is no one secret group – no Illuminati, 
Masonic Grand Lodge or cabal of reptilian shape-
shifters pulling the strings. ‘Power elites’ are 
exactly who they appear to be. 
A better understanding of these ‘power elites’ 
can only enhance democratic politics, and in 
this report we attempt to cast some light on a 
particular faction which is engaged in pro-Israel 
advocacy. Many of its members are from Jewish 
backgrounds. Before we proceed, therefore, it 
is necessary to deal with the question of anti-
Semitism.
Racism towards Jewish people is deeply rooted 
in European history and culture and a common 
theme is the notion that wealthy Jews control 
powerful institutions or historical events from 
behind the scenes. As Brian Klug has noted:
Anti-semitism is an ingrained European fantasy 
about Jews as Jews. Whether they are seen 
as a race, religion, nation or ethnic group, and 
whether anti-Semitism comes from the right 
or the left, the image of ‘the Jew’ is much the 
same. To an anti-Semite, Jews are a people 
set apart, not merely by their customs but by 
their collective character. They are arrogant, 
secretive, cunning, always looking to turn a 
profit. Loyal only to their own, wherever they 
go they form a state within a state, preying 
upon the societies in whose midst they dwell. 
Mysteriously powerful, their hidden hand 
controls the banks and the media. They will 
even drag governments into war if this suits 
their purposes. Such is the figure of ‘the Jew’, 
transmitted from generation to generation.4
Readers will likely be familiar with the cynical use 
of this history to smear critics of Israel. This is a 
reprehensible practice, but it should not disguise 
the fact that critiques of Israel and Zionism can 
potentially absorb anti-Semitic ideas. As Klug 
notes, where anti-Semitic fantasies ‘are projected 
on to Israel because it is a Jewish state, or 
Zionism because it is a Jewish movement, or 
Jews in association with either Israel or Zionism: 
there you have anti-Semitism.’5 
Conservative critics, we would suggest, are 
particularly vulnerable to this tendency, since they 
are more likely to believe that the politics of a 
state reflects some innate character of its people. 
From this assumption, held consciously or not, it 
follows that the history and politics of the state of 
Israel in some way reflects on Jewish people as a 
whole, whatever role particular Jewish individuals 
may have played in its politics. Again we reject 
such assumptions. Just as national states do 
not have a single self-evident ‘national interest’, 
neither can Jewish people in general be said to 
share particular interests or political perspectives. 
The actual history of the State of Israel illustrates 
very well that national states are not the inevitable 
products of the innate characteristics of their 
people, but are formed from specific political 
and historical circumstances aided by deliberate 
human efforts, including the use of propaganda.
In what follows we detail the interests and ideas 
of groups and individuals involved in pro-Israel 
advocacy, but we do not tacitly point to some 
modern ‘Jewish conspiracy’. Indeed, many of 
those pushing pro-Israel policies are not Jewish, 
and many of those opposing them are.6
The truth is that those involved in pro-Israel 
advocacy networks are conservatives of various 
stripes, some of whom originated on, and may 
still identify with, the left. On many issues they are 
at odds with mainstream opinion in what is often 
described as the ‘Jewish community’ in the UK, 
the US and in Israel. To the extent that common 
agendas exist, they are about pushing ideas 
related to corporate interests, the interests of the 
Israeli state or its dominant factions, those of the 
foreign policy establishment and the intelligence 
agencies of several Western powers, or those of 
the transnational conservative movements. None 
of these interests have anything to do with the 
interests of ‘the Jews’ any more than they do 
those of ‘the Christians’ or ‘the Muslims’.
The Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre: Giving peace a chance? • 7
Given the considerable criticism one can face, 
it is understandable that many commentators 
and analysts are reluctant to scrutinise pro-
Israel political networks. But those who do not 
do so for fear of appearing to be anti-Semitic 
profoundly misunderstand the nature of anti-
Semitism and in fact risk playing into the hands 
of these conservative forces and worsening anti-
Jewish racism.
For our part we proceed on the assumption 
that the politics of Zionism and the Israeli state 
should not be conflated with Jews as a people or 
Judaism as a cultural or religious tradition.
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Summary 
Introduction
BICOM is an important pro-Israel grouping that 
focuses on managing the British media. It is 
important because it is at the more sophisticated 
end of the pro-Israel lobby and because it works 
behind the scenes to cultivate elite opinion on 
Israel. BICOM is primarily about taking standard 
pro-Israel arguments, but repackaging them 
in ways that resonate with opinion-forming 
elites, and teaching other activists to do the 
same. So, although it focuses on the media and 
communications its main audience is not public 
opinion but a political elite that is insulated from 
the public. 
Chapter One – Shlomo 
Zabludowicz and the business 
of war
BICOM owes its existence to its principal donor 
Poju Zabludowicz, whose own wealth stems 
from the money his father, Shlomo Zabludowicz, 
made from the arms trade. Networking with 
top political leaders in Israel and internationally, 
Shlomo Zabludowicz sold weapons to some of 
the world’s most repressive regimes over several 
decades. This history spans the development 
of Israel’s domestic arms industry in the 1950s, 
the expansion of the arms market domestically 
and internationally and globally during the 1970s 
and later the geopolitical and other factors 
contributing to a decline in profitability that 
eventually prompted a move by the younger 
Zabludowicz to diversify into property.
Chapter Two – Poju Zabludowicz 
and the business of peace
Poju Zabludowicz’s father made a fortune out 
of the business of war, but by the time of his 
death in 1994 the business sector in Israel 
had come to see its best interests as lying 
with the normalisation of the country and the 
internationalisation of its economy. Zabludowicz 
now became part of the ‘peace dividend’ lobby 
in London which supported the Oslo process of 
the 1990s. He made billions from the state-led 
property booms, privatisations, mergers and tech-
bubbles of the neoliberal period, wealth which is 
now tied up in opaque offshore trusts and hedge 
funds, managed by associates in London. 
Chapter Three – The second 
intifada and the establishment  
of BICOM
The Oslo process, though successful from the 
perspective of Israeli business, did not bring 
an end to the occupation or illegal settlements, 
and the ‘final status’ talks held at Camp David 
in 2000 ended with no agreement. Palestinian 
frustration erupted into protests and rioting in 
September 2000. These events subsequently 
grew into the second intifada. Israel’s violent 
response and its rightward shift left many in the 
UK Jewish community uncomfortable, but the 
official communal leaders sought to mobilise 
British Jews behind Israel and BICOM emerged 
as part of this struggle to maintain support. Poju 
Zabludowicz was its first major donor.
Chapter Four – BICOM and 
British Zionism
BICOM came from and is embedded within 
the British Zionist movement. We examine 
the key groups that are closest to BICOM 
especially the United Jewish Israel Appeal, 
the Board of Deputies of British Jews and The 
Jewish Leadership Council all of which, despite 
their names, are pro-Israel rather than simply 
representatives of the Jewish community. BICOM 
is also close to the Parliamentary ‘Friends of 
Israel’ groups that wield some influence in 
Westminster. It is important to note, however, 
that BICOM, although it distances itself from 
some of the more hard-line pro-Israel groups, 
also co-operates with groups such as the 
Zionist Federation. The Federation is affiliated to 
the World Zionist Organisation, headquartered 
in Jerusalem and shares premises with the 
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three most important diaspora facing Israeli 
organisations known as the ‘national institutions’, 
which are quasi-official institutions of the state. 
Each has UK branches. This highlights the 
integration that exists between the UK Israel 
lobby and the Israeli state. BICOM has more 
direct connections with Israel through a number 
of think tanks and in particular the institutions of 
what we call ‘neoliberal Zionism’. We conclude 
the chapter by examining the tensions within  
the pro-Israel lobby, tensions that suggest that 
the lobby is not monolithic and that various 
interests and ideas contend between the 
various groups.
Chapter Five – BICOM strategy, 
elite networks and the media 
Here we argue that BICOM is the most 
sophisticated of the pro-Israel advocacy groups 
in the UK. It has employed public relations 
professionals and lobbyists and has adopted a 
strategic approach to communications. BICOM’s 
original mission included influencing the general 
public, but this appears to have been dropped 
and today its website makes no mention of 
public opinion. BICOM believes in trying to 
insulate elites from what it sees as the negative 
opinions about Israel encountered amongst the 
British public.
BICOM undertakes its work in the context 
of the UK’s highly unequal society in which 
countervailing democratic powers have been 
systematically undermined over the last three 
decades. This is part of the reason why BICOM 
sees it as more important to build and sustain 
elite support. Those who bankroll BICOM also 
do this directly by supporting sympathetic 
people in the main political parties, especially the 
Conservative Party. 
Because of its focus on elites, BICOM has always 
emphasised the need to be accurate and rational 
in its approach, to ensure that it avoids the 
hectoring approach of some of the hard-liners in 
the UK pro-Israel community and can develop 
reciprocal working relationships with journalists. 
BICOM has had some considerable success in 
influencing mainstream media. However it is  
also clear that BICOM operates in a media context 
that is largely sympathetic to supporters of Israel.
Managing the recurrent crises thrown up by 
Israeli human rights abuses and military activities 
is also a key role for BICOM, as it is targeting 
critics of Israel and attempting to mobilise grass 
roots supporters. 
Managing the recurrent crises thrown up by 
Israeli human rights abuses and military activities 
is also a key role for BICOM, as it is targeting 
critics of Israel and attempting to mobilise grass 
roots supporters. 
Chapter Six – Funding and 
finances 
In recent years BICOM has demonstrated 
the ability to fundraise the odd million pounds 
through organising business delegations to 
Israel offering access to leading politicians or 
hosting dinners at prestigious London locations. 
However, it remains overwhelmingly dependent 
on the wealth of Poju Zabludowicz, whose 
generosity has increased over time. Claims 
that BICOM has over 100 donors cannot be 
verified due to a chronic lack of organisational 
transparency but other sources indicate that the 
interests and connections of those donors who 
are identifiable overlap considerably. Drawn from 
the transnational business elite, several of them 
have investments in the same private equity fund 
as Zabludowicz, or, like him, have donated to 
other British pro-Israel groups, one or both of the 
major political parties in the US or UK or have 
business interests in Israel.
Chapter Seven – BICOM’s views 
and arguments 
We show how BICOM’s narrative seeks to 
present Israel as a benign and reasonable 
actor yet the moderate tone and rhetoric it 
deploys undermined by the extremism of its 
underlying arguments. Despite professing 
support for Palestinian statehood, it echoes 
Israeli rejectionism on the key issues of the 
conflict: borders, Jerusalem, settlements and 
refugees. This stands in stark contrast with 
the overwhelming international consensus 
10 •  Public Interest Investigations
premised on international law and United Nations 
resolutions. Nonetheless the increasing care 
taken to cultivate this respectable façade, which 
sets it apart from other more strident pro-Israel 
groups, is indicative of BICOM’s broader goal 
of shoring up support for Israel amongst the 
strategically vital political elite in the UK.
Chapter Eight – The Fox-
Werritty scandal and the decline of 
democracy 
This chapter examines the resignations of 
Defence Secretary Liam Fox in October 2011 
over the activities of his unofficial adviser Adam 
Werritty, who was funded in part by key BICOM 
backers. The scandal broke after a former 
BICOM lobbyist introduced Werritty to a client 
who then attempted to use his contacts with Fox 
as leverage in a business dispute.
Although it was claimed that they were intended 
to promote peace and reconciliation, Fox and 
Werritty’s activities in Sri Lanka emboldened 
a hard-line government. Their parallel 
diplomacy effort on Iran supported hard-line 
neoconservative rhetoric, but also engaged 
policymakers in both Britain and Israel who 
favoured covert action over a military strike. 
Chapter Nine – Conclusions 
BICOM positions itself as the moderate 
mouthpiece of a badly misunderstood state. It 
aims to defend Israel by encouraging a skewed 
perception of the conflict amongst elites and 
insulating them from pressure to support 
Palestinian rights. 
By seeking to present even illegal actions by 
the Israeli state in a favourable light, BICOM 
simultaneously strengthens its backers’ 
relationships with  state officials whilst minimising 
any harm that they might bring. It is clear 
that what worries BICOM’s backers most are 
campaigns for the boycott of settlement goods, 
Israeli academia or wider measures. The attempt 
to mobilise British Jews and to dissuade critics 
in the Jewish community (and elsewhere) from 
speaking out is also very important as it helps to 
identify Jews en masse with Israel and helps to 
head off criticism of Israel from non- Jews.
We suggest that BICOM and other lobby 
groups should be understood in the context of 
the transnational elite networks incorporating 
players from big business, finance, politics, PR 
and the media. The existence and activities 
of BICOM cannot be separated from issues 
of undemocratic governance in the UK and 
elsewhere, and  any solution to the problems we 
highlight here must necessarily entail significant 
political reforms. What is needed is  a systematic 
overhaul of ethics rules in Whitehall including a 
statutory lobbying register . Lobby groups, think 
tanks and media organisations should also be 
transparent and accountable to the public. 
BICOM wants to suggest that it is in favour of 
a two state solution and of the peace process 
in the Middle East. Our findings suggest, on 
the contrary, that it  supports the rejectionism 
of an Israeli state which refuses to give peace 
a chance.
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Introduction
BICOM is not well known to the public, but it is 
probably the most important pro-Israel grouping 
in the UK. It is at the more sophisticated end of 
what is collectively referred to as the pro-Israel 
lobby and, in contrast to the more strident and 
less subtle element of the lobby, can appear to 
be centrist and moderate. BICOM works behind 
the scenes to cultivate elite opinion on Israel 
and focuses on the British media, attempting to 
ensure that reporting is more favourable to the 
interests of the Israeli state. It’s remit is primarily 
about taking standard pro-Israel arguments, 
but repackaging them in ways that resonate 
with opinion-forming elites, and teaching other 
activists to do the same. Although it focuses 
on the media and communications its main 
audience is not public opinion, but a political and 
media elite that is insulated from the public. 
In this report we do not simply examine 
BICOM in isolation, but try to show that it is 
one organisation amongst many which act in 
a concerted way around shared objectives. 
We also situate it in the context of the wider 
networks of power and influence, in particular a 
nexus of relations between the British and Israeli 
states, and business, political and media elites 
in both countries. We regard the lobbying and 
PR activities we describe here as symptoms 
of the tenuous nature of democracy in the UK, 
as well as a means by which democracy is 
circumvented. 
In chapter one we begin by delving into the 
background of the main funder behind BICOM, 
Poju Zabludowicz. His wealth comes originally 
from the arms industry, in which his father 
was something of a pioneer. The subsequent 
diversification away from arms towards finance 
and tourism tells us more than a particular family 
history, mirroring as it does the more general 
transformation of the Israeli economy since 
1948. In chapter two we show that the interests 
underlying BICOM have a material stake at least 
in the appearance of a peace process in Israel/
Palestine. Thus we suggest the main point of 
BICOM is to encourage the idea that Israel is 
serious about peace with the Palestinians.
Chapter three examines the creation of BICOM 
in response to the beginning of the second 
intifada in 2000. Chapter four looks at the 
wider pro-Israel networks in which BICOM is 
embedded, their interconnections, and their links 
with Israeli state institutions. This allows us to 
turn, in Chapter five, to examine BICOM’s role 
in the context of the UK’s ‘post-democracy’, its 
strategy of attempting to build elite support for 
Israel, and undermine support for Palestinian 
human rights. This takes place against a 
media and political background that is largely 
sympathetic to Israel. The funding and finances 
of BICOM are examined in chapter six whilst the 
arguments advanced by BICOM are examined 
in chapter seven. Chapter eight builds on our 
account of BICOM by examining the Fox-Werritty 
scandal and highlighting the intimate relations 
between the networks we have outlined here and 
the UK defence establishment. Finally chapter 
nine provides a short conclusion to this study.
Research approach
This report is based on a combination of 
historical, archival and investigative research 
as well as a review of the scholarly literature on 
Israel/Palestine and Israeli political economy.
Though we spoke to several people with 
knowledge and experience of BICOM and the 
broader pro-Israel lobby in the UK, the views 
and perspectives of those with whom this 
report is concerned remained accessible to us 
only through secondary sources. This absence 
reflects their unwillingness to speak with us, 
rather than any disinterest on our part. During 
our research we contacted nearly ten former 
“ the main point of BICOM is to 
encourage the idea that Israel is serious 
about peace with the Palestinians.”
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BICOM members of staff requesting interviews. 
One replied declining our request and the rest 
failed to respond. We also contacted BICOM for 
an official interview, but received no response. 
When we followed up our original request, a 
member of staff confirmed it had been received 
and said we would receive a response from 
a more senior member of staff in due course. 
None was received. Whilst we would expect a 
certain reticence given that our research was 
clearly adopting a broadly critical perspective, 
when considered alongside BICOM’s lack of 
transparency about its funding and governance 
structures, we believe this unwillingness to enter 
into even minimal engagement with critics reflects 
very poorly on BICOM as an organisation.
Finally. a note on terminology though ‘directors’ 
and ‘board members’ are generally synonymous 
in the corporate world, in this report we use the 
former term when referring to those who are 
registered as directors at Companies House 
and the latter term to refer to those who though 
not officially registered as directors, have been 
identified as a ‘director’ or ‘board member’ in 
other sources.
The Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre: Giving peace a chance? • 13
Chapter One – Shlomo Zabludowicz and the business 
of war
During a decade of pro-Israel activism BICOM 
has employed three different directors, two 
interim directors and dozens of members of staff. 
A constant presence has been its chairman, the 
Finnish financier Poju Zabludowicz. Zabludowicz 
was the first major donor to pledge support for 
the Cross Community Emergency Co-ordinating 
Group, from which BICOM emerged7 and the 
organisation has remained dependent on him 
ever since for month-to-month financial support.8
When he emerged as the key figure behind 
BICOM, Zabludowicz was barely known in the 
UK, either inside or outside the Jewish community. 
He remains a low-key figure, rarely granting 
interviews. His role in Israel advocacy aside, 
the billionaire is best known as a collector and 
patron of the arts. His British wife, Anita, serves 
as a trustee of the Tate Foundation (which raises 
funds for the Tate Gallery). The couple’s generous 
financial patronage, in art and politics, is made 
possible by a portfolio of lucrative investments, the 
total value of which has been estimated as £1.5 
billion.9 This substantial wealth has been built up 
through the buying and selling of property assets 
and commercial investments, principally in the UK, 
the US and Israel. But Poju Zabludowicz’s wealth 
has its origins in the business interests of his late 
father, Shlomo Zabludowicz – an arms dealer 
who made a fortune out of his close relations with 
the Israeli state, and some of the world’s most 
repressive regimes.
The following section describes the origins of 
this wealth and charts the changing geopolitical 
context in which it has been accumulated. While 
some of the events described here precede 
the establishment of BICOM by as much as 
half a century, they have powerfully shaped the 
present, and we hope that the broader view 
presented here will help the reader gain a better 
understanding of BICOM’s politics. 
The business of war 
Poju Zabludowicz’s father, Shlomo Zabludowicz, 
was born in Poland in 1915 to a rabbinic family. 
One of eight children, he was the only member 
of his family to survive the Nazi genocide. He 
met Poju’s mother, Pola, after the war at a 
rehabilitation camp in Sweden and they were 
married in Israel in 1948. Finding it difficult to 
integrate in the country however, they returned 
to Scandinavia shortly afterwards.10 They settled 
in Tampere, a city in the south of Finland where 
Shlomo Zabludowicz became affiliated with the 
Finnish company Tampella, a manufacturer based 
in the town.11 Though it is not clear whether he 
was ever officially in the employment of Tampella, 
he established a close, and lucrative, working 
relationship with the firm, positioning himself as 
a middleman between the company and Israel’s 
largest construction firm, Solel-Boneh.12
Like many other institutions in Israel during the 
state’s early years, Solel-Boneh was notionally 
socialist. It was affiliated to the Histadrut, the 
Israeli trade union umbrella group in some ways 
analogous to the Trade Union Congress in the 
UK, but distinct in that it had been a key part of 
the Zionist state-building project and thus was 
deeply embedded in the Israeli power structure.13 
Business, trade unions and the state were not 
easily distinguishable in Israel and the nationalist 
Histradrut simultaneously represented ‘big 
business’ and ‘big labour’,14 as well as enjoying 
close relations with politicians. In the 1950s, 
encouraged by the desire of Israel’s first Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion to develop a domestic 
arms industry, Solel-Boneh’s industrial arm moved 
into ‘defence’, looking to Europe for technical 
expertise.
Finland’s Tampella, which had begun 
manufacturing mortars for the Finnish Defence 
Forces in the 1930s, subsequently formed a 
joint venture with Solel-Boneh, licensed to sell 
Tampella weapons in Israel.15 Soltam Corporation, 
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as the joint venture was known, was based near 
the town of Haifa in northern Israel16 and was 
the country’s first private defence company.17 
Tampella’s relationship with Solel-Boneh, the 
industrial arm of which was spun-off as Koor 
Industries in 1958,18 appears to have been kept at 
arm’s length. Contracts were handled by a selling 
agent incorporated in Liechtenstein called Salgad, 
which in 1956 acquired a London subsidiary 
called Tamares Ltd.
The relationship between Tampella and Koor 
Industries lasted several decades. But in 
1973, a new managing director took over at 
Tampella and a year later the joint venture with 
Koor Industries was terminated. Soltam then 
became a partnership between Koor Industries 
and Shlomo Zabludowicz, but nevertheless 
continued to sell Tampella-type mortars. Shlomo 
Zabludowicz maintained his business relationship 
with Tampella until at least 1977, by which time, 
despite his initial lack of enthusiasm for the 
country, he was mainly based in Israel19 and had 
become an Israeli citizen.20
Shlomo Zabludowicz’s success is said to have 
been due to ‘a mix of determined lobbying 
and business acumen’.21 He had no capital or 
financial backing, but did have connections 
in Israel and no doubt sensed a business 
opportunity in a country where, as Jonathan 
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler note, ‘the spheres 
of government, business, military, culture and 
opinion-making’ were deeply ‘entangled’.22 
During the 1950s he developed a close 
relationship with the current President of Israel, 
Shimon Peres; a hawkish politician who as 
Defence Minister played a significant role in 
the development of the Israeli arms industry,23 
Peres was, according to the former diplomat 
and historian Shlomo Ben-Ami, ‘second to 
none in his talent for political manoeuvring 
and manipulation’.24 Shlomo Zabludowicz also 
appears to have developed close relations with 
other Israeli politicians over the years. In 1971 
the Swedish Broadcasting Company reported 
that the then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir 
had attended a meeting with three men at a 
hunting lodge in Sweden arranged by a Finnish 
representative of Soltam.25
Soltam’s early contracts included supplying 
artillery to the Israel Defence Forces, but the 
company soon sought to expand onto the 
international arms market.26 Thanks to his 
Finnish nationality and some adept lobbying, 
Shlomo Zabludowicz was able to exploit arms 
markets closed off to the Israeli state, so much 
so that Shimon Peres dubbed him ‘Columbus’ 
for his role in opening up new lands for Israeli 
investors.27 He won a contract supplying mortars 
to West Germany, causing a political scandal 
in Israel that led to the resignation of several 
members of Ben-Gurion’s Cabinet in 1959.28 
According to The Times whilst ‘the arms deals 
with Germany were Soltam’s bread and butter’, 
over the course of three decades Shlomo 
Zabludowicz sold arms to at least 26 different 
countries.29 In 1965, the year of the Second 
Kashmir War, Soltam won a contract to supply 
India, and though the country had no diplomatic 
relations with Israel, Shlomo Zabludowicz is said 
to have been close to its long serving Prime 
Minister, Indira Ghandi.30
The real boom years for Soltam were the 
1970s and early 1980s, when the Israeli arms 
industry expanded dramatically. As Israeli 
sociologists Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled 
note, the development of ‘Israel’s modern military 
industries was triggered by the imposition of 
the French [arms] embargo in June 1967, but 
their explosive expansion was a response to a 
growing global market for arms, with expanding 
profit margins’.31 According to Michael Shalev: 
The aftermath of the 1967 war fundamentally 
altered key elements of Israel’s political-
economic regime. Although senior politicians 
and bureaucrats developed a sudden fondness 
for laissez-faire rhetoric, and some elements of 
economic regulation did become less direct, 
there was no undermining of the state’s role as 
the central pivot of the economy. Instead, this 
pivot found a new axis in the ‘military-industrial 
complex.’ The basis for this development 
was a potent combination of government-
subsidized local military procurement, the 
burgeoning world market for arms, and (from 
1970) U.S. government financing of Israel’s 
foreign arms purchases.32
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In Singapore, where the IDF had provided secret 
assistance in the development of the country’s 
military, Shlomo Zabludowicz formed a close 
relationship with the Defence Minister Goh Keng 
Swee,33 supplying mortars to the country in 
1970 and 1976.34 Soltam also won contracts 
with Thailand in 1974 and 1988, and in 1983 
won a contract to supply mortars to the military 
regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines,35 
where Shlomo Zabludowicz reportedly developed 
relations with Fidel Ramos, later the country’s 
President.36 Zabludowicz is reported to have 
had good connections with the aristocracy in 
Indonesia and to have dealt arms to Malaysia.37 
Soltam also sold arms to Apartheid South Africa 
in 1976, the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile in 1983 
and the military governments in Ecuador (in 1974) 
and Honduras (in 1976).38
Shlomo Zabludowicz’s luck began to change 
in 1979 when the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
overthrew the Shah. A brutal dictator who had 
toppled the democratically elected Mossadeq 
government in a coup orchestrated by Britain 
and the US, the Shah’s regime was reportedly 
Soltam’s most important customer.39 Soltam 
was further hit by the decline in Israeli military 
spending following the peace treaty with Egypt 
that same year, which continued after the 1982 
Lebanon War.40
Seeking new markets for their weapons, Shlomo 
and Poju Zabludowicz (who by then had joined 
the family business) looked to the United States 
– the heart of the international arms industry, 
where a group of militaristic and fiercely pro-Israel 
intellectuals and political operators, known as the 
neoconservatives, were coming to the fore.
In 1980 the Zabludowiczes hired the American 
neoconservative Richard Perle as a lobbyist in 
an effort to win a Pentagon contract for Soltam. 
Perle, who later became a member of the George 
W. Bush administration, had worked as an 
influential Senate aide for many years and spent 
a short period as a private consultant in 1980 
before joining the Reagan administration. During 
this time he worked for Abington Corporation, 
a lobbying company established by John F. 
Lehman, later Reagan’s Secretary of the Navy. 
Perle was paid $50,000 by the Zabludowiczes to 
promote the sale of their mortars to the Defense 
Department, which then held a supply contract 
with the British Royal Ordnance Factories (later 
part of BAE Systems). 
In 1983 the New York Times revealed that Perle 
had pushed for the use of Soltam’s mortars, 
and that he had received funds from the 
Zabludowiczes after his appointment as Assistant 
Secretary for International Security Policy.41 
Responding to the accusations, Perle said that 
the Army’s mortar contract needed to be opened 
up to competition and stressed that he had 
ended his relationship with the Zabludowiczes 
before entering government, only later receiving 
payment.42
In 1985 the Zabludowiczes used their 
Washington lawyer, Daniel J. Spiegel, as 
a defence lobbyist, paying him a monthly 
retainer through their Cayman Islands vehicle 
Salgad International. They also developed a 
relationship with Reagan’s Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, Melvyn R. Paisley, a former official 
at Boeing, which, like the Zabludowiczes, 
had hired Abington Corporation as a lobbyist. 
In 1988 Paisley’s home was raided by the 
FBI, which suspected that he had helped the 
Zabludowiczes’ US subsidiary, Pocal Industries 
Inc., obtain defence contracts during his term 
in office.43 Paisley was later imprisoned after 
admitting receiving hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in bribes,44 though not in relation to the 
Zabludowiczes.
Despite the Zabludowiczes’ best efforts, 
Soltam did not succeed in winning a Pentagon 
contract until 1988, when, jointly with the US 
based Martin Marietta Corporation (later part of 
Lockheed Martin), it successfully bid for a US 
Army contract.45 This breakthrough followed 
Israel’s official designation in the US as a ‘major 
non-NATO ally’, allowing Israeli companies to bid 
for US military contracts on an equal footing with 
firms in the US and NATO countries – cementing 
the intimate political and military ties between 
the US and Israel that had developed after the 
1967 war.
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By the time of the Pentagon contract, however, 
Soltam had run into serious financial difficulties. 
In 1987 the company reportedly held an unsold 
inventory of over $80 million worth of weapons 
and had no finalised sale contracts. Drastic 
cut backs on staff in Israel resulted in the 
occupation of the factory by its workers and 
even the company’s senior management being 
held hostage for a period.46 Soltam’s decline 
continued into the early 1990s. Sales, which 
peaked at $139 million in 1985, by 1991 were 
expected to reach no more than $40 million, 
whilst staff had been cut by almost 75 per cent.47
Out of arms
Soltam’s downturn reflected a more general 
decline in the Israeli arms industry and the 
international arms market48 to which the 
company responded by moving into joint 
ventures with high-tech companies.49 The 
Zabludowiczes meanwhile diversified into 
property and household goods.50 In 1989 they 
split with their Soltam partner, Koor Industries, 
divesting their 26 per cent stake in exchange for 
control of the firm’s marketing agent Salgad.51
The Zabludowicz family’s wealth was henceforth 
managed by Poju Zabludowicz from London. 
A CV states that Poju led Tamares (as the 
family’s group of companies became known) 
from 1990.52 By this time, he had been based 
in London for years. In January 1978 he was 
appointed a director of Salgad’s London 
subsidiary, Tamares Ltd, and later that year 
he moved into a flat in St John’s Wood, north 
London.53 He met his British wife in London and 
they became engaged in 1988.54 A year later they 
purchased a mansion on The Bishops Avenue 
in Hampstead (dubbed ‘Billionaire’s Row’), later 
purchasing the adjacent mansion in 1997.
In February 1993 Poju set up a property 
company in London called Ivory Gate (UK) Ltd 
and a subsidiary called Clearacre Ltd. Using 
offshore vehicles, Ivory Gate made substantial 
investments in UK commercial property including 
in 1-6 Lombard Street in the City of London, 
Argyle House in Edinburgh and Princes House in 
London’s West End – where Poju Zabludowicz’s 
offices were at one time based. He later recalled: 
‘When we left the [arms] industry, it was natural 
to invest in real estate. It’s a business that you 
can access without having to buy yourself a large 
office and establish large operations.’55
On 8 August 1994, Poju’s father Shlomo died 
at his villa in Israel.56 Following a drawn-out 
family feud, his legacy, tied up in trust funds in 
Lichtenstein and Gibraltar, was divided between 
Poju and his sister Rivka.57
The Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre: Giving peace a chance? • 17
Chapter Two – Poju Zabludowicz and the business 
of peace
Poju Zabludowicz’s father made a fortune out of 
the business of war, but by the time of his death 
in 1994, Israel, and its relationship with the world 
economy, was undergoing a significant shift. 
As Markus Bouillon notes, in the 1990s Israel 
returned to growth and its economy moved away 
from arms and towards high technology:
The influx of 600,000 Russian immigrants 
between 1990 and 1994 heralded a new 
phase of economic expansion... The trend 
was fuelled not only by manpower, but also by 
an influx of foreign direct investment and trade 
deregulation, in addition to renewed efforts 
at privatization and capital market reform. On 
the basis of its military industry, Israel, which 
had the highest proportion of engineers in the 
population worldwide, became a major high-
tech producer.58
The business sector in Israel now 
increasingly saw its best interests as lying 
with the normalisation of the country and the 
internationalisation of its economy. It therefore 
supported the drawn-out ‘peace process’ of 
the 1990s, hoping to benefit from the ‘peace 
dividend’. A key objective for the business sector 
was the lifting of the Arab League’s boycott of 
Israeli companies and especially the so-called 
‘secondary boycott’, under which companies 
doing business with Israel or Israeli companies 
were barred from business with Arab countries 
and companies. Shafir and Peled note that:
Many Israeli business leaders realized that the 
Arab boycott was an obstacle on the road to 
integrating the Israeli economy into the world 
market; that while it was in effect all efforts in 
this direction would yield only limited results. 
Similarly, only the stability ensured by peace 
could bring foreign investment and foreign 
corporations into Israel in significant numbers.59
Similarly, Jan Selsby notes that:
The central problem facing the Israeli 
corporate sector during the early 1990s was 
that diplomatic isolation and the secondary 
Arab economic boycott posed profound 
obstacles to the country’s global penetration, 
making it more difficult for Israeli businesses 
to enter emerging markets in South and East 
Asia, or to attract investment from, and enter 
into, joint ventures with European and North 
American companies. Addressing this situation 
became a priority for Israeli business leaders, 
and the Oslo peace process was launched in 
part for this reason.60
This new drive for peace – albeit a superficial 
one that preserved Israel’s supremacy over 
the Palestinians – led to the signing of the 
‘Declaration of Principles’ in September 1993 
and the famous handshake on the White House 
lawn between the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat. Under the Oslo 
I Accord, as the ‘Declaration of Principles’ are 
also known, Israel recognised the PLO, which 
in turn agreed to end its armed struggle against 
Israel. A timetable was agreed under which 
the Palestinians would be afforded increasing 
autonomy in the Occupied Territories, whilst 
the most contentious issues of the conflict 
– including the illegal Israeli settlements, the 
status of Jerusalem and the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees – were postponed for 
further negotiations.
Poju Zabludowicz
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The accords were criticised by the far right in 
Israel and by many long-standing supporters 
of Palestinian self-determination. Edward Said, 
for example, dubbed it a ‘Palestinian Versailles’, 
arguing that the PLO had given up on Palestinian 
national rights in return for little more than 
‘recognition’ and would effectively become 
‘Israel’s enforcer’ in the territories.61 Nevertheless, 
as Nitzan and Bichler note, the Oslo process was 
enough to satisfy international investors:
For years, many transnational companies 
stayed away from the country, scared off by 
regional instability and the Arab Boycott. When 
the circumstances changed after the 1993 Oslo 
Accord, they discovered Israel was an empty 
spot on their maps, and rushed in with their 
troubleshooters to quickly fill the void. Entrants 
in this category included consumer-good giants 
Kimberly Clark, Nestlé, Unilever, and Procter & 
Gamble; food chains such as McDonald’s and 
Grand Metropolitan (Burger King); raw material 
investors like British Gas and Volkswagen; 
financial groups such as Generali, Lehman 
Brothers, Citigroup, Republic Bank, HSBC, 
Chase Manhattan and Bank of America; as well 
as many of the world’s communication giants... 
In addition to these ‘direct’ investments, many 
large companies and institutional investors 
began building up an Israeli ‘portfolio’, acquiring 
stocks and bonds on the open Tel Aviv and 
New York markets.62 
Politicians and businessmen in London quickly 
sensed an opportunity and in October 1993 the 
Conservative Government announced that it 
would host a conference in London to discuss 
the establishment of financial markets in the 
region.63 It was encouraged in such initiatives by 
the more liberal pro-Israel organisations in London 
who, following the lead of Israeli politicians and 
businesspeople, lobbied for closer business 
relations with Israel. The British Israel Chamber of 
Commerce and the Britain-Israel Parliamentary 
Group (BIPG) both campaigned for legislation 
outlawing the Arab boycott64 and though this 
was not forthcoming, the UK Government was 
nevertheless sympathetic, declaring the Arab 
boycott to be ‘totally incompatible with the peace 
process’.65 Prime Minister John Major persuaded 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and 
the United Arab Emirates to lift the boycott66 after 
receiving a letter from the BIPG urging him to 
do so, and his government urged businesses to 
invest in Israel.67 In 1995 Major visited Israel with 
a group of British business people68 and jointly 
with the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin 
established the Israel-Britain Business Council, 
which was backed by public funds and tasked 
with promoting business relations between the 
two countries. In 1996 the Foreign Office minister 
Jeremy Hanley told the House of Commons:
The boycott is withering on the vine; I hope 
that it will be lifted completely. After all, Britain 
is Israel’s third biggest trading partner ... we 
are actively encouraging business-men to 
ignore the boycott.69
During this period Poju Zabludowicz, still a 
little-known figure, became part of the ‘peace 
dividend’ lobby in London. In late 1994, he 
was appointed chairman of the BIPG’s newly 
formed ‘business advisory group’, a ‘lobbying 
forum’ established to promote commercial and 
technological links between Israel and the UK.70 
He also became a member of the advisory board 
of Major and Rabin’s Israel-Britain Business 
Council.71 Zabludowicz had also become friends 
with Gideon Meir,72 the number two at the 
Israeli Embassy in London, who later became 
deputy director-general of public affairs at Israel’s 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was Meir who in 
March 1994 introduced Tony Blair to his friend 
Michael Levy,73 later Blair’s chief fundraiser and 
his personal envoy to the Middle East.
Although it is not clear how much Poju 
Zabludowicz invested, either politically or 
financially, in the ‘peace process’, it appears that 
during the 1990s he became affiliated with other 
wealthy London-based businessmen for whom 
the prospect of peace brought with it significant 
business opportunities; and for whom it was 
convenient to believe that lucrative business 
relationships could form the bedrock of a lasting 
peace. Zabludowicz’s oldest political ally in Israel, 
Shimon Peres (who was the Israeli signatory to the 
1993 ‘Declaration of Principles’) exemplified this 
trend, as Israeli sociologist Uri Ram noted in 2000:
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Peres expresses the current perspective of 
the Israeli economic and political elite, the 
discourse of which is threaded with issues of 
globalisation, intimately interwoven with neo-
liberal messages of privatization, competition, 
efficiency, deregulation, flexibility and so 
forth.74
Decades earlier, when he first became 
acquainted with Poju Zabludowicz’s father, Peres 
had been of the view that permanent war with 
the Arabs was basically inevitable.75 Though his 
position changed significantly in the 1990s, as 
Shlomo Ben-Ami notes, Peres was no ‘dove’ 
and remained opposed to the creation of an 
independent Palestinian state.76
Peres, having succeeded Rabin as Prime 
Minister after the latter was assassinated, was 
unseated in June 1996 by Benjamin Netanyahu, 
a populist right-winger with powerful supporters 
in the United States. Markus Bouillon attributes 
Netanyahu’s electoral victory to the elitist 
nature of the business-driven peace process, 
which had entrenched inequality in Israel and 
alienated much of the population.77 Netanyahu 
combined anti-socialist, free market rhetoric with 
an outspoken opposition to the ‘peace process’. 
He had opposed Oslo from the start,78 describing 
Oslo II as a surrender agreement, and accusing 
Rabin of ‘causing national humiliation by accepting 
the dictates of the terrorist Arafat’.79 As Rosemary 
Hollis notes: ‘Netanyahu made it plain that he 
had no intention of facilitating the creation of a 
Palestinian state; would make no concessions on 
Jerusalem; and would bar the return of Palestinian 
refugees to the state of Israel.’80
In the split between the right-wing, populist 
faction of Israeli politics, exemplified by 
Netanyahu, and the more liberal faction 
represented by Peres, Poju Zabludowicz appears 
to have kept a foot in each camp. Though a long-
standing ally and financial supporter of Peres,81 
he is known to have funded the right-wing Likud 
Party in the 1980s82 and has been a friend of 
Benjamin Netanyahu’s since that time. Indeed 
Netanyahu holidayed at Zabludowicz’s villa in 
Caesarea during his term as Prime Minister in the 
mid to late 1990s.83 Ultimately Zabludowicz is a 
businessman and an opportunist, and describes 
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himself as such,84 and his interest in peace is 
perhaps less important than his relationship 
with powerful political actors in Israel, whatever 
their politics. Indeed Shimon Peres himself 
has suggested that ‘the business community 
benefits more from its relations with the [Israeli] 
government than from peace’.85 This is no 
doubt true whether one holds interests in the 
arms industry, or in high technology, and as we 
shall see, Zabludowicz, despite having long ago 
divested from the former, still holds significant 
interests in Israel and has maintained close 
relations with current and former state officials.
Poju Zabludowicz’s wealth today
Zabludowicz’s assets are collectively referred 
to as the Tamares Group, comprising dozens 
of companies registered in Cyprus, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, the UK and the US. At its core are 
family trusts established in Vaduz, Liechtenstein 
– including the Zabludowicz Trust, the Poju 
Zabludowicz Trust and the Poju Zabludowicz 
Settlement – as well as several holding 
companies incorporated in Gibraltar – including 
Tamares Capital Corporation Ltd, Tamares Hotels 
Ltd, Tamares (Israel) Ltd, Tamares Media Ltd 
and Tamares Real Estate Holdings Ltd. In recent 
years the Tamares Group has bought and sold 
substantial assets in commercial property, high 
technology, media and telecommunications. Its 
property portfolio includes office buildings in New 
York and Washington, several hotels and casinos 
in Las Vegas and a number of hotels in Israel.86 
It has purchased stakes in several companies 
where Zabludowicz has been subsequently 
appointed a director; including the Asia Pacific 
private equity fund GEMS87 and the Finnish 
venture capital firm Stratos Ventures.88
Zabludowicz’s interests then are genuinely 
transnational, but despite the fact that he is not 
an Israeli citizen, the country still appears to be his 
most important area of operations. Since 2006 his 
Israel operations have been overseen by Yodfat 
Harel Buchris (née Gross), Tamares Capital’s 
managing director who formerly worked at the 
Israeli technology company Orbotech Ventures.89 
She was preceded as managing director by 
Pinchas Buchris, a retired Israeli Brigadier General 
who headed the IDF’s Unit 8200 (also called the 
Central Unit of Technology Intelligence)90 between 
1997 and 2001. Pinchas Buchris joined Tamares 
in 2002 when he also became a ‘venture partner’ 
at the private equity firm Apax Partners,91 an 
international venture capital firm which opened 
an office in Israel in 1994 and has invested $2.25 
billion in the country.92 Buchris left Tamares in 
2007 when he was appointed Director-General of 
the Israeli Defense Ministry by the then Defence 
Minister Amir Peretz.93 This revolving door, 
whereby individuals traverse multiple public and 
private roles, is familiar in the UK and the US and 
is an indication of closely intermeshed networks 
operating between business and the state.
Zabludowicz has completed a number of 
lucrative deals in Israel with other wealthy 
investors. In 2005, for example, he purchased 
shares in Knafaim Holdings Ltd, giving him a 7.9 
per cent stake in the Israeli airline El Al.94 This 
made him a business partner of (and occasional 
rival with) the Borovich family, which had 
acquired a controlling stake in the airline after its 
privatisation.95 Zabludowicz’s stake in Knafaim 
Holdings also made him a shareholder in Kanfei 
Tahzuka Limited Partnership, a company that 
maintains aeroplanes for the Israel Air Force.96
Another major deal came in December 2008 
when Zabludowicz agreed a merger with the 
British property tycoon Leo Noe, combining 
Tamares Real Estate (Israel) Ltd – the owner 
of two high-tech parks in the Haifa area – with 
Leo Noe’s listed holding company, British 
Israel Investments – the owner of a number of 
shopping centres in Israel.97 As Channel 4’s 
Dispatches programme pointed out in 2009, 
this deal made Zabludowicz an investor in a 
shopping centre in the illegal Israeli settlement 
of Ma’ale Adumim.98 Zabludowicz responded 
to this disclosure by stating that he had no 
ideological commitment to Israeli settlements in 
the Occupied Territories,99 and has since divested 
his interests in British Israel Investments, which 
was acquired by Ofer Investments.100
In the UK, Zabludowicz has in recent years been 
increasingly involved in the hedge fund industry. 
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In 2006 he established the London-based hedge 
fund advisory firm Auctor Capital Partners, a 
UK subsidiary of the Gibraltar company Auctor 
Holdings Ltd. Auctor’s head is Amir Shariat, a 
London-based Austrian investment banker and 
art collector. He is reportedly good friends with 
Zabludowicz and his wife, and with fellow art 
collectors Fatima and Eskander Maleki.101 In 
2007, Tamares launched the private equity fund 
Synova Capital with former Tamares adviser and 
BICOM donor David Menton as its co-director 
and Zabludowicz as its chairman. The Fund is 
a client of Auctor Capital Partners, where David 
Menton has also served as a director, and like 
Auctor it operates out of Tamares’s London office. 
It has an advisory board, members of which have 
included Anthony Alt, who heads investment 
banking at N.M. Rothschild, Peter Weinberg 
of Perella Weinberg Partners and BICOM’s 
former deputy chairman Michael Lewis. Michael 
Lewis’s offshore investment fund, the Oceana 
Concentrated Opportunities Fund, committed 
£5.9 million to Synova Capital102 and Albany 
Homes Development Ltd, where David Menton’s 
wife previously worked, is also an investor.103 
Other partners include Anthony Alt, BICOM vice 
chair and hedge fund owner Edward Misrahi, the 
aforementioned art collector Eskander Maleki, the 
Swiss private bank ING Bank (Suisse) SA and the 
Luxembourg based investment company RCG 
International Opportunities Sarl.104
In conclusion, whilst his father made his millions 
through the state-led internationalisation of the 
Israeli arms industry, Poju Zabludowicz himself 
made billions from the state-led property booms, 
privatisations, mergers and tech-bubbles of the 
neoliberal period. His wealth grew significantly 
and was largely divested from industries with 
a direct interest in military conflict – even being 
partially redirected to areas vulnerable to political 
violence (notably tourism and aviation). These 
assets are tied up in opaque offshore trusts and 
hedge funds, managed by close associates 
from his base in London – long a home of the 
international super-rich. Poju Zabludowicz’s 
interests, like his father’s, are transnational in 
character, yet closely tied to the Israeli corporate-
state nexus.
How might these interests relate to the Israel-
Palestine conflict, with which BICOM is so 
preoccupied? As we have seen, Zabludowicz 
was affiliated to what we have called the ‘peace 
dividend lobby’ in the 1990s. It would appear 
that this basic orientation has continued to the 
present. In March 2011, he hosted secret talks 
between Shimon Peres and the Palestinian leader 
Mahmoud Abbas at his North London home.105 
The meeting was one of several reportedly 
arranged by the venture capitalist Sir Ronald 
Cohen, the UK’s leading exponent of Peres-
style neoliberalisation through peace.106 Though 
the meeting was said to have the support of 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the 
Israeli daily Haaretz reported in January 2012 
that subsequent talks, though encouraged by 
the Foreign Office and 10 Downing Street, had 
been cancelled under pressure from the Israeli 
Government.107 This incident might suggest that 
Zabludowicz is at odds with the rejectionist wing 
of the Israel elite. In fact, as discussed above, he 
is a friend and admirer of Benjamin Netanyahu, 
who, after the final collapse of the Oslo process 
in 2000, was able to gain the support of big 
business in Israel by combining unpopular 
neoliberal policies with an aggressive foreign 
policy stance.108 He identifies Netanyahu’s term 
as Finance Minister (2003-2005) as a key turning 
point for Israel and compares him favourably to 
Thatcher and Reagan.109
Zabludowicz’s connections with the ‘hawkish’ 
rejectionist factions of the Israeli state, however, 
appear to be born more out of economic 
expediency than any commitment to ‘Greater 
Israel’ (as noted above Zabludowicz denies any 
ideological commitment to settlement building). 
It would appear therefore that his interests lie 
with protecting his relationships with key political 
actors in Israel and protecting Israel’s reputation 
amongst the international elite. This suggests that 
BICOM is both an opportunity for Zabludowicz 
and his allies to maintain close ties to the Israeli 
state and at the same time to retain the benefits 
of a ‘peace process’ in absence of any genuine 
Israeli commitment to peace. This is further 
explored in the next chapter, in which we detail 
the emergence of BICOM in 2000 and 2001.
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Chapter Three – The second intifada and the 
establishment of BICOM
As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
protagonists in the Israel-Palestine conflict 
entered into a protracted negotiation process 
during the 1990s which was supposed to lead 
to a ‘final status agreement’, bringing an end 
to Israel’s occupation of land captured in the 
1967 war and establishing an independent 
Palestinian state.
The business sector in Israel was key in 
pushing for these negotiations which, from their 
perspective, were a success – they reduced 
the political stigma attached to Israel and 
facilitated its opening up to international finance 
and multinational corporations. This economic 
internationalisation was highly lucrative for 
wealthy businesspeople in Israel and international 
financial centres like London, though it offered 
only meagre benefits to the broader Israeli 
public, not to mention the Palestinians, whose 
conditions significantly deteriorated.110
In the United Kingdom, the Conservative 
Government led by John Major was naturally 
sympathetic to the neoliberal ethos that 
underpinned the ‘peace process’. It ended the 
arms embargo on Israel imposed by the Thatcher 
Government in 1982, and worked to end the 
Arab boycott (encouraged in both initiatives 
by business orientated pro-Israel groups in 
the UK). Economic relations with Israel were 
stepped up, with imports and exports more than 
doubling during the decade,111 and a relationship 
‘blossomed’ between the UK and Israeli arms 
industries.112
Though there were still those in the UK Jewish 
community (and beyond, such as some Christian 
Zionists113) who opposed reconciliation with 
the Palestinians, the great majority supported 
the Oslo process and the ‘land for peace’ 
formula.114 Crucially the supporters of the ‘peace 
process’ included many wealthy members of the 
community,115 who had longstanding financial 
relations with the State of Israel (as donors to the 
Joint Israel Appeal or Jewish National Fund for 
example) and who in practice held more sway 
given the support they provided for communal 
organisations.
Peace and the decline of the lobby
With Israeli and British elites having developed 
closer diplomatic, military and economic ties, and 
with media coverage of the Middle East largely 
favourable to Israel, organisations working to 
secure support for the country in the UK were 
increasingly considered redundant. In 1999, 
the forerunner to BICOM, the British-Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (BIPAC), was closed. 
Explaining the closure, the Institute for Jewish 
Policy Research (JPR) noted that ‘extremely few 
respondents [to its Jewish community survey] 
felt that British Jewry should regularly make 
representations to the British government on 
Israel’s behalf,’ preferring that the Israeli Embassy 
in London perform this role.116
Helen Davis, a former editor of Israel Scene, the 
magazine of the World Zionist Organization, had 
headed BIPAC for a decade.117 Under Davis’s 
leadership, the lobby group had assumed a 
hard-line position, at odds with its major financial 
backers. In January 1996, it co-sponsored 
with Conservative Friends of Israel a speech at 
the prestigious think tank Chatham House by 
Ariel Sharon, a critic of the peace process,118 
and in 1997 it sponsored a meeting in London 
addressed by then Netanyahu adviser David 
Bar-Illan. At that meeting Bar-Illan made his 
government’s position on Palestinian self-
determination clear: ‘We’re talking about a 
demilitarised “X”, call it a state or a fried chicken. 
It doesn’t make a difference. The point is we are 
talking about an entity that does not have all the 
authority and the powers of a state.’119
It was at around this time that BIPAC lost the 
support of two key institutional donors and ran 
into financial difficulties. Helen Davis later claimed 
The Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre: Giving peace a chance? • 23
that it had lost support because of its opposition 
to the Oslo process:
Whenever BIPAC raised the subject of 
Palestinian violence, noncompliance, media 
incitement, textbook anti-Semitism, I could 
expect muttered criticism from Britain’s 
communal leaders (and BIPAC’s funders). 
In the name of peace, we were obliged, 
like them, to see no evil and hear no evil. 
Eventually, starved of funds, BIPAC was 
quietly closed down at the end of 1999, 
destroying two decades of sustained, 
effective lobbying.120
This suggests that the wealthy businessmen who 
supported London’s pro-Israel groups were at 
this stage largely aligned with the Peres ‘peace 
process’ faction, rather than the Israeli right. 
Nevertheless, there were a number of influential 
figures in the UK Jewish community with 
business interests in Israel who were opposed to 
the closure of BIPAC. Following the publication of 
its influential ‘Community of Communities’ report 
in March 2000 (which examined how the interests 
of the Jewish community were represented), the 
JPR held two seminars to discuss the report’s 
proposals. One of the seminars concerned 
the report’s recommendation to create an 
‘independent mass media and resource office’ to 
operate as an impartial ‘clearing house’ directing 
journalists to individuals and organisations with 
different views within the UK Jewish community. 
Although the recommendation made no mention 
of Israel – indeed Israel had not featured 
particularly prominently in the ‘Community of 
Communities’ report – the seminar discussing 
it focused on ‘the image of Israel’. According to 
the JPR, concerns had been raised ‘especially 
by those from the business sector’ about the 
‘perceived public relations void’ arising from the 
closure of BIPAC.121
The ‘image of Israel’ seminar was hosted by the 
British-Israel Chamber of Commerce. Its twelve 
members included Tony Warwick, the director 
of the Britain-Israel Industrial R&D Foundation 
(Britech) – a multimillion pound high-tech 
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Figure 1. Poju Zabludowicz’s major investments by region and business sector
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research and development fund backed by the 
British and Israeli Governments – and the late 
David Lewis, a pioneer of the tourism industry 
in Israel who headed the Isrotel hotel chain in 
the country and was a long time supporter of 
Conservative Friends of Israel.122 Tony Warwick 
said he thought ‘the greatest obstacle to ongoing 
investment in Israel is the perception that, at 
best, Israel, is not a safe place to do business, 
and at worst, that it is a war zone’.123 According 
to the JPR, a majority of the seminar participants 
‘voiced a need for an effective UK-based 
PR campaign for Israel that could serve the 
philanthropic, political, information and business 
sectors’.124
As Warwick’s comments suggest, the ‘peace 
process’, lucrative as it was, had produced 
not a stable peace but sporadic violence and 
simmering discontent. This was partly because 
it had delivered very little for the Palestinians. 
Indeed the whole notion of a ‘peace process’, 
as Jan Selsby notes, had allowed Israeli 
elites ‘to have their cake and eat it’, allowing 
them to ‘claim a commitment to the process 
of peacemaking, and reap great benefits in 
return, without necessarily having to make any 
substantive sacrifices’. ‘Israel,’ Selsby argues, 
‘managed to transform itself into a dynamic 
high-tech globalised economy, without having 
to make any final status compromises with the 
Palestinians’.125 Similarly, Bouillon states that the 
tentative peace ‘necessarily turned lukewarm, if 
not cool, since it remained a peace of the elites, 
which pocketed the benefits even as inequality, 
poverty, and unemployment rose’.126
The second intifada
Though the Palestinian Authority had obtained a 
degree of autonomy over parts of the occupied 
territories, the Oslo process did not bring an 
end to Israel’s occupation or to the construction 
of illegal settlements on occupied land. The 
Netanyahu government had demolished 
Palestinian houses in East Jerusalem and 
approved plans for new settlements in the area 
around the city. Netanyahu’s successor, Ehud 
Barak, also authorised the construction of new 
settlements and, like Netanyahu, delayed the 
scheduled redeployment of Israeli occupation 
forces. Under the Oslo Accords Israel had 
pledged to withdraw from 90 per cent of the 
occupied territories by the beginning of 2000, but 
by that time they had in fact withdrawn from only 
18 per cent.127 During the same period not one 
Israeli settlement was removed and the settler 
population doubled.128 The ‘final status’ talks 
held at Camp David in July 2000 ended with no 
agreement between Barak and Arafat, each side 
blaming the other for the failure. Political scientist 
Jeremy Pressman writes:
Palestinian discontent grew during the Oslo 
peace process because the reality on the 
ground did not match the expectations 
created by the peace agreements. From 
1993-2000, many aspects of the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
deepened rather than abated. Palestinians 
expected their lives to improve in terms of 
freedom of movement and socioeconomic 
standing; when both worsened, significant 
resentment built up in Palestinian society. 
This discontent, further fed by the failure of 
the Camp David summit in July 2000, laid the 
groundwork for popular support for a more 
confrontational approach with Israel.129
Palestinian frustration erupted into protests and 
rioting when in late September 2000 the right-
wing Israeli politician Ariel Sharon, accompanied 
by a thousand Israeli armed police, made a 
provocative visit to the Temple Mount in the Old 
Town of Jerusalem. The protests and rioting 
subsequently grew into the Second or Al-Aqsa 
Intifada. 
From the beginning of the second intifada, 
Palestinian demonstrations – most of which 
were non-violent – were met with excessive 
and lethal force by Israel,130 whose reaction to 
the uprising has been characterised as one of 
‘brutal repression’.131 By early 2002 Israel was 
implementing ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, 
which included a siege of Jenin refugee camp 
and involved, according to Norman Finkelstein 
‘massive indiscriminate destruction’.132 Human 
rights organisations record that ambulances 
and medical personnel were targeted by the 
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Israeli army and that Palestinian civilians were 
used as human shields.133 Beatings, abuse and 
torture134 were also extensively documented, as 
were forced evictions and house demolitions, 
practiced in particular in the Gaza Strip, which 
constituted violations of international law135 and in 
some cases war crimes.136 A number of suicide 
bombings were also perpetrated by Palestinian 
militants. These included the 1 June 2001 attack 
at a discotheque in Tel Aviv which killed 21 Israeli 
teenagers137 and the Sbarro pizzeria bombing 
of 9 August 2001 which killed fifteen civilians 
including at least six children and injured more 
than 100.138
The ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed in the 
early weeks of the violence has been put at 20:1, 
and the total numbers killed at 2,316 Palestinians 
and 827 Israelis, an overall ratio of approximately 
3:1.139 In the Occupied Territories, the intifada 
exacerbated the humanitarian situation of millions 
of Palestinians, increasing unemployment and 
poverty and decreasing food consumption.140 
Human rights groups also accused Israel of 
having an assassination ‘policy’.141 
From the beginning of the intifada, shocking 
images from both sides were broadcast around 
the world, including the death of a Palestinian 
boy called Muhammad al-Dura142 and footage 
of two Israeli army reservists being beaten and 
lynched by a group of Palestinians.143 It was not 
until early 2005 that the high intensity violence 
subsided. Taking stock, human rights groups 
concluded that the vast majority of Palestinians 
killed had been unarmed civilians.144 Most 
saliently for our purposes, the intifada had also 
been a ‘public relations disaster’ for Israel.145 
Establishing BICOM
This is the immediate context in which BICOM 
was established; as a permanent organisation 
it grew out of a broader PR offensive by the 
Israeli state and pro-Israel groups. In Israel, the 
media operation was coordinated by four senior 
officials, among them Zabludowicz’s friend 
Gideon Meir, recently appointed Deputy Head of 
Media and Public Affairs at the foreign ministry.146 
The Israeli foreign ministry also provided 
the impetus for the PR response in the UK. 
According to a report in the Jewish Chronicle, 
the day after the intifada began the then Israeli 
Ambassador to the UK, Dror Zeigerman, 
summoned ‘some 50 leading Jews’ and asked 
them to donate to a pro-Israel lobbying and 
public relations initiative. The businessmen 
reportedly raised approximately £250,000 and 
Poju Zabludowicz was the first major donor to 
pledge support.147 This fundraising meeting led 
to the establishment of the Cross Community 
Emergency Co-ordinating Group, an ad hoc 
organisation jointly chaired by Jo Wagerman, 
then President of the Board of Deputies of British 
Jews, and Brian Kerner, then President of the 
United Jewish Israel Appeal.148 The Group also 
included representatives of the Israeli Embassy,149 
the Jewish Agency for Israel and other major 
Zionist organisations in the UK.150
According to the American Jewish Committee, 
the Emergency Co-ordinating Group ‘plan[ned] 
solidarity missions to Israel,… prepare[d] 
briefings for the community and its institutions’ 
and ‘counter[ed] slanted media coverage’.151 In 
December 2000, it jointly funded a two-day trip to 
Israel by British journalists, led by the Chief Rabbi 
Jonathan Sacks.152 According to its co-chair 
Brian Kerner, the purpose of the trip – which he 
described as ‘an overwhelming success’ – was 
to ‘open [British journalists’] eyes to the actual 
facts on the ground’.153 The group also set up 
what was called a ‘British Israel Communications 
Office’, staffed by public relations and media 
professionals, as well as volunteers, which 
included a ‘rebuttal desk’ to correct perceived 
errors in media reporting.154 One public relations 
professionals who joined the Group told PR 
Week: ‘We have developed a war room to ensure 
correct information and solidarity with Israel is 
maintained.’155
Brian Kerner
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An indication of the political perspective of this 
group is provided by Brian Kerner who several 
months after its establishment told the Guardian:
My own opinion has changed totally. I have 
gone from being leftwing to supporting a 
rightwing government. [Ehud] Barak offered 
everything and got a kick in the head for 
doing so. By offering so much, it encouraged 
violence. The Palestinians respond to strength 
rather than anything perceived as weakness. 
… [Ariel Sharon] has not put a foot wrong so 
far. There has been restraint. I find it odd that I 
am now supporting a man a few months ago I 
would not have considered.156
Kerner’s claim that the Israeli state responded 
with ‘restraint’ to the protests and rioting of 
September 2000 is not credible. Indeed, Shlomo 
Ben-Ami, Israel’s Minister of Public Security 
during the second intifada, has written that it 
was ‘Israel’s disproportionate response to what 
had started as a popular uprising with young 
unarmed men confronting Israeli soldiers armed 
with lethal weapons [that] fuelled the intifada 
beyond control and turned it into an all-out 
war’.157 Jeremy Pressman writes:
Israel responded to the initial protests with a 
heavy hand, incorrectly believing that such an 
approach would calm the situation. The IDF, 
as had been planned, made extensive use of 
snipers, even in the absence of Palestinian 
gunfire. Sniper squads were reinforced 
following the 1996 riots, and in 2000 they 
played ‘a central role in the fighting’. According 
to the IDF, Israeli forces fired one million rounds 
in the first three weeks of the intifada, ‘a 
bullet for every child’ according to one Israeli 
officer. In the first five days of fighting, Israeli 
forces killed 50 Palestinians and wounded 
more than 1,000. Palestinian doctors said 
the nature of the injuries suggested an Israeli 
shoot-to-kill policy. Most injuries were to the 
upper body (head, chest, abdomen), and only 
20 percent of those injured in the first three 
days were discharged on that day. Israel’s 
disproportionate use of force was quickly 
noted by human rights organizations...158
Sociologist Keith Kahn Harris, co-author of 
Turbulent Times: The British Jewish Community 
Today, notes that this was a key turning point in 
attitudes to Israel amongst British Jews:
Since the second intifada in 2000, traditional 
UK Jewish support for Israel had become 
increasingly difficult to maintain as more and 
more Jews saw Israeli intransigence as a 
contributing factor in the failure of Oslo. While 
at first such ‘dissidence’ from communal 
support for Israel was largely confined to the 
left … and groups that were, often unfairly, 
dismissed as comprising secular, uninvolved, 
marginal Jews – as the 2000s wore on, the 
consensus at the heart of the community also 
came under strain.159
Though many liberals and leftists in the 
UK Jewish community grew increasingly 
uncomfortable with the escalating violence 
and rightward shift of Israeli politics, communal 
leaders sought to mobilise British Jews behind 
Israel. Antony Lerman, former Director of the 
Institute for Jewish Policy Research, writes that: 
‘Since the second intifada started, the pro-Israel 
leaderships in Jewish communities urged Jews 
to close ranks and express complete solidarity 
with Israel. They tried to marginalise dissent, 
increasingly fostering a “for us or against us” 
mentality.’160
BICOM has been part of this struggle to maintain 
support for Israel. As a permanent organisation, 
it emerged out of the Emergency Co-ordinating 
Group’s ‘British Israel Communications Office’, 
which had used the acronym ‘BICOM’ for several 
months before the organisation was formally 
created.161 Mick Davis, chair of the United Jewish 
Israel Appeal, later recalled: ‘Poju had a vision of 
a new era in Israel advocacy for the UK. He took 
the fledgling crisis room created in response to 
the outbreak of the second intifada and turned 
it into the renowned and respected organisation 
that BICOM is today.’162
During its first few months of campaigning, the 
leadership of the Emergency Co-ordinating 
Group held a number of meetings to discuss the 
possibility of putting the Group on a permanent 
footing. These meetings, which included the 
Emergency Co-ordinating Group chairs, Jo 
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Wagerman and Brian Kerner, were also attended 
by the lobbyist Jonathan Mendelsohn – a onetime 
chairman of Labour Friends of Israel who later 
became Gordon Brown’s chief fundraiser.163 In 
December 2000 the idea of creating ‘a full-time 
corps of [PR] professionals’ was reported to have 
the support of the Israel Embassy in London and 
the ‘highest level’ of the Israeli foreign ministry, 
as well as the Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks. The 
Jewish Chronicle suggested that the organisation 
would need to be ‘far bigger’ than its forerunner 
BIPAC and that it would require ‘up to £400,000’ 
of funding for its launch.164
BICOM was formally established in April 2001. 
Its website was registered that month and it was 
incorporated as a company limited by guarantee 
(that is without shareholders) under the name 
Britain Israel Communications & Research 
Centre Ltd. The signatories to its incorporation 
documents were Poju Zabludowicz, Philip 
Rubenstein (a marketing consultant who at that 
time worked at the accountancy firm BDO165), 
David Green (a businessman who became the 
organisation’s treasurer) and the joint chairs of the 
Emergency Co-ordinating Group, Jo Wagerman 
and Brian Kerner. That year it recruited five 
paid members of staff, with an average salary 
of around £24,000166 and moved into offices at 
15 Cavendish Square.167 In December 2001 the 
organisation was inaugurated at a ceremony at its 
offices attended by Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks.168
28 •  Public Interest Investigations
Chapter Four – BICOM and British Zionism
BICOM does not operate in isolation. Since its 
establishment it has worked closely with other 
organisations and institutions, and more broadly 
has drawn on and contributed to, the ideas and 
strategies produced by other elements of the 
pro-Israel lobby. Understanding what BICOM is 
and does therefore requires some knowledge of 
this broader context. In this chapter we look at 
BICOM’s most significant partner organisations 
and its broader political networks to show how 
BICOM ‘fits’ into this wider movement. We 
also point to certain tensions and divisions that 
illustrate that the ‘Israel lobby’, though capable 
of cohering around certain key objectives, is not 
monolithic.
Key partner organisations
As we saw in the previous chapter, BICOM 
emerged from the Cross Community 
Emergency Co-ordinating Group, a joint 
project that incorporated several pro-Israel 
groups as well as Israeli state, and quasi-state, 
institutions. The Emergency Co-ordinating 
Group was jointly chaired by the heads of 
two organisations: the United Jewish Israel 
Appeal and the Board of Deputies of British 
Jews. The latter is the official representative 
body of Britain’s Jewish community and 
has collaborated with BICOM on pro-Israel 
campaigns. The former is the UK’s leading 
Zionist fundraising body and though not active 
in terms of political campaigning or lobbying, is 
nevertheless a central institution in UK Zionism. 
Together with a third organisation, the Jewish 
Leadership Council, they are some of BICOM’s 
key partner organisations.
The United Jewish Israel Appeal
The United Jewish Israel Appeal (UJIA) is 
currently chaired by Bill Benjamin, an American 
property investor, who heads the international 
real estate fund manager, AREA Property Partner. 
UJIA had an income of around £12.5 million in 
2010/11 (less than half its income in 2007/8) 
which was used to support educational and 
charitable projects in Israel, with a focus on the 
north of the country, as well as programmes 
encouraging young Jewish people in Britain to 
identify with Israel. It was formed in 1997 when 
its forerunner, the Joint Israel Appeal, merged 
with Jewish Continuity, an educational charity 
founded three years earlier by Chief Rabbi 
Jonathan Sacks.169
UJIA’s roots date back over 60 years to before 
the establishment of the State of Israel. It has its 
origins in a fundraising body called the United 
Palestine Appeal (UPA), which was founded 
in 1944 under the leadership of Simon Marks, 
the son of Marks & Spencer founder Michael 
Marks. The UPA was superseded by the Joint 
Palestine Appeal campaign in 1947,170 which 
was eventually renamed the Joint Israel Appeal 
in 1973.171 By that time, the Joint Israel Appeal 
was headed by Simon Marks’s nephew, Michael 
Sacher. Under Sacher’s leadership it ‘established 
itself as the pre-eminent and most powerful single 
organization in the [UK Jewish] community’.172 It 
was on his initiative that the forerunner to BICOM, 
the British-Israel Public Affairs Committee (BIPAC) 
was established in 1976,173 supported by funds 
from the Joint Israel Appeal.174
Though the merger with Jewish Continuity in 
1997 meant that the UJIA adopted a broader 
remit, it has retained its strong focus on Israel. 
In 1999, the Commission on Representation of 
the Interests of the British Jewish Community 
noted that: ‘organizations clustered around’ 
the UJIA ‘have effectively constituted a 
pro-Israel lobby and have mobilized for this 
purpose’.175 In 2011 the UJIA completed an 
internal review, which recommended a ‘greater 
focus on the place of Israel in the formation 
of Jewish identity in young people in the UK’. 
Its ‘flagship’ programme in this area is the 
‘Israel Experience’ under which young people 
visit Israel on summer tours and school trips 
organised through the Jewish Agency for Israel, 
the main Israeli body responsible for integrating 
Jewish immigrants into Israel.176
The Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre: Giving peace a chance? • 29
There has been considerable crossover between 
BICOM and the UJIA at the level of funding and 
leadership. According to a report in the Jewish 
Chronicle, BICOM’s original backers included 
some of the leading supporters of the United 
Jewish Israel Appeal (UJIA).177 Zabludowicz has 
been affiliated with the UJIA since the 1990s and 
is currently a member of its advisory board.178 
In 1999, less than a year before providing the 
start-up funds for BICOM, he chaired a UJIA 
fundraising dinner, attended by the then Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Barak, which raised a record 
£3.8 million.179 Zabludowicz also hosted the 
UJIA’s 2009 fundraising dinner, which reportedly 
raised £3.7 million.180 BICOM’s former deputy 
chairman, Michael Lewis, has also been a major 
donor to the UJIA and was one of its directors 
at the time that BICOM was founded. Brian 
Kerner, who, as previously mentioned, headed 
the UJIA at the time BICOM was set up, remains 
a President of the UJIA and a vice-chairman 
of BICOM.181 Other influential figures holding 
positions in both organisations include the 
veteran British Zionists Gerald Ronson, Lord 
Janner and Trevor Chinn.182
Though the UJIA’s work is over whelmingly 
cultural and educational, it has mobilised behind 
Israel during controversial armed conflicts in 
recent years. In 2006, during Israel’s attack on 
south Lebanon, it launched a ‘solidarity appeal’ 
to raise funds for Israel and its then chairman, 
Mick Davis, embarked on a ‘One-Man Solidarity 
Mission’ to the country.183 
Board of Deputies of British Jews
Most controversial in this regard, however, has 
been the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the 
official representative body of UK Jewry and the 
other major communal organisation that oversaw 
the Emergency Co-ordinating Group. During 
the 2006 Lebanon War, the Board organised a 
‘solidarity rally’ during which the then chairman 
of  the UJIA was one of the speakers.184 The 
rally used the slogan ‘Yes to Peace, No to 
Terror’ (the same slogan used at a similar rally 
in 2002).185 The growing perception that the 
Board of Deputies was taking a partisan position 
on the Israel-Palestine conflict, and that critical 
perspectives within the Jewish community were 
not being heard, prompted a number of British 
Jews to establish Independent Jewish Voices in 
February 2007.
The Board of Deputies, sometimes described as 
the ‘parliament’ of British Jews, brings together 
around 265 representatives, known as Deputies, 
who are appointed mainly by synagogues, but 
also by other Jewish organisations such as youth 
groups and charities. The Deputies in turn elect 
its officers, who effectively run the Board and 
meet to discuss Board policies.
The Board of Deputies, which dates back to the 
18th Century, has been criticised by some British 
Jews for failing to represent members of the 
community who are not affiliated to synagogues, 
as well as for adopting an uncritical stance 
on Israel.186 The Board has not always been 
supportive of Zionism however, and it was not 
until 1944 that it officially endorsed the call for a 
Jewish state.187 In the early 20th century, Zionists 
were still a small minority in the UK Jewish 
community, whose most influential members 
tended to dominate the Board of Deputies and 
were strongly opposed to the idea of a Jewish 
state. This changed in the period leading up to 
the Second World War, when, as the Institute for 
Jewish Policy Research notes, ‘the organized 
Zionists, who were increasing in number, began 
a kind of long march through the Anglo-Jewish 
institutions, finally capturing the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews in 1939’.188 Today one 
of the constitutional purposes of the Board of 
Sir Trevor Chinn
Lord Janner
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Deputies is ‘to advance Israel’s security, welfare 
and standing’.189 As the Board notes, much of its 
work ‘underpins Jewish life in ways that may not 
be immediately obvious or apparent’, including 
education, fighting extremism and anti-Semitism, 
preserving Jewish cemeteries, Holocaust era 
issues, interfaith relations, international issues, 
research, safeguarding Jewish life and social 
action.190
However, defending Israel does have a key place 
in its work. During Israel’s bloody assault on Gaza 
in the winter of 2008/9, it held a rally in Trafalgar 
Square, central London, using the slogan, ‘End 
Hamas Terror!’. This event was organised jointly 
with the Jewish Leadership Council (JLC), a 
communal umbrella group which exists in parallel 
to, and occasionally in competition with, the 
Board of Deputies. The JLC is probably BICOM’s 
most important partner organisation. In 2013 it 
is headed by former UJIA chairman Mick Davis, 
a London-based South African multi-millionaire 
who heads the mining company Xstrata.
The Jewish Leadership Council
The Board of Deputies dates back to the 18th 
Century and can be regarded as a rather 
archaic institution.191 For this reason, the Jewish 
Chronicle notes, ‘the main bankrollers and 
power-brokers in the Jewish community’ have 
tended to remain ‘aloof from what they saw as 
its cumbersome bureaucracy’.192 In 2003 the 
Board of Deputies appointed a new President, 
Henry Grunwald, who was frustrated that even 
though a number of wealthy Jewish businessmen 
were close to the Prime Minister Tony Blair, he 
had not met with any official representatives of 
the community since taking office in 1997.193 
In an effort to address this apparent political 
marginalisation, Grunwald organised a number 
of meetings with ‘bankrollers and power-brokers’ 
(including Blair’s chief fundraiser Lord Levy) 
with a view to forming a new organisation that 
could capitalise on their political connections. 
Grunwald’s initiative led to the establishment in 
October 2003 of a new organisation claiming to 
represent British Jews, to run in parallel with the 
Board of Deputies, called the Jewish Community 
Leadership Council – later renamed the Jewish 
Leadership Council (JLC). The Jewish Chronicle 
noted that the new organisation brought together 
‘a number of undeniably influential, wealthy... 
figures who have in the past lacked the patience 
for the tiresome business of wider consultation 
and accountability’.194 Within months of its 
October 2003 launch, JLC members had met 
with Blair at 10 Downing Street.195
The JLC is an umbrella group for Jewish 
organisations and represents a number 
of non-political charities (Jewish Care, the 
Nightingale Carehome, Norwood, World Jewish 
Relief) and religious groups (the Assembly of 
Masorti Synagogues, Liberal Judaism, Reform 
Judaism, the Spanish and Portuguese Jews’ 
Congregation, United Synagogue). This is 
Mick Davis
Board of Deputies and Jewish Leadership Council response 
to the assault on Gaza: Rally to defend Israel, January 2009.
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reflected in its broad remit that covers religious, 
charitable and welfare activities. It also represents 
a number of Zionist organisations including 
BICOM and the UJIA, and lobbying for Israel has 
always been an important part of its operations. 
A number of its leading personnel are connected 
to the UJIA. In 2006 the Jewish Chronicle noted 
that the JLC ‘reunites Lord Levy, Sir Trevor 
[Chinn] and Mr [Gerald] Ronson, the triumvirate 
that ran the Joint Israel Appeal in the 1980s, 
then widely regarded as the community’s most 
influential organisation’.196 Another key founder, 
David Cohen, was chairman of the UJIA at the 
time that the JLC was established, and its first 
director, Douglas Krikler, worked simultaneously 
at the JLC and the UJIA before his official 
appointment.197 He later left the JLC to become 
chief executive of the UJIA.198
The JLC was part of a BICOM-led pro-Israel 
advocacy ‘action plan’ approved in June 
2006.199 In November that year, it announced 
that it would review its operations, in part so 
as to make its Israel lobbying activities more 
effective.200 Brian Kerner, a founder and vice-
chairman of BICOM,201 joined the Council202 and 
that December the JLC established a limited 
company called the Jewish Activities Committee 
to act as a vehicle to handle political operations 
(it was the Jewish Activities Committee which 
was involved in the aforementioned Trafalgar 
Square rally). Though not officially affiliated to 
the JLC, the Jewish Activities Committee has 
operated out of the same offices and received 
grants from it. It is directed by Brian Kerner, 
Poju Zabludowicz and JLC’s founder and former 
Board of Deputies president, Henry Grunwald.
That same month the JLC co-founded the 
Fair Play Campaign group with the Board of 
Deputies, an initiative set up ‘to coordinate 
activity against boycotts of Israel and other anti-
Zionist campaigns’.203 According to the JLC’s 
website, the Fair Play Campaign group ‘acts 
as a coordinating hub’ and ‘keeps an eye out 
for hostile activity so it can be an early-warning 
system for pro-Israel organisations in the UK’.204 
Fair Play later launched the Stop the Boycott 
campaign with BICOM, with the Jewish Activities 
Committee acting as a vehicle for donations.
What we see here is considerable cross-over 
at the level of leadership – particularly between 
BICOM, the Jewish Leadership Council and the 
United Jewish Israel Appeal – close coordination 
on campaigning, particularly at times of crisis, and 
a certain ‘division of labour’ between these key 
organisations. Though leading figures involved 
in BICOM have been involved in lobbying, the 
organisation’s major focus is on media operations 
– an issue we will consider in more detail in the 
next chapter. Political lobbying and campaigning 
meanwhile are mainly carried out by the JLC 
and the Board of Deputies. Both organisations 
lobbied David Cameron to oppose the Palestinian 
declaration of statehood at the UN and expressed 
‘profound concern and disappointment’ in a letter 
to Douglas Alexander over Labour’s support for 
the bid.205 They also campaigned, with BICOM, 
to have the universal jurisdiction law repealed, 
thus removing the legal basis for prosecutions for 
war crimes (for example of Israeli military or other 
officials). Between the Board of Deputies and 
the JLC, there would also appear to be a certain 
division of labour. Whilst the latter was explicitly 
created for the purpose of gaining access to 
senior political figures, the Board of Deputies 
would appear to be more capable of mobilising 
supporters of Israel within the Jewish community, 
and is therefore more useful for campaigning 
activity. In addition to the rallies which have 
been organised at times of crisis, the Board of 
Deputies also runs a project called ‘Speak Out for 
Israel!’ which was established to support grass 
roots pro-Israel campaigning in the ‘regional 
communities’ (and is supported by the JLC).206 
The role of the UJIA meanwhile would appear to 
be less important in terms of immediate political 
interventions. It remains significant however,  
both as an institution dedicated to fostering 
solidarity with Israel amongst British Jews, and  
as a hub for a network of wealthy Zionists 
who hold considerable sway over communal 
institutions.
The Parliamentary ‘Friends of Israel’ groups
When it comes to political lobbying, the other 
organisations of particular note in the UK are 
the various parliamentary ‘Friends of Israel’ 
groups. BICOM has strong links with these 
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groups, especially with Labour Friends of Israel, 
of which successive directors of BICOM have 
been members.
Labour Friends of Israel
Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) has been highly 
effective in nurturing and organising support for 
Israel within the Labour Party and is said to have 
organised more overseas trips for MPs than any 
other group.207 It was established in October 1957 
at a public rally at the Labour Party conference.208 
An advert in the Jewish Chronicle declared that 
its aim was to ‘strengthen the ties of friendship 
between the Labour movements of Britain and 
Israel’.209 Israel was at that time dominated by 
MAPAI, the left-wing party headed by Israel’s 
first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, which had 
strong links with the UK Labour Party. Labour 
Friends of Israel helped to strengthen these links 
and by the time of the Six Day War of 1967 could 
count more than 300 Labour MPs as members, 
including a number of Cabinet Ministers.210
Labour Party support for Israel however began 
to decline following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, 
the election of the right-wing Likud Government 
in Israel in 1977 and particularly the Lebanon 
War of 1982. During the 1980s a growing 
awareness of Palestinian rights, resulting partly 
from the influence of the left inside and outside 
the party, further eroded support for Israel. The 
shift towards a more critical stance however 
was partially reversed by the rise of New Labour. 
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown both joined Labour 
Friends of Israel and their close financial and 
political relationship with pro-Israel businessmen 
played a significant part in the party’s rightward 
shift under their leadership, allowing them to 
lessen the party’s financial dependency on the 
trade unions. The key figure in the network of 
New Labour donors was Michael Levy, who 
was introduced to Blair by Gideon Meir and was 
later appointed his chief fundraiser and ‘special 
envoy’ to the Middle East. In 2001 the Labour 
Party power broker, lobbyist and former LFI chair 
Jonathan Mendelsohn, commented that: ‘Blair 
has attacked the anti-Israelism that had existed 
in the Labour Party… The milieu has changed. 
Zionism is pervasive in New Labour. It is 
automatic that Blair will come to Labour Friends 
of Israel meetings.’211 This close relationship 
continued under Gordon Brown, who appointed 
Mendelsohn as his chief fundraiser.212
Conservative Friends of Israel
As support for Israel in the Labour Party waned 
during the ‘70s and ‘80s, support within the 
Conservative Party meanwhile began to grow. 
In the 1970s, the ascendant Tory right wing 
came increasingly to see Israel as a military and 
strategic asset for ‘the West’, whilst politics in 
Israel began to shift to the right. Conservative 
Friends of Israel (CFI), which was founded in 
1974, both reflected and strengthened this 
trend. It was established by the right-wing 
religious Zionist and Conservative politician 
Michael Fidler, who was described by his 
biographer as having had extreme political 
views ‘reminiscent of the philosophy of Enoch 
Powell’.213 Over 80 MPs joined the new group, 
including Margaret Thatcher, who was soon 
to become party leader, and within a year CFI 
had a larger membership than Labour Friends 
of Israel.214 By 1978 it was the largest political 
lobby in Parliament.215 According to conservative 
journalist Peter Oborne, it is now ‘beyond doubt 
the best connected, and probably the best 
funded, of all Westminster lobbying groups’216 
and is said to include around 80 per cent 
of Tory MPs as members.217 Like its Labour 
counterpart, Conservative Friends of Israel 
organises events in Parliament and free trips to 
Israel for Parliamentarians. It is also thought to 
organise financial patronage for prospective MPs 
from wealthy Zionists.218 BICOM’s Public Affairs 
Manager, Stefan Kerner, is a former deputy 
director of Conservative Friends of Israel219 and 
according to Peter Oborne there is ‘a huge 
amount of co-ordination’ between BICOM and 
Conservative Friends of Israel: ‘Many of BICOM’s 
key figures also play roles in the CFI: Trevor 
Pears, Michael Lewis and Poju Zabludowicz are 
driving forces behind both lobbies.’220 
Since 1989 CFI has been headed by Stuart 
Polak, who also runs the lobbying firm, The 
Westminster Connection. Clients of this ‘political 
consultancy’ include the Israeli defence company, 
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Elbit Systems, the British chair of which, retired 
General Richard Applegate, was secretly 
recorded in 2012 saying that Elbit had ‘piggy 
back[ed]’ on Conservative Friends of Israel to 
‘gain access to particular decision makers’.221
Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel
The third and least significant of the parliamentary 
groups is Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel. It is 
the oldest of the three groups and can trace its 
origins to the Liberal Friends of Israel, a group 
within the Liberal Party (which merged with the 
Social Democratic Party to form the Liberal 
Democrats in 1988).222 In the 1970s the Liberal 
Party was the strongest supporter of Israel in 
Parliament,223 but the group has nevertheless 
been less significant as a force because of the 
relative marginality of the Liberal Democrats 
and their predecessors. Like the Labour and 
Conservative groups, Liberal Democrat Friends of 
Israel distributes news on Israel to its members, 
arranges events with Israeli politicians as well as 
trips to Israel for MPs and Peers.224
The broader pro-Israel network
Despite being relatively new organisations, 
BICOM and the Jewish Leadership Council have 
eclipsed several more established pro-Israel 
groups in the UK, a cause, as we shall see, of 
some considerable tension. Many of these older 
groups were originally formed as part of the 
pre-state Zionist movement and because of this 
history either have close links with Israeli politics, 
or are themselves quasi-official Israeli state 
institutions. The most notable of these groups 
is the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and 
Ireland.
The Zionist Federation was established in 1899, 
but it grew slowly and was ‘moribund for most 
of the inter-war period’.225 It began to grow more 
quickly in the early 1930s and by the end of the 
decade had turned into ‘a mass phenomenon’.226 
After the creation of the state of Israel the ZF 
struggled to find a role, eventually reinventing 
itself as a PR outfit advocating for Israel to 
the general public and fundraising. By the last 
quarter of the twentieth century other groups had 
emerged on the scene and ZF’s relative size and 
influence diminished. The decline is emphasised 
by the failure of the Federation to publish its own 
journal since the mid 1990s. It published the 
Zionist Review from 1917. With a few breaks 
in publication and a name change (1952-77), it 
relaunched as the Zionist Review in 1982 but 
ceased publication around 1995. According 
to its then editor Joseph Finklestone, writing in 
1997, ‘so meagre are the resources of the Zionist 
Federation that it is unable to publish regularly its 
famous journal Zionist Review’.227 
Today the Zionist Federation states that it is 
made up of around 120 affiliated groupings, 
though it is not transparent about the names of 
its members or even the precise number and 
appears to give various different figures for its 
membership.228
While its affiliates (both historical and current) 
cover a broad spectrum of Zionist tendencies, 
the leadership of the ZF has fairly consistently 
been to the right, if anything moving further 
rightward over time. As a result liberal and labour 
Zionist groups often feel marginalised by the 
positions taken by the leadership. 
World Zionist Organization and the 
‘National Institutions’
The Zionist Federation is the British affiliate 
of the World Zionist Organisation which is 
simultaneously a quasi-official Israeli institution 
and a global umbrella body for the Zionist 
movement. It is headquartered in buildings in 
Jerusalem known as the ‘national institutions 
house’, along with several other para-statal 
institutions including the Jewish Agency, the 
Jewish National Fund and Keren Hayesod. These 
groups, which are all pre-state institutions of 
the Zionist movement, have affiliates across the 
world, with a variety of similar titles. For example, 
the Keren Hayesod affiliate in the UK is the United 
Jewish Israel Appeal, which as we have seen 
has close connections with BICOM. Another 
local affiliate is JNF UK, the UK branch of the 
Jewish National Fund. The JNF was originally 
established to purchase land in what was then 
Palestine to facilitate Jewish immigration. Today 
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JNF UK focuses on supporting what it calls 
the ‘frontier communities’ in the south of Israel; 
Israeli towns that have been targeted by rocket 
fire from Gaza.229 It is something of a bête noire 
for Palestinian human rights groups that have 
long accused the JNF of ethnic cleansing via its 
programme of land acquisition.230
‘Neoliberal Zionism’ 
BICOM is not closely affiliated with institutions 
like the World Zionist Organisation, the Jewish 
Agency or the Jewish National Fund, though 
there is a degree of collaboration and interlocking 
cross-membership. It is, however, more closely 
affiliated with an informal international network of 
what we will here refer to as ‘Neoliberal Zionism’, 
a key centre of which is the Interdisciplinary 
Center Herzliya, a private university in Israel 
with close links to the country’s military and 
intelligences institutions.
The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC) 
was established in 1994 by Professor Uriel 
Reichman, who two decades earlier had helped 
to create the ‘free market’ Shinui party.231 The 
ideology of the IDC strongly reflects Reichman’s 
combination of committed Zionism and distrust 
of the corporatist Labour Zionism that dominated 
Israel’s early years. In a 2008 interview he argued 
that the strengths of Israel’s society were in 
private businesses, and its weaknesses in the 
public sector. He flattered the Center’s private 
donors, saying
The Israeli owners of capital whom I know 
personally – Arison, Ofer, Wertheimer, 
Dankner, Teshuva, Strauss and others – are 
people who have the good of the country at 
heart. They contribute both by their initiatives 
and by their philanthropy.232
Figure 2. BICOM in context: senior figures and location in the British Zionist scene
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If this private sector orientation is reflected in 
the titles of IDC institutions like the Sammy 
Ofer School of Communications and the Arison 
Business School, another side of the IDC’s 
philosophy is evidenced by its strong links 
with the Israeli security establishment. In 2007 
Reichman told the Jerusalem Post: 
We’re trying to fix national problems in the 
university setting. For example, a central 
mission of ours is the strengthening and 
development of Israel’s security forces. From 
day one, the IDC gave preference to some 
15 per cent of its total student body who 
came out of elite army units and served at 
least five years.233 
In the 1990s, these students were vetted by 
Shabtai Shavit, a former head of the Mossad, 
one of many former military and intelligence 
leaders who have played key roles at the 
centre.234 Another such figure is former Mossad 
head of research Uzi Arad, who founded the 
Institute of Policy and Strategy.235 The Institute 
of Policy and Strategy hosts the annual Herzliya 
Conference, which has been described by 
Haaretz journalist Yair Sheleg as ‘the leading 
forum for conservative thought in Israel’.236 
BICOM has been a ‘Principal Supporter’ of the 
Herzliya Conference and Zabludowicz’s Tamares 
Group has provided funding.237 BICOM staff 
regularly present talks at the conference. Former 
BICOM director Lorna Fitzsimons, for example, 
spoke in 2011 and 2012,238 and participated in 
a seminar in 2010.239 As can be seen elsewhere 
in this report, the IDC Herzliya performs a useful 
role for BICOM as a prestigious venue for trips 
with British politicians, journalists and other 
opinion makers. It also connects BICOM and its 
supporters and allies with a powerful network 
of likeminded state and private sector actors in 
Israel and the United States.
Linked In: BICOM’s networked 
personnel
The CVs of BICOM’s staff offer further insights 
into how the organisation is situated within the 
wider Israel lobby in the UK, the US and Israel 
and linked to the British and Israeli states. Many 
BICOM personnel have been drawn from – and 
gone on to work for – key media, PR and political 
organisations too. For example, Daniel Shek 
(BICOM director 2004-6), formerly worked at 
Israel’s foreign ministry and left to become Israeli 
ambassador to France.240 Carly Maisel who 
became BICOM’s head of communications in 
November 2012 was previously Public Affairs 
officer at Israel’s London embassy.241 Former 
BICOM fellow Tal Becker242 was also a fellow 
of the US-based Washington Institute for Near 
East Policy [WINEP], the think tank set up by 
the influential American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee243 and current BICOM fellow Michael 
Herzog still holds this role at WINEP. Becker is 
a former adviser to ex-Israeli Foreign Minister 
Tzipi Livni, while Herzog also leads the ‘anti-
delegitimisation’ work of the Jerusalem-based 
Jewish People Policy Institute,244 a think tank set 
BICOM staff 
clockwise: Alan 
Johnson, Dermot 
Kehoe, Michael 
Herzog, Stefan Kerner, 
Toby Greene, Richard 
Pater, and Carly 
Maisel.
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up by the Jewish Agency. Herzog previously led 
the IDF’s strategic planning division – and is the 
subject of a war crimes investigation opened by 
the Spanish judicial authorities in 2009 related to 
the 2002 bombing of a residential area of Gaza.245
BICOM’s close links to the British Labour Party 
and Labour Friends of Israel (LFI) are illustrated 
by Lorna Fitzsimons (BICOM director 2006-12) 
a former Labour MP,246 while Luke Akehurst who 
runs the BICOM spin-off We Believe in Israel 
is a Labour councillor in the London borough 
of Hackney.247 The late David Cairns, who was 
MP for Inverclyde and chair of LFI until his 
death in May 2011, was the partner of current 
BICOM CEO Dermot Kehoe.248 But BICOM also 
welcomes Israel advocates from the other side 
of the political spectrum such as its Public Affairs 
Manager Stefan Kerner who was previously 
deputy director of Conservative Friends of Israel 
and also worked as Head of Campaigns and 
Public Affairs for the Zionist Federation.249 If the 
ZF are hardliners on the UK Zionist scene, BICOM 
also maintains strong links to the more moderate 
UJIA through people like founding director Brian 
Kerner (Stefan’s father). These and a number 
of other links to media outlets, public relations 
companies, lobby groups, think tanks and 
governments are illustrated in the diagram below.
Cooperation and conflict
Though the various pro-Israel groups outlined 
here broadly pursue similar aims, they are 
Figure 3. BICOM staff links to US, UK and Israeli state, lobby groups, media and PR firms
Luke Akehurst
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occasional rivals, and their membership, politics, 
strategies and tactics are often distinct, leading 
to conflicts and tensions.
Tensions between the Board of Deputies and 
the Jewish Leadership Council, for example, 
have been common since the establishment of 
the latter, with the JLC criticised for its lack of 
democratic credentials and its perceived attempt 
to usurp the Board as the representative body of 
British Jews. In January 2011 one of the JLC’s 
key founders, Lord Levy, resigned explaining 
that he ‘did not envisage it becoming a new 
power base and expanding its infrastructure 
– something that is neither necessary nor 
needed’.250 That month the Jerusalem Post 
quoted an unnamed deputy as saying: ‘The JLC 
has no mandate and no right to make decisions 
on behalf of the community. The organisation is 
self-appointed, undemocratic and is merely a talk 
shop for the wealthy elders of the community, 
who in the main are out of touch with the 
realities on the ground.’251 In February 2012, the 
senior vice-president of the Board of Deputies, 
Jonathan Arkush, was applauded by Deputies 
at a board meeting when he said: ‘The JLC is 
unelected, it’s unaccountable and it is therefore 
unacceptable to the community for it to hold 
itself out as exercising political leadership of our 
community.’252 The chairman of the JLC later 
threatened that its members might withdraw 
funding from the Board of Deputies and Arkush 
was instructed by its President Vivian Wineman 
to write a letter of apology.253
Much of the criticism of the Jewish Leadership 
Council has come from the right of UK Zionism 
and from some of the older pro-Israel groupings. 
Shortly after its launch in 2004, the JLC was 
criticised by Eric Moonman of the Zionist 
Federation and Gail Seal of JNF UK for its failure 
to include their organisations in its Council. The 
Jewish National Fund later joined the JLC in 
November 2004254 but left complaining of its 
insufficiently supportive stance on Israel. This 
followed comments made in November 2010 by 
the JLC’s chairman, Mick Davis, that Israel risked 
becoming an apartheid state unless a two-state 
solution could be reached. Sociologist Keith 
Kahn-Harris writes:
The Zionist Federation questioned putting 
the blame ‘entirely on Israel’ and [Mick] 
Davis’s stance was denounced by the chair 
of the Jewish National Fund, who argued 
that diaspora Jews should never criticise 
Israel in public. Frustration at what is seen 
as the Jewish establishment’s weak defence 
of Israel has led to the setting up of grass-
roots organisations such as the British Israel 
Coalition to fight what they describe as a rising 
tide of hatred directed at Israel.255
Another notable point of conflict came in January 
2011, when a planned visit to the West Bank 
by then JLC chair, Vivian Wineman, and other 
council members, was cancelled under pressure 
from right-wing Zionists. The Council members 
had planned to meet with Palestinian leaders and 
members of non-governmental organisations.256 
Jonathan Hoffman, then deputy chairman of the 
Zionist Federation, told the Jerusalem Post: ‘We 
felt it would give entirely the wrong message 
to Israelis. Besides, why would leaders want 
to improve relations with NGOs when many of 
them, for example Amnesty and War on Want, 
are bent on demonizing and delegitimizing 
Israel?’257 A month later, the JNF chairman 
announced that he would resign from the Jewish 
Leadership Council. Its then chairman Vivian 
Wineman would subsequently claim that the JNF 
owed over £10,000 in membership fees and had 
failed to pay £15,000 in contributions to the anti-
boycott campaign for three years.258
Such conflicts speak of a split in UK Zionism 
between increasingly vocal right-wing activists 
and a more liberally styled leadership. As Kahn-
Harris has noted, the Board of Deputies has been 
a key battleground for this political struggle.259 In 
January 2011 the Board’s executive advanced 
a motion declaring official support for the ‘two 
Vivian Wineman
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state solution’, but it was rejected by the Board’s 
Deputies by 79 votes to 51.260 The Board then 
released a statement declaring that its ‘policy 
is unchanged and it remains unwavering in its 
support for Israel,’ adding that it ‘completely 
stands behind the quest of Israel for a just and 
lasting negotiated peace and in particular behind 
the courageous stand of the present government 
as formulated by Prime Minister Netanyahu’.261 
This controversial vote, which effectively meant 
the Board had assumed a hard-line position 
on the Israel-Palestine conflict at odds with 
the overwhelming majority of British Jews,262 
prompted an online petition signed by more 
than 1000 British Jews professing their ‘love’ for 
Israel, but calling on the Board to reconsider its 
rejection of a future Palestinian state.263
Mick Davis, has not since publicly repeated 
his concerns about Israeli ‘apartheid’, but has 
continued to express concerns about ‘the Settler 
movement and its supporters’. In a blog piece 
published in February 2013 he wrote:
Peace with the Palestinians is an existential 
need. The conflict divides us and puts us all 
at risk. Israel is losing the battle of legitimacy 
and no matter how much we rage against 
the injustice of it, a boycott movement is on 
the rise. There is a real danger that unless we 
demonstrate that we are tirelessly pursuing 
peace, the boycott movement could achieve 
its malignant goal of isolating Israel from 
the Community of Nations, exposing it to 
pariah status, sanctions and exclusion. If this 
happens we will become fractured as a people 
as we inevitably condemn each other and our 
nation will be at risk.264
BICOM has occasionally been criticised as 
ineffectual and insufficiently proactive when it 
comes to campaigning,265 but it has not been at 
the forefront of major intra-Zionist conflicts. It is 
therefore not completely clear where it sits on the 
political spectrum of pro-Israel advocacy. In terms 
of its institutional affiliations, it certainly appears 
to be more associated with the wealthy elite who 
control the Jewish Leadership Council than their 
more hard-line critics. In the case of Mick Davis’s 
criticisms of the Netanyahu administration and 
his warnings about ‘apartheid’, Zabludowicz and 
fellow BICOM director David Menton were both 
amongst the prominent signatories of a letter of 
support sent to the Jewish Chronicle.266 
This move however may have been motivated 
more by the need to preserve an important 
relationship than by ideological sympathy. It is 
notable that the abortive Jewish Leadership 
Council trip to the West Bank was reportedly 
met with ‘wholesale opposition’ when raised at a 
BICOM board meeting, seeming to place BICOM 
more towards the hard-line end of British Zionist 
opinion. One aspect of the planned trip was an 
engagement with NGOs, on which Zabludowicz 
told the Jewish Chronicle that the challenge was 
‘to make sure we are doing so by supporting and 
empowering the appropriate organisations and 
in a co-ordinated way’.267 This comment reveals 
the strategic rationale that underlines BICOM’s 
activities, a topic to which we now turn.
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Chapter Five – BICOM strategy, elite networks and 
the media 
Though one early critic dismissed BICOM 
as a ‘two-men-and-a-dog operation’268 it is 
certainly the most sophisticated of the pro-Israel 
advocacy groups in the UK. It has employed 
public relations professionals and lobbyists since 
its establishment in 2002 and has adopted 
a strategic approach to communications, 
retaining leading consultants as advisers and 
using detailed public opinion surveys to craft its 
communications strategy. 
In 2011 its then director, Lorna Fitzsimons, 
boasted that: ‘BICOM is the home of the most 
empirical research in Britain full stop, on what 
every British person – class dissection, you 
name it – thinks about Israel’.269 Back in late 
2002, it hired the prestigious US pollsters and 
political strategists Stanley Greenberg and Frank 
Luntz to work on a ‘quantitative and qualitative’ 
research programme examining public attitudes 
to Israel.270 Both Luntz and Greenberg have 
worked as pollsters for American Israel lobby 
organisations, and Luntz has produced at least 
two substantial documents for The Israel Project 
(a US-based lobby organisation), providing 
sophisticated advice on how to most effectively 
frame Israel’s case.271 Both men were again 
retained by BICOM in 2007 to work on its Stop 
the Boycott campaign, along with the British 
consultant Rick Nye, of the UK polling and 
communications company Populus.272
Populus, which provides polling and focus 
group data to its clients, appears to be BICOM’s 
most important communications consultant. 
Its director Rick Nye, a former director of the 
Conservative Research Department, was a 
participant in BICOM’s ‘We Believe in Israel’ 
conference in 2011 (see below).273 A year earlier 
he attended the Herzliya Conference in Israel 
where he was a member of a team of lobbyists 
and Israeli officials who worked on a paper called 
‘Winning the Battle of the Narrative’. Other team 
members included BICOM’s then director Lorna 
Fitzsimons and its then Israel director Jonathan 
Cummings.274 ‘Winning the Battle of the 
Narrative’ noted that members of the public are 
largely excluded from foreign policy decisions, 
but that nevertheless public opinion, and more 
particularly media opinion, can have an important 
indirect impact:
Whilst foreign policy decision-making includes 
a closed circle of people, usually consistent 
of the very elite of each society (politicians, 
advisors and renowned academics included), 
public opinion and atmosphere still matter. 
The political elites in Europe and in the US are 
much more tolerant towards Israel’s policies 
then [sic] the wider public in those same 
countries; however, the public’s mood and 
the media’s coverage (especially in the UK) 
determine the government’s leeway to pursue 
a pro-Israeli foreign policy agenda.275
This perspective was echoed by Lorna 
Fitzsimons herself during the same conference, 
when she commented that ‘public opinion does 
not influence foreign policy in Britain. Foreign 
policy is an elite issue’.276 Similarly, BICOM’s 
Jonathan Cummings has written that ‘discourse 
is far less friendly [in] Britain among the general 
public than it is among elite opinionmakers’ 
and that pro-Israel advocates should therefore 
seek to ‘create barriers to delegitimisation, 
insulating policy-making environments’.277 This 
strategic distinction between elite and public 
opinion appears to be reflected in BICOM’s 
communication strategy. In February 2007, Lorna 
Fitzsimons wrote that ‘BICOM has the most 
“ public opinion does not influence 
foreign policy in Britain. Foreign 
policy is an elite issue.” 
Lorna Fitzsimons
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up-to-date polling of opinion formers and the 
general public’,278 and Populus is known to have 
conducted polling of both public and elite opinion 
on Israel.279 
BICOM’s original mission was: ‘to bring about 
a significant shift in opinion in favour of Israel 
amongst the general public, opinion-formers 
and the Jewish community’.280 However, the 
ambitious objective to shift public opinion 
appears to have been quietly abandoned. In 
2008 a spokesperson told the Jewish Chronicle 
that BICOM’s ‘main target audiences are British 
journalists, politicians and other senior opinion 
formers’281 and its website now makes no 
mention of public opinion, whilst referring twice to 
‘opinion formers’.282 
All this suggests that BICOM does not 
necessarily aim to influence UK public opinion 
per se. Rather its objective is to cultivate a 
policymaking environment in Britain that is 
favourable to Israel, regardless of trends in 
broader public opinion. It seeks to achieve 
this through three principle means: building 
and sustaining elite support in politics and the 
media; isolating those who campaign against 
Israeli policies; and, most recently, mobilising 
supporters of Israel, especially in the UK Jewish 
community. Below we examine each of these 
elements more closely, but first we provide, by 
way of context, an account of how power and 
influence is wielded in Britain today.
The UK’s post-democracy
The distribution of wealth and power in the UK 
is highly unequal. Politically, a relatively small 
number of people are involved in formulating 
policy, whilst most of the population – including 
members of political parties – feel profoundly 
isolated from decision making. In 2006, a study 
of popular disengagement from formal politics 
noted that although public interest in ‘political 
issues’ remained high, ‘the level of alienation 
felt towards politicians, the main political parties 
and the key institutions of the political system 
is extremely high and widespread’. It noted that 
‘citizens do not feel that the processes of formal 
democracy offer them enough influence over 
political decisions’.283
Leading politicians, influential journalists 
and political commentators, philanthropists 
and business executives, lobbyists, political 
consultants and PR executives – these are the 
people who effectively run Britain today284 and 
make up what author Dan Hind has called the 
‘effectually ruling public’.285 They operate in 
broadly similar social environments and tend to 
share certain assumptions and values – some of 
which set them apart from much of the rest of 
BICOM’s website circa 2003
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the population. Though publicly acknowledging 
this concentration of power remains highly taboo, 
it is implicitly understood by those who work in 
the insular and interconnected worlds of politics, 
lobbying and public relations, who do not doubt 
for a second that some people matter more 
than others.286
In some ways it makes sense to view the people 
who make up the world of policy makers as 
a cohesive ‘power elite’ or ‘ruling class’, yet 
such labels risk exaggerating their ideological 
cohesion.287 Many do not see themselves as part 
of an elite, and dismiss such characterisations 
as paranoid or conspiratorial. This is partly 
because they are so insular and are therefore 
less conscious of their isolation from the rest of 
British society. But it is also because within the 
policy world there is considerable competition 
and disagreement – not to mention further (and 
not inconsiderable) gradations of wealth, power 
and influence.
Patterns of competition and cooperation in the 
policy world are complex. Elected politicians 
of course must compete for votes. That is well 
understood. But to win elections they must also 
– increasingly – compete for financial support 
from business and political support from media 
corporations, a fact that pulls mainstream 
politicians in a more business-friendly direction, 
particularly since the advent of neoliberalism. 
Media corporations similarly must compete for 
readers and viewers, but also for advertisers, 
whilst the increasingly stretched journalists 
who work at those media corporations rely on 
politicians and their strategists, and businesses 
and their public relations advisers, for content. 
Meanwhile, businesses compete with each 
other through advertising and public relations 
campaigns, whilst lobbyists, political consultants 
and public relations consultants288 compete for 
clients in the world of business and politics, as 
well as for influence with media corporations, 
politicians and civil servants.
In short, the world of politics, business and 
communications are deeply intertwined and in 
certain respects highly complex and competitive. 
Exercising power in this world requires 
considerable resources, not least because 
though power is highly concentrated, it is also 
dispersed. Generally one cannot simply ‘buy’ 
a politician. For power is not solely vested in 
politicians and in any case the fate of individual 
politicians or even whole political parties is 
unpredictable. Exercising power and influence 
in 21st century Britain therefore lies in building 
and sustaining a network of actors within the 
policymaking world. To be effective, such a 
network must span politics, business and the 
media and will usually be highly organised in 
civil society. The lobbying and PR activities 
of BICOM and its close partner organisations 
must be understood in this context. It is not 
necessarily correct to see lobbying and PR 
as a process whereby certain actors impose 
their interests or perspectives on politicians or 
journalists. Though in some cases coercion can 
be an effective strategy, building cooperative 
relationships is generally more effective in the 
long-term. Indeed, BICOM’s former CEO, Lorna 
Fitzsimons has emphasised the importance 
of relationship building. Fitzsimons cited the 
work of Robert Cialdini, author of Influence: 
The Psychology of Persuasion, as a model for 
BICOM’s communication strategy and specifically 
his account of how to use ‘reciprocation’ as a 
‘weapon of influence’.289 Cialdini writes that the 
indebtedness we instinctively feel towards those 
who grant us favours is ‘overpowering’ and 
can therefore be ‘profitably used’ as ‘a device 
for gaining another’s compliance’.290 One of his 
examples is that of favours, gifts or financial 
support given to politicians.291
Building and sustaining elite 
support 
It was noted in the previous chapter that BICOM’s 
pro-Israel activity is largely focused on the media, 
whilst other groups, notably the parliamentary 
‘Friends of Israel’ groups, the Jewish Leadership 
Council and the Board of Deputies, are more 
focused on lobbying politicians. Nevertheless 
BICOM has however paid for politicians to visit 
Israel and a number of its key donors have also 
funded both Labour and the Conservatives. The 
largest of these donors is Poju Zabludowicz. 
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According to Electoral Commission records, 
Zabludowicz and his corporate vehicle Tamares 
Real Estate Investments (UK) Ltd have donated a 
total of £314,300 to the Conservative Party since 
2005. BICOM’s former vice-chairman Michael 
Lewis is also a major Tory donor. His family 
investment company Oceana donated £30,000 
to the Conservative Party in 2001, as well as 
£2,500 to support Michael Portillo’s bid for the 
Party Leadership. In 2004 Oceana donated 
£3,000 to the Conservative Party in Harlow 
where Robert Halfon of Conservative Friends of 
Israel was the Conservative Party’s candidate, 
and in 2005 Michael Lewis personally donated 
£5,000 to support Liam Fox’s bid for the Party 
Leadership. In September 2005, funds donated 
by Lewis to Liam Fox were used to pay for a 
delegation of Conservative MPs to Washington 
D.C. The delegation was led by Fox and included 
five newly elected Tory MPs, namely Mark 
Harper, John Penrose, Brooks Newmark, Adam 
Holloway and Philip Dunne. Although Michael 
Lewis was identified as having funded the flights 
and accommodation for the Washington trip, in 
response to a Guardian article he stated that he 
had no say over how his donation was spent 
and denied funding the trip.292 More recently 
Lewis emerged as a donor to Adam Werritty, 
the unofficial adviser whose activities led to 
Liam Fox’s resignation as Defence Secretary 
(discussed below). Along with Mick Davis and 
Zabludowicz’s Tamares Capital, Oceana was 
revealed as a funder of Pargav, a vehicle which 
Werritty described as a not-for-profit organisation 
that supported his work in the Middle East.293 
Lewis is also reported to have donated £13,822 
to Atlantic Bridge, a now defunct think tank set 
up by Fox and headed by Werritty.294
In 2008 David Menton, another BICOM 
donor and a close business associate of Poju 
Zabludowicz, donated £1,000 to the Labour 
Party in John Spellar’s constituency of Warley 
(Spellar spoke at BICOM’s advocacy conference 
that year295). In 2011 he donated £2,477 to the 
Labour Party in Michael Dugher’s constituency of 
Barnsley East. That year he also paid for Spellar, 
by then a Shadow Foreign Office Minister, to 
attend the Herzliya Conference. Menton also 
paid for accommodation for Michael Dugher and 
a member of his staff during that conference. 
Dugher, a former Labour special advisor and 
corporate lobbyist, was at that stage a shadow 
defence minister and vice chair of Labour Friends 
of Israel. Both Michael Dugher and John Spellar 
attended BICOM’s 10th anniversary dinner in 
November that year.296
At the Herzliya Conference, Michael Dugher 
spoke as part of a session called ‘Is Israel Losing 
Europe?’ He praised BICOM, as well as Labour 
Friends of Israel and Trade Union Friends of 
Israel, for their ‘important work’ saying ‘they work 
hard to ensure that there is a more balanced 
debate in the United Kingdom and we continue 
to promote the State of Israel in a positive way’. 
He blamed the negative view of Israel amongst 
the public on the lack of context provided in 
television coverage.297
BICOM itself paid for three Labour Party 
politicians to visit Israel in 2011. It paid for 
Michael Dugher to visit Israel again on 5-8 June 
2011 as part of the shadow defence team’s 
review into defence procurement and also paid 
for the Shadow Defence Secretary Jim Murphy 
and a member of his staff to visit Tel Aviv on 6-9 
June 2011.298 That February it paid for Stephen 
Twigg MP, then a shadow Foreign Office minister, 
to fly to Israel. Twigg, who was chairman of 
Labour Friends of Israel from 1998 to 2001,299 
visited Israel and the West Bank between 4 and 
8 February 2011. He later wrote that he had 
undertaken ‘an intense itinerary of meetings and 
visits with politicians, trade unionists and civil 
society organisations’ and attended the Herzliya 
Conference.300
BICOM’s media strategy
As noted above, BICOM was formed in response 
to the outbreak of the second intifada and its 
early focus was very much on responding to 
negative coverage of the violence. In September 
2001, BICOM’s first director Mark Berg wrote 
a briefing note for Jewish communal leaders 
in which he referred to ‘Israel’s lonely struggle 
against hostile elements in the media’.301 
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Under Berg’s short leadership, BICOM supported 
a wider campaign by pro-Israel groups to 
pressure the UK media into more favourable 
coverage, providing advice and support to grass 
roots activists. It worked closely with the Zionist 
Federation’s ‘Israel Response Group’302 and 
with the Zionist Central Council and the Jewish 
Representative Council in Manchester set up 
a network to respond to local media.303 It also 
assisted the Board of Deputies in producing 
a 50-page information pack for pro-Israel 
activists, combining factual information on the 
Israel-Palestine conflict with information on the 
media, details of the various pro-Israel watchdog 
organisations and guidance on how to contribute 
to talk shows and join television audiences. 
Meanwhile BICOM’s head of media, Nick 
Conway, gave a number of talks to British Jews 
on ‘media bias’ and ‘winning the media war’.304 
BICOM’s role in these campaigns was not to 
mobilise activists, but to provide them with advice 
and information. Its director Mark Berg urged 
people to write to the media, but also stressed 
the importance of accuracy in lodging complaints, 
saying, ‘We need your help to put across factually 
correct letters that have an impact’ [emphasis 
added].305 In an interview in early 2002, Berg 
commented that there was ‘a minority of people 
in the community who are overly shrill and overly 
emotional. And unfortunately, there is another, 
maybe the same, minority who have a tendency 
to be inaccurate.’306 This comment underlines 
the BICOM strategy of targeting opinion formers 
and elites who don’t react well to hectoring, 
bluster, trolling and sloganeering. BICOM is thus 
particularly concerned with credibility – putting 
the arguments in a tone and language that 
resonates with elite audiences and they are 
often embarrassed by more hard-line or less 
sophisticated elements. 
Berg’s successor as director, the Israeli diplomat 
Daniel Shek, shifted the organisation’s emphasis, 
promoting positive stories on Israel unrelated 
to the conflict and emphasising shared values 
between Israel and the UK, which it was 
hoped would help create a more sympathetic 
environment for political messages.307 Since 
then BICOM’s media strategy appears to have 
mirrored that of conventional PR firms: seeking 
to develop reciprocal working relationships with 
journalists by providing them with content for 
news stories and access to senior sources, 
rather than complaining about critical coverage. 
BICOM’s Israel director Jonathan Cummings has 
argued that, ‘Harassing the media is a counter-
productive tactic, which limits dialogue,’311 
whilst Lorna Fitzsimons has stressed that in 
order to exert influence through the media it is 
necessary to acknowledge that Israel does ‘make 
mistakes’.312 Whilst such groups doubtless serve 
a useful purpose in intimidating critics, BICOM’s 
strategy of engagement with elites appears to 
have enjoyed considerable success. 
The most prominent such organisations in the 
US are the Committee for Accuracy in Middle 
East Reporting in America (CAMERA), which was 
founded in 1982 to combat negative coverage 
of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon that year, and 
the more internationally oriented Honest 
Reporting, which like BICOM was founded 
in response to the second intifada. In the UK 
a similar organisation called Just Journalism 
operated between 2008 and 2011 and was 
affiliated to the neoconservative think tank, 
the Henry Jackson Society. Just Journalism 
was denounced by one of its directors, Adel 
Darwish, as a McCarthyite operation following his 
resignation after around nine months.308 It took 
a position on the hawkish extreme of the Zionist 
spectrum, which put it in a similar camp to small 
attack blogs such as CiFWatch, which monitors 
alleged anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel 
at the Guardian’s ‘Comment is Free’ website. 
Those running CiFWatch appear to be based 
in Israel, and when it started it featured mostly 
anonymous contributors.309 The use of anonymity 
is also a feature of attack blogs such as Harry’s 
Place, launched in 2002 in the aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks and largely devoted to 
attacking the anti-war left and critics of Israel.310
This strategy of engagement appears to have 
enjoyed considerable success. In June 2006, 
reflecting on BICOM’s early achievements, the 
Jewish Chronicle noted that ‘BICOM experts 
have been allowed unprecedented access to 
the BBC to brief the corporation’s staff on the 
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Middle East’.313 In August that year a BICOM 
spokesperson told the Jewish Chronicle that 
the organisation ‘had worked with broadcasters 
including those from the BBC’s Hardtalk, 
Newsround and Newsnight, as well as placing 
articles and offering background briefings to 
journalists, editors and spokespeople’.314
An important aspect of BICOM’s media strategy 
is its organised and paid for delegations of 
journalists to Israel. The aforementioned Herzliya 
Conference paper ‘Winning the Battle of the 
Narrative’ noted that:
introducing people to daily life in Israel has 
been very successful in gaining their support; 
spending a night out in Tel-Aviv or taking part in 
a tour of Herzliya proved to be the best way for 
foreigners to understand and relate to Israel.315
Jonathan Cummings, the head of BICOM’s Israel 
office, has written at length about what he calls 
‘visiting elite opinion-maker delegations’ noting 
that ‘visiting Israel can be an important element 
in forming elite British opinions on Israel,’ and 
that, ‘bringing politicians, journalists, students, 
and academics to Israel can help to create 
barriers to delegitimisation, insulating policy-
making environments from the most destructive 
discourse’.316
In January 2008 the Jewish Chronicle reported 
that BICOM was organising the ‘largest-ever 
group of senior UK journalists’ to visit Israel. 
The article stated that representatives from The 
Times, The Independent, The Sun, Sky and the 
BBC would be part of a group that would attend 
the Herzliya conference that year.317 (The BBC 
representative who signed up to the tour later 
cancelled after it was pointed out that it would 
violate the BBC’s guidelines.318) In November 
2009, BICOM’s chairman Poju Zabludowicz 
wrote that: ‘Over the past two years we have 
taken more than 60 journalists to Israel and 
the PA [Palestinian Authority], working with 
at least 50 more regularly. Foreign editors, 
correspondents and leading commentators 
regularly attend our events, rely on us for 
information and, after joining our delegations to 
Israel, regularly recommend that colleagues do 
the same.’319
Despite the fact that a BBC correspondent was 
barred from attending the 2008 trip, a BICOM 
email made public in September 2011 revealed 
that the BBC’s Sophie Long participated in a 
trip to Israel organised by BICOM. The email, 
intended for BICOM’s donors but sent in error to 
its media lists, stated:
BICOM has one of BBC News’ key anchors 
on a bespoke delegation. When planning her 
very first trip to the region, Sophie Long got in 
touch with BICOM to see if we could help her 
out with meeting in the region. Sophie is now 
spending three days of her trip with BICOM 
Israel, taking a tour around the Old City, 
meeting [the Prime Minister’s spokesperson] 
Mark Regev and [Hebrew University professor] 
Dr. Alex Yacobsen, as well as visiting Ramallah 
and Sderot.320
The leaked email also stated that BICOM had 
been ‘in contact with a whole host of BBC 
and SKY news desks and journalists, ensuring 
that the most objectively favourable line was 
taken, and offering talking heads, relevant to the 
Lorna Fitzsimons leaked email, 2011
Fathom - claims to foster a ‘deeper understanding’ of the 
Middle East
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stories unfolding’. It claimed that Sky News had 
‘changed their narrative’ after being contacted by 
BICOM’s media team and that Lorna Fitzsimons 
had briefed Jonathan Ford on his Financial Times 
leader for the following day. The email also noted 
that: ‘BICOM had regular contact with the Editor 
at Large of Prospect Magazine, David Goodhart, 
helping to inform him about the forthcoming UN 
vote on Palestinian statehood.’321
In February 2012, another email surfaced 
revealing that BICOM was for the first time 
organising a trip to Israel and the West Bank 
for bloggers. According to the email, the ‘social 
media delegation’ was planned for 26 February 
to 1 March 2012.322 Six bloggers attended the 
four-day trip, including Richard Angell, from 
Progressonline.org.uk, and Jonathan Isaby, 
political director of the Taxpayers Alliance and  
co-editor of Conservativehome.com.323
In late 2012 BICOM launched a quarterly ‘journal’ 
called Fathom, with the tag line ‘for a deeper 
understanding of Israel and the region’. Edited by 
BICOM’s Senior Researcher Alan Johnson, among 
its advisory editors are Efraim Halevy, the former 
director of Israel’s foreign intelligence agency 
Mossad, at least two people from Israel’s Institute 
of National Security Studies and neoconservatives 
from both sides of the Atlantic such as Alan 
Mendoza of the UK’s Henry Jackson Society and 
Joshua Muravchik formerly of the Washington-
based American Enterprise Institute.324 Available 
as an iPad app and slickly produced, the title 
implies high-brow, nuanced, scholarly analysis – 
in contrast to the bold, simple slogans of much 
Israel advocacy aimed at the general public. It has 
featured prominent neoconservative Richard Perle 
– who served in the Reagan and George W. Bush 
administration – and rejectionist Israeli viewpoints. 
For example, Gerald Steinberg President of the 
group NGO Monitor claimed in the third issue 
that NGOs in the UK such as Oxfam, exhibited 
‘theological anti-Semitism’.325 Fathom’s second 
issue showcased an article by Yisrael Medad, 
a spokesman for the Yesha Council of Jewish 
Communities (an Israeli settlement organisation), in 
which he described Naftali Bennett, leader of the 
far-right Jewish Home Party, as ‘the new hope’.326
In addition to building working relationships 
with journalists and bloggers, BICOM has also 
developed crisis management techniques which 
it has utilised during controversial Israeli military 
operations, and at key political and diplomatic 
junctures. In 2011, Lorna Fitzsimons wrote 
in the Jerusalem Post: ‘We make the case 
in public, even at the hardest times, such as 
during Operation Cast Lead, during the Gaza 
flotilla incident, and in the wake of the recent 
publication of the “Palestine Papers.”’327 A year 
later she noted that: ‘We now have a well-
developed and practiced crisis management 
system and protocol run jointly with the JLC. 
We used it to great effect in response to 
Operation Cast Lead, in 2010 as the first Flotilla 
hit the headlines, as well as last year during the 
Palestinian bid for UN membership.’328
BICOM appears to have developed its ‘crisis 
management system’ in the aftermath of the 
2006 Israel-Lebanon war, during which BICOM, 
along with the Israeli Embassy, was accused of 
a failure to present Israel’s case in the media.329 
BICOM and the Jewish Leadership Council 
then appear to have consciously prepared their 
communication strategies in anticipation of 
The cover of Fathom, Issue 1 - featuring Benjamin 
Nethanyahu’s presentation to the United Nations
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another Israeli attack. In February 2008, Henry 
Grunwald, the chair of the JLC wrote: 
Lessons have been learnt from the summer of 
2006. In recent weeks, working with BICOM, 
communal organisations have stepped up their 
activities in this area, publishing and distributing 
the most up-to-date fact sheets documenting 
the sheer scale of rocket attacks [on Israel] and 
their effects. … If Israel does take the military 
option, we must be prepared.330
The lesson from the Israel-Lebanon War of 2006 
was apparently that not enough context was 
provided to explain why Israel was resorting to 
such extreme violence. Grunwald wrote:
If we are not careful, there could be a re-run 
of the 2006 war with Hezbollah, where the 
context of the actual fighting was lost in the 
media war of striking pictures of tanks and the 
rubble of burning buildings.331
One Israel advocate lamented during the attack: 
‘There is a conflict here between images and 
words. If the Lebanese case is made by pictures 
and Israel’s by words, it’s a difficult match.’332 
Comments such as this reflect a growing anxiety 
amongst pro-Israel advocates that since Israel 
is one of the world’s leading military powers 
and its enemies are poor, and poorly armed, 
observers are likely to reflexively view Israel as the 
aggressor in any likely conflict. This was noted in 
the aforementioned 2010 paper for the Herzliya 
Conference:
Mass media, the main vehicle for shaping 
public opinion, is an inherently problematic 
medium for putting across Israel’s message. 
Heavily based on images, it often plays into 
the hands of Israel’s opponents. Asymmetric 
warfare, in terms of media exposure, allows 
weaker parties certain advantages when 
faced with a camera-lens, such as the well-
known images of Palestinian children ‘fighting’ 
Israeli tanks.333
Israel advocates during the 2008/9 assault 
on Gaza therefore stressed the context of the 
massacres, emphasising that Israel had no 
choice but to resort to force. Though many 
people were shocked by the violence displayed 
during Operation Cast Lead, this PR approach 
appears to have been largely successful in 
managing public understandings. A study by the 
Glasgow University Media Group found that only 
a minority of viewers blamed Israel for the killing 
of women and children in Gaza, whilst 63 per 
cent blamed either the Palestinians or both sides 
equally. The authors noted that: 
There is a sense amongst some that the 
disparity between the power of each side 
is ‘unfair’. But what is missing from most of 
this audience is the Palestinian perspective… 
On the other hand, many elements of what 
is assumed to be true are exactly the points 
which were highlighted in Israeli public 
relations and reported uncritically on the 
news. Crucially, this can affect how audiences 
apportion blame and responsibility and also 
influence how the images of civilian casualties 
were interpreted.334
As media academic Simon Cottle notes in 
summarising the Glasgow Group’s findings, 
‘images of human suffering first need to be 
contextualised before they can be made sense of 
by audiences. Visual images of the Palestinians 
as the underdog, for example, do not necessarily 
produce a sympathetic response’.335
The media context
Before moving on to BICOM’s other areas of 
operations, it is worth considering in more detail 
the context in which these media operations take 
place, since this is commonly misunderstood.
The notion that the UK media is biased against 
Israel is widespread amongst pro-Israel 
campaigners. The Guardian and the BBC 
in particular are regularly accused of being 
anti-Israel, or pro-Palestinian, and the latter 
has been subject to numerous campaigns 
attempting to influence its output.336 Contrary 
to the claims made by pro-Israel activists, 
however, evidence-based academic studies of 
media content suggest that Israeli perspectives 
tend to appear more frequently in the British 
media than Palestinian perspectives. The most 
comprehensive research on this topic has been 
conducted by the Glasgow University Media 
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Group, which first published its findings in 2004 
as Bad News From Israel and later expanded 
its research, republishing an updated version as 
More Bad News From Israel in 2011. The authors 
note that
on TV news the coverage of deaths and 
casualties had a very disproportionate 
emphasis on those of Israel and different 
language was sometimes employed by 
journalists to describe these. There is no 
evidence from our analysis to suggest that 
Palestinian views were given preferential 
treatment on the BBC. The opposite is really 
the case. This is part of a consistent pattern on 
TV news in which Israeli perspectives tended 
to be highlighted and sometimes endorsed by 
journalists.337
Other scholarly studies have confirmed this 
general picture. Loughborough University’s 
Communications Research Centre, which was 
commissioned by the BBC to research the 
impartiality of its coverage of the conflict, found a 
disparity in favour of Israeli actors both in terms 
of the number of appearances and ‘talk time’ 
and also noted that ‘Israeli fatalities generally 
receive greater coverage than Palestinian 
fatalities’.338 A subsequent study by researchers 
at the University of Bedfordshire and Goldsmiths 
College, London, which examined coverage of 
the 2006 Lebanon War, found that
both the BBC and ITV demonstrated a 
slant towards the Israeli side in terms of the 
percentage of time given to the direct speech 
of Israel and her supporters compared with 
Lebanon/Hezbollah and their supporters. 
The proportionate coverage of casualties 
also favoured Israel in that, on the BBC, 20 
per cent of the coverage was devoted to 
the impact of the fighting on Israeli civilians 
and 28 per cent on the impact on Lebanese 
civilians… but in terms of actual casualties, the 
Lebanese suffered ten times as many deaths 
as did the Israelis.339
There are no reputable academic studies of 
television coverage of Israel/Palestine which 
support the view of those pro-Israel activists who 
claim that British television is biased against Israel.
The British press is more obviously partisan in its 
coverage of Israel. Some of this is explained by 
the political commitments of media moguls or 
editors and the general orientation of the press 
in Britain towards the narrow range of views of 
the foreign policy establishment. It is, however, 
also the case that journalistic investigation can 
trump such pressures. The British tabloids tend 
to ignore Israel, but with some exceptions are 
generally hostile to the Palestinians when they do 
cover the Middle East. Amongst the broadsheets 
the Financial Times, The Guardian and the 
Independent are more likely to be comparatively 
even-handed, though there is evidence that they 
tend to adopt Israel perspectives more often 
than not.340 Papers owned by News International 
and the Telegraph Group (formerly owned by 
Hollinger) have tended to be more ideologically 
driven, especially by proprietorial interest.
News International is the UK subsidiary of Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corp, which owns the Sun, The 
Times, the Sunday Times and the Sun on Sunday 
(formerly the News of the World). Murdoch 
has business interests in Israel and is strongly 
supportive of conservative Israeli politicians – he 
was reportedly ‘a strong political backer and 
close friend of’ Ariel Sharon, Israel’s hard-line 
former Prime Minister.341 He has received awards 
from a host of pro-Israel advocacy organisations, 
including the Simon Wiesenthal Center (2006), 
the American Jewish Congress (1982),342 the 
American Jewish Committee (2009) and the 
Anti-Defamation League (2010).343 Journalist 
Eric Alterman records attending ‘a United 
Jewish Appeal-Federation “Humanitarian of the 
Year” ceremony’ for Murdoch. The award was 
presented, ‘I kid you not’ he wrote, by Henry 
Kissinger.344
Murdoch wrote the foreword for a 2005 book 
Israel in the World: Changing Lives Through 
Innovation, by two long standing pro-Israel 
activists Helen Davis and Douglas Davis. Helen 
Davis was Director of the Britain-Israel Public 
Affairs Centre (BIPAC), the forerunner of BICOM 
from 1991 to 1999. Douglas Davis wrote for the 
Jerusalem Post from 1990 until around 2005 
and subsequently worked for the Spectator. 
He has been highly critical of BBC reporting of 
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Israel and the US, claiming in 2002 that the BBC 
‘has become the principal agent for reinfecting 
British society with the virus of anti-Semitism’.345 
In February 2013, the UK Chief Rabbi Lord 
Sacks made an ‘unexpectedly robust’ defence of 
Rupert Murdoch, stating that Israel did not have 
‘a better or more significant friend in the world’.346
Murdoch has a reputation as an interventionist 
proprietor and one recent incident provides clear 
evidence that his pro-Israel politics affect the 
content of his newspapers. In January 2013, 
the Sunday Times was attacked for a cartoon 
by Gerald Scarfe said to be anti-Semitic by a 
host of pro-Israel groups.347 The paper’s recently 
appointed acting editor, Martin Ivens, initially 
defended Scarfe’s ‘typically robust’ cartoon, 
describing it as ‘aimed squarely at Mr Netanyahu 
and his policies, not at Israel, let alone at Jewish 
people’. However, after Rupert Murdoch tweeted: 
‘Gerald Scarfe has never reflected the opinions of 
the Sunday Times.  Nevertheless we owe major 
apology for grotesque, offensive cartoon,’ Martin 
Ivens arranged a meeting with officials from 
BICOM, the Jewish Leadership Council and the 
anti-Semitism monitoring group the Community 
Security Trust, and apologised ‘unreservedly’ for 
the ‘terrible mistake’.348
Strong proprietorial influence can also make itself 
felt on news coverage. At News International 
both Robert Fisk and Sam Kiley left The Times 
over censorship of their work. Fisk wrote:
I don’t believe Murdoch personally interfered… 
He didn’t need to. He had turned The Times 
into a tame, pro-Tory, pro-Israeli paper shorn 
of all editorial independence. 349
Kiley left The Times in August 2001, writing in the 
London Evening Standard, that the paper’s:
foreign editor and other middle managers 
flew into hysterical terror every time a pro-
Israel lobbying group wrote in with a quibble 
or complaint and then usually took their side 
against their own correspondent ... I was told 
I should not refer to ‘assassinations’ of Israel’s 
opponents, nor to ‘extra-judicial killings or 
executions’.350 
Kiley also noted the influence of the proprietor:
Murdoch’s executives were so scared 
of irritating him that, when I pulled off a 
little scoop by tracking, interviewing and 
photographing the unit in the Israeli army 
which killed Mohammed al-Durrah, the 
12-year-old boy whose death was captured 
on film and became the iconic image of 
the conflict, I was asked to file the piece 
‘without mentioning the dead kid’. After that 
conversation, I was left wordless, so I quit. 351
Another influential pro-Israel press baron is 
Conrad Black, who, before he was sent to jail 
for fraud, controlled Hollinger International Inc 
which published leading newspapers such 
as the Daily Telegraph (UK), Chicago Sun 
Times (US), the Jerusalem Post (Israel), National 
Post (Canada), the Sydney Morning 
Herald (Australia), and The Age (Australia) and 
hundreds of community papers in the US. Both 
Black and his wife Barbara Amiel have long been 
strongly pro-Zionist and hostile to Palestinians. 
Black has characterised the Palestinian 
leadership as ‘vile and primitive,’352 while Amiel 
concluded one 5,300 word piece, published 
in both the Daily Telegraph and the Jerusalem 
Post, by claiming that some Palestinians were 
‘behaving’ like ‘animals’.353 
In July 2003 Barbara Amiel accused the BBC of 
having been a ‘bad joke’ for ‘several decades’ 
and exhibited ‘relentless anti-Israel and anti-
America biases’.354 In 2006 she accused the BBC 
of having ‘practically gone native’ concluding: 
‘Any BBC newscast on the situation could play 
happily on al-Jazeera – and probably does.’355 
Black himself has more than once questioned the 
editorial line of papers with which he disagreed in 
print, including the example of the Jerusalem Post 
about which he wrote:
I shared the wish of [Israeli Prime Minister] 
Yitzhak Rabin, who expressed the hope when 
my associates and I bought control of the 
‘Post’ in 1987, that it would cease to be a ‘pro-
PLO’ newspaper. It did and I am proud of that 
fact despite the strains variations of this policy 
have sometimes caused with friends in Israel 
and in the international Jewish community.356
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Among the casualties of the change: ‘nearly half 
the journalists on the Jerusalem Post were sacked 
when they showed what [Black] judged to be an 
unhealthy enthusiasm for Palestinian rights’.357
Black’s strong support for Israel is alleged 
to have interfered, as the second intifada 
progressed from October 2000, with journalists’ 
abilities to report properly. According to William 
Dalrymple the result was that ‘uniquely among 
British papers, the foreign pages of the Daily and 
Sunday Telegraph contained a notable absence 
of clear, critical reporting of Israel’s deadly 
methods of suppressing Palestinian dissent. 
Their comment pages have been even more 
extreme’.358 In March 2001, Black again took 
to the pages of another of his own publications 
– The Spectator – labelling a contributor as 
anti-Semite for criticising the role of Israel in the 
Middle East. In response,
three prominent writers – all of them past 
contributors to Mr Black’s Telegraph group – 
have signed a letter to the Spectator accusing 
him of abusing his responsibilities as a 
proprietor. Such is the vehemence with which 
Mr Black has expounded his pro-Israel views, 
they say, no editor or reporter would dare write 
frankly about the Palestinian perspective.359
The control of key sections of the broadsheet 
press by proprietors and their immediate circle 
with strongly conservative views on Israel, 
and the practice of promoting those views in 
the paper, can evidently make a significant 
contribution to news coverage. It is not true, 
however, to suggest that their views are able to 
entirely dominate the papers they control, which 
also need to maintain some connection with their 
journalists and their readers. Thus in the case of 
The Times it has been possible for the paper to 
publish material that elements of the Israeli state 
were keen not to see the light of day. The attack 
on the Gerald Scarfe cartoon noted above is a 
case in point. Even in the case of Conrad Black, 
his views were not always faithfully relayed. Thus, 
in 1993, he published an article in the Jerusalem 
Post decrying the paper’s editorial stance of 
opposing the proposed Middle East peace 
deal.360 Later, some of Barbara Amiel’s columns 
were, reportedly, spiked:
With Black in control of the Telegraph group, 
[Amiel] had a lofty platform from which to 
shout, and complete control of the contents 
of her musings. It was a brave departmental 
editor who spiked a column, but it did happen 
on occasions when an editor of the day was 
faced with a rant too far against the BBC.361
Amiel was sacked from the Daily Telegraph in 
May 2004 after she was named in a lawsuit 
against Black and other directors of Hollinger.362 
The new editor, Martin Newland concluded that 
the politics of Amiel and Black and their adviser 
Dean Godson were just too conservative, as he 
later explained: ‘I soon came to recognise that 
(the Daily Telegraph was) speaking a language 
on geopolitical events and even domestic 
events that was dictated too much from across 
the Atlantic. It’s OK to be pro-Israel, but not 
to be unbelievably pro-Likud, it’s OK to be 
pro-American but not look as if you’re taking 
instructions from Washington. Dean Godson and 
Barbara Amiel were key departures.’363
It is in this generally pro-Israel atmosphere that 
BICOM attempts to manage media coverage of 
Israel and build elite support. In other words it 
operates in a relatively favourable media milieu, 
with some very notable supporters amongst 
media proprietors.
Isolating critics of Israel
We have argued that BICOM’s approach is not 
so much to seek to persuade the UK public, 
but rather to insulate ‘elite opinion-makers’ 
from criticisms of Israel. This is achieved 
firstly by building working relationships with 
the media and ‘opinion-makers’, as we 
outlined above, and secondly by isolating and 
discrediting writers and activists – including 
those from a Jewish background – who 
criticise Israel or work to win support for 
Palestinian rights.
In recent years, critics of Israel have been 
depicted by Israel lobby groups through the lens 
of ‘delegitimisation’. This is a term with a specific 
meaning in pro-Israel discourse. It is used to 
suggest that critics of Israel are motivated by an 
antipathy to the state of Israel itself, rather than 
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specific policies, questioning the very basis of 
Israel as a ‘Jewish state’. From there, it is a short 
step to the suggestion that delegitimisation is a 
new form of anti-Semitism. 
Although the term delegitimisation has been 
used for some decades by Israel advocates, it 
has gained a renewed popularity among pro-
Israel groups in the last few years. It was used, 
for example by Natan Sharansky in 2004 when 
he referred to the ‘3D test’ of anti-Semitism 
which refers to Demonization, Double Standards 
and Delegitimization.364 He claimed that this 
means that ‘Israel’s fundamental right to exist is 
denied – alone among all peoples in the world’.
A major contribution to the development of the 
idea was a 2010 report by the conservative Reut 
Institute. It argued that ‘negation of Israel’s right 
to exist or of the right of the Jewish people to 
self-determination’ together with ‘demonisation 
or blatant double standards’ is a kind of 
‘fundamental delegitimisation’ that ‘represents a 
form of anti-Semitism’.365 In April 2011, a three 
day conference in Washington DC, organised 
by Reut and the American Jewish Committee 
‘brought together a global network to fight 
against the campaign to de-legitimise Israel: 
275 leader-activists from twenty countries… 
from dozens of organisations; and from all the 
major theaters of confrontation including labor 
unions, campuses, media, and academia’.366 
Reut’s Gidi Grinstein participated in a panel on 
‘Delegitimisation: The global assault on Israel’ 
with Lorna Fitzsimons from BICOM.367 
In a separate report Reut suggested in late 
2010 that London was the ‘hub of hubs’ of 
delegitimisation.368 The ‘Big Tent for Israel’ 
conference, held in Manchester on 27 November 
2011 ‘was based on Reut’s document on 
London as a hub of delegitimisation, a copy of 
which was also distributed to the participants’.369 
BICOM’s Lorna Fitzsimons spoke at the event 
and was a ‘project team member’ along with 
Reut’s Grinstein, in a roundtable in preparation 
for the 2010 Herzliya conference.370 In 
March 2012, Fitzsimons wrote in the Jewish 
Chronicle that:
Five years ago there was a lot of turning a 
blind eye in Britain. Today we have faced 
up to the use of London as a hub for 
delegitimisation and we are working hard to 
counter efforts to portray Israel as a pariah 
state. This work really started with the 
Stop The Boycott Campaign, which lifted 
advocacy out of smoke-filled rooms to the 
front pages of every national newspaper.371
The Stop the Boycott Campaign was launched 
in response to a motion on the ‘Boycott of Israeli 
Academic Institutions’ passed at the University 
and College Union’s inaugural Congress on 30 
May 2007. Despite the furious response to the 
motion, it did not in fact call for the boycott of 
Israeli universities. Rather the motion stated that 
the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and 
Cultural Boycott of Israel, launched in July 2004, 
should be distributed to UCU branches and that 
members should be encouraged to ‘consider 
the moral implications of existing and proposed 
links with Israeli academic institutions’. The full 
text of the motion read as follows:
Congress notes that Israel’s 40-year 
occupation has seriously damaged the fabric 
of Palestinian society through annexation, 
illegal settlement, collective punishment and 
restriction of movement.
Congress deplores the denial of educational 
rights for Palestinians by invasions, closures, 
checkpoints, curfews, and shootings and 
arrests of teachers, lecturers and students.
Congress condemns the complicity of 
Israeli academia in the occupation, which 
has provoked a call from Palestinian trade 
unions for a comprehensive and consistent 
Stop the Boycott, a campaign run by BICOM with the Fair 
Play Campaign Group
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international boycott of all Israeli academic 
institutions.
Congress believes that in these circumstances 
passivity or neutrality is unacceptable and 
criticism of Israel cannot be construed as anti-
Semitic.
Congress instructs the NEC to
– circulate the full text of the Palestinian 
boycott call to all branches/LAs for information 
and discussion;
– encourage members to consider the moral 
implications of existing and proposed links 
with Israeli academic institutions;
– organise a UK-wide campus tour for 
Palestinian academic/educational trade 
unionists;
– issue guidance to members on appropriate 
forms of action;
– actively encourage and support branches 
to create direct links with Palestinian 
educational institutions and to help set up 
nationally sponsored programmes for teacher 
exchanges, sabbatical placements, and 
research.372
The motion was passed by 158 votes to 99.373 
Prime Minister Tony Blair phoned his Israeli 
counterpart Ehud Olmert to reassure him that 
the boycott did not reflect wider public opinion 
in Britain, whilst Education Minister Bill Rammell 
informed the Israeli government that the British 
government would do whatever it could to defeat 
a boycott.374
BICOM launched Stop the Boycott jointly 
with the ‘Fair Play Campaign Group’ – itself a 
collaboration between the Board of Deputies 
and Jewish Leadership Council founded 
in December 2006 to ‘coordinate activity 
against boycotts of Israel and other anti-
Zionist campaigns’.375 The ‘Jewish Activities 
Committee’, a company limited by guarantee 
and based in the same premises as the 
JLC, sought donations to support STB’s 
activities.376 In February 2013, it was reported 
that the Community Security Trust (CST), a 
British charity ostensibly concerned only with 
combating anti-Semitism, was also on the 
executive committee of the Fair Play Campaign 
Group.377
With BICOM’s Lorna Fitzsimons and the JLC’s 
Jeremy Newmark as figureheads, STB enlisted 
the services of PR firm Champollion as a 
‘strategic advisor’.378 It also commissioned a 
Populus poll, which found that 86 per cent of 
business, cultural and political leaders in Britain 
opposed an academic boycott of Israel.379 Other 
activities included encouraging supporters to 
lobby their MPs to sign Early Day Motion 1603, 
tabled by Jane Kennedy MP (Labour), which 
opposed the idea of a boycott. More than 250 
academics signed a petition against a boycott in 
The Times and The Guardian380 and Lord Melvyn 
Bragg and Lord Robert Winston were quoted 
in the press as prominent critics of the UCU 
motion.381
Originally STB decided to support calls for the 
UCU to conduct a full ballot of its 120,000 
members, confident that the boycott motion 
would not pass. However, before this could 
happen, in September 2007, the UCU 
announced that its legal advice suggested an 
academic boycott of Israel could be unlawful and 
lead to legal action against the union.382 Although 
Stop the Boycott saw this as a victory, the issue 
continually resurfaced and in May 2009 another 
resolution on the boycott of Israeli academia was 
passed – but immediately declared void by the 
union’s lawyers.383 However, in the same year the 
Trades Union Congress, representing 6.5 million 
members, passed its first ever boycott motion 
relating to Israeli settlement goods and has 
subsequently passed further boycott policies.384 
Although in practice Stop the Boycott lost 
the argument in the unions, efforts to use 
legal measures against the boycott campaign 
subsequently picked up. In July 2011, Ronnie 
Jeremy Newmark
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Fraser, the director of Academic Friends 
of Israel, announced that he would sue at 
an employment tribunal claiming there was 
‘institutional anti-Semitism’ in the UCU.385 
However, Fraser’s attempt to take on the UCU 
was a comprehensive failure with all his claims 
‘dismissed in their totality’.386 The Tribunal judged 
that his claim was ‘an impermissible attempt to 
achieve a political end by litigious means’ which 
demonstrated ‘a worrying disregard for pluralism, 
tolerance and freedom of expression’ and 
lamented the fact that public resources had been 
‘squandered’ hearing the ‘unmeritorious’ case.387
Fraser was supported in his action by members 
of the Jewish Leadership Council388 and the 
Zionist Federation, where he sits on the National 
Council. It appears that legal claims of this kind 
are also supported by the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In a briefing in South Africa in 
February 2013, Amir Sagie, the director of the 
ministry’s civil society affairs department noted 
that Israel had worked ‘in partnership with UK 
Jewry’ on two court cases related to boycotts in 
the previous six months.389 It is not known if the 
Fraser case is one of these. Another possible 
case is that of Moty Cristal, an Israeli negotiator 
who – supported by the JLC and ‘liaising closely 
with the government of Israel’390 – brought 
a discrimination claim against a Manchester 
NHS Trust and the trade union UNISON after 
an invitation to him to run a workshop was 
withdrawn.391
A core element of the BICOM strategy is to, 
isolate and undermine critics of Israel. 
Mobilising the grass roots
BICOM has recently invested significantly in 
attempts to manage and mobilise the UK Jewish 
community. Poju Zabludowicz has referred 
to BICOM as a ‘communal organisation’,392 
suggesting that key figures see it as a body 
representing the Jewish community. It has 
attempted to mobilise British Jews in support of 
Israel and in opposition to those active in Palestine 
solidarity and human rights work (which includes 
many Jews). Pressure on Israel advocates in the 
UK to mobilise came from the series of influential 
reports published in 2010 by the Israeli Reut 
Institute on what it called ‘the delegitimisation 
challenge’ faced by Israel. London was identified 
as ‘the hub of hubs’ of this phenomenon.393 
Writing in the Jerusalem Post in February 
2011, Fitzsimons implicitly acknowledged that 
BICOM had lost support amongst British Jews, 
particularly liberals and the left:
I believe we have to defend Israel even more 
visibly. We also need to reengage with the 
grass roots of British Jewry. We cannot 
win the public debate without the backing 
of a mobilised, active community at a local 
level. Marking BICOM’s 10th anniversary 
this year, we are planning the largest ever 
pro-Israel conference in London. We are 
launching a campaign to win back and hold 
the center ground alongside many other 
communal organisations. We are launching 
the progressive case for Israel and driving 
the campaign for the Left to support it as a 
Jewish state.394
This focus on managing UK Jewry resulted in a 
conference held on 15 May 2011 and originally 
called ‘Winning Britain back for Israel’. It was 
organised by BICOM and backed by the Jewish 
Chronicle, the Board of Deputies, the Jewish 
Leadership Council, 395 the Zionist Federation and 
the Israeli embassy.396 It was in fact the second 
such conference organised by BICOM. The first 
was held on the JFS School’s campus in North 
West London on 5 April 2008 and was reportedly 
attended by over 200 activists. Speakers included 
Lorna Fitzsimons, John Spellar MP, Israeli 
Ambassador Ron Prosor, DJ Collins, director 
of Google in the UK and Ireland and Michael 
Prescott of PR firm Weber Shandwick, a former 
political editor of the Sunday Times.397 
The 2011 conference was much larger 
and would have a more lasting impact. 
BICOM established a website at www.
israeladvocacyconference.org.uk which 
adopted the slogan ‘We believe in Israel’.398 
This was later registered as a trademark 
by BICOM399 and became the URL for the 
conference website (www.webelieveinisrael.
org.uk). The conference organisers told the 
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Jerusalem Post: ‘Sessions will allow attendees 
to develop personal knowledge and skills 
– encompassing letter-writing, lobbying 
Parliament.’400 The conference is said to have 
included over 50 workshops for Israel lobbyists 
and media activists. Around 1,500 people 
reportedly attended.401 Key presenters included 
the then Defence Secretary Liam Fox and 
the Israeli politician Natan Sharansky. Other 
notable guests included Sun journalist Trevor 
Kavanagh, the Israeli diplomat Ron Prosor, the 
UK Ambassador to Israel Matthew Gould and 
Tony Blair’s former director of communications, 
Matthew Doyle.402 Liam Fox gave a speech 
in which he criticised Israeli settlements in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and was 
booed by a group of delegates.403 He was also 
reportedly jeered by delegates after saying 
the UK Government hoped the Fatah-Hamas 
agreement would lead to a peaceful outcome.404 
The conference was subsequently cited by 
one of the Reut Institute’s main analysts, 
Eran Shayson, as a key event in 2011, which 
witnessed ‘the emergence of the pro-Israel 
network’ to combat delegitimisation.405 In keeping 
with the conference’s aim to ‘begin the fight-back 
for Israel’,406 a toolkit was published designed 
to ‘give pro-Israel campaigners the essential 
information and advice needed to campaign for 
Israel both all-year-round and in the event of a 
crisis when Israel hits the headlines’. It included 
sections on ‘how to influence people’, ‘dining for 
Israel’ and ‘dealing with anti-Israel arguments’.407
In August 2011, BICOM appointed Labour Party 
right-winger Luke Akehurst, formerly of the PR 
firm Weber Shandwick, as full time director of 
‘We Believe in Israel’,408 which was established 
as a permanent ‘grassroots network’ to ‘build 
on the success’ of the conference.409 A second 
conference in April 2012 was planned, but in 
February BICOM cancelled it, saying: ‘In the 
short term we have decided we want to focus, 
rather than on a one-off “big bang” event, on 
the quiet organisational revolution that needs to 
take place to enable us to punch our weight in 
the debate about Israel in the UK.’410 Another 
conference however is planned for 2013.
In January 2013, ‘We Believe in Israel’ claimed 
to have ‘3,400 subscribers’411 on its mailing 
list and its emails to supporters have included 
offers of support to set up local pro-Israel 
groups. Akehurst has spoken at a number of 
regional events.412 The group has collaborated 
with Labour Friends of Israel to host an event 
in the House of Commons413 and often urges 
supporters to contact MPs, MEPs and the 
press. It has distributed a leaflet claiming that 
a number of Palestine Solidarity Campaign 
groups have expressed anti-Semitic views414 
and has supported efforts to counter the 
boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign, 
for instance suggesting supporters contact 
the Co-op supermarket after it stopped doing 
business with companies sourcing goods from 
illegal settlements.415 During ‘Operation Pillar 
of Defence’ in November 2012, We Believe 
in Israel sent out daily briefings and circulated 
information about an ‘emergency rally’ in 
support of Israel organised by the Zionist 
Federation.416
In conclusion; BICOM’s strategy is to insulate 
the political elite from pressure to support 
Palestinian human rights. This is done especially 
via the media, by isolating critics of Israel and 
by mobilising British Jews (amongst others) in 
support of Israel. It is important to recognise how 
the attack on critics of Israel and the mobilisation 
of support have important mutually confirming 
elements. The attempt to mobilise British Jews 
and to dissuade critics in the Jewish community 
from speaking out is also very important for them 
as it helps to identify Jews en masse with Israel 
thus helps to head off criticism of Israel from  
non-Jews.
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Chapter Six – Funding and finances
BICOM’s accounts for the years ending 30 
April 2002 and 2003 reported an income of 
£373,674 and £460,921 respectively. Since 
then however its accounts have provided no 
information detailing its income or expenses and 
disclosed only its balance sheet (which contains 
a breakdown of assets and liabilities). However, 
press reports and the disclosure of donations 
by BICOM directors confirm that BICOM’s 
income has increased substantially since then. 
Similarly, BICOM does not disclose the identity 
of its donors, but press reports as well as certain 
details available from corporate filings reveal the 
identity of a number of its financial backers. 
BICOM’s chairman Poju Zabludowicz has 
been the organisation’s main backer since its 
establishment in 2002, but there have been a 
number of other major donors. In September 
2002, the South African born multi-millionaire and 
Labour Party donor, Isaac Kaye, was reported to 
be a ‘key backer’ of BICOM, as was the British 
businessman David Green.417 Kaye is reportedly 
a representative of BICOM418 and David Green 
is the organisation’s treasurer. According to a 
report in the Jewish Chronicle, BICOM’s original 
backers also included some of the leading 
supporters of the United Jewish Israel Appeal 
(UJIA),419 which was the major donor behind 
BIPAC, the forerunner to BICOM. Zabludowicz 
has been affiliated with the UJIA since the 1990s 
and is currently a member of its advisory board.420 
BICOM’s former deputy chairman, Michael Lewis 
has also been a major donor to the UJIA, and was 
one of its directors when BICOM was founded. 
Financial developments
BICOM reportedly had a budget of £1.2 
million in 2006 – well over twice its budget 
three years earlier.433 In July 2007, following 
private discussions with Gerald Ronson, the 
key donor behind the Community Security 
Trust, Zabludowicz announced that he would 
underwrite a £300,000 BICOM ‘fighting fund’ 
in response to the UCU’s boycott motion.434 
Zabludowicz’s total donations to BICOM then 
increased almost threefold, from £341,694 in 
2006, to £937,995 in 2007.435 That December 
he announced that he would double his donation 
to BICOM in 2008 to £1 million, adding that: ‘my 
donations must be followed by other likeminded 
individuals’.436 This statement however does not 
seem to match the reported figures in BICOM’s 
accounts, since Zabludowicz had already 
donated just under £1 million in 2007 and in 
2008 his donations in fact decreased overall 
to £837,616,437 decreasing further in 2009 to 
£780,247.438 
BICOM’s budget increased again in 2009 and 
2010. At a meeting held on 8 July 2009, its 
board agreed that it would require a 12.5 per 
cent increase in spending that year and a 25 
per cent increase in 2010 – increasing its total 
expenditure to around £2million. Its then director, 
Lorna Fitzsimons said: ‘Our detractors will use 
the political and trade union conferences in 
September to their advantage and we must 
uplift our activities to meet this need.’439 Though 
the value of Zabludowicz’s donations since that 
time have not been disclosed, BICOM’s 2010 
accounts confirm that it has remained dependent 
on him for monthly financial support.440
Though Zabludowicz remains its core donor, 
a board member has stated to the press that 
BICOM has as many as 120 different donors.441 
Very few of these donors however are known. 
Certain donations are detailed in BICOM’s 
accounts, due to the fact that the donors also 
served as company directors. Its former deputy 
chairman, the South African financier Michael 
Lewis, for example, is known to have donated 
 Gerald Ronson
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a total of £25,000 between 2006 and 2007.442 
Much smaller sums from other BICOM directors 
have also been disclosed. Jonathan Kestenbaum 
is known to have donated £2,000 in both 2007443 
and in 2008 and Philip Rubenstein made annual 
donations of £250 between 2006 and 2008.444 
Michael Sherwood, a Goldman Sachs trader is 
reportedly a donor.445 BICOM’s vice-chairman, 
Edward Misrahi, an Italian hedge fund partner 
and former Goldman Sachs trader may also a 
donor. He joined the BICOM board in November 
2011. The Benson Black Memorial Charitable 
Trust is known to have donated £5,000 in 
the 2009 and 2010 tax years.446 The Trust is 
controlled by Keith Black, a former chair of the 
UJIA in Manchester, and members of his family. 
David Green – BICOM’s Treasurer
BICOM’s Treasurer David Green421 is extremely low profile but is reportedly one of its key 
backers.422 He comes from a large and wealthy family, originally from the East End of London, 
but which subsequently moved to the city’s affluent northern suburbs. One of his uncles, the late 
Monty Green, was a lieutenant-colonel in the Indian army during the Second World War and went 
on to became a founder of the Israel Defense Forces and a member of the Israeli General Staff 
during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War.423
The Green family originally made their money through tobacco in colonial India, but later invested 
in property and electrical engineering in the UK. In the 1960s these interests were consolidated 
into British Industrial Holdings, which was chaired by David Green’s late father Joseph. The family 
took the company private in 1977 through its vehicle Greenbrook Securities.424 Today David Green 
and his close family own and run the electrical components corporation Greenbrook Industries, 
which also has interests in property and stakes in Sandal plc and Unicorn Training Group.425 
Isaac Kaye – an early ‘key backer’
Isaac Kaye is a South African born multi-millionaire who came to Britain in 1985. Like David 
Green, he was reported to be a ‘key backer’ of BICOM shortly after its establishment in 2002426 
and is reported to be one of the organisation’s board members.427 
Kaye made his millions from drugs companies428 and has been associated with a number of 
political scandals. In South Africa during the early 1980s an official ‘gifts for influence’ inquiry 
found that he had ‘no scruples about applying dishonest or unethical methods’,429 although 
Kaye denied ‘any impropriety, saying the giving of presents was not an inducement but an 
appreciation’. In the UK Kaye became a major donor to New Labour in the late 1990s and in 
2008 funded Peter Hain’s bid for the deputy leadership via a think tank that had ‘never’ held a 
meeting.430431 He is a donor to Labour Friends of Israel and the United Jewish Israel Appeal as 
well as BICOM432 and has business interests in Israel where he co-founded the venture capital 
firm Israel HealthCare Ventures (IHCV). Like Zabludowicz, Kaye has also funded the Herzliya 
Conference at the Interdisciplinary Center, Israel’s only private university.
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Michael Lewis – donor and former vice chair
Michael Lewis is a UK-based South African financier who served as a director of BICOM between 
September 2006 and December 2007. During this time he was reportedly the organisation’s vice-
chairman and is known to have donated a total of £25,000.447 He has said that he has had no 
involvement in BICOM since 2007, but has confirmed that he remains a donor.448
Michael Lewis was born on 27 January 1959, the son of the Stanley and Zea Lewis (née Theadora). 
His paternal grandfather, the Latvian-born Meyer Lewis, established a furniture company in Cape 
Town in 1934 which in 1946 was listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.449 For several 
decades Michael Lewis’s late father, Stanley Lewis, controlled the South African clothing retailer 
Foschini and the Israeli travel company Paltours (which was originally a subsidiary of the Jewish 
Colonial Trust450).
Stanley Lewis moved from Cape Town to London in 1986451 where he established the family’s 
investment vehicle Oceana Investment Corporation, probably best known in the UK for its 
attempted takeover of the Etam clothing chain in 1992.452 Michael Lewis joined Oceana 
Investment Corporation in 1987 having worked as a fund manager in Edinburgh and London453 
and from that point jointly managed the family’s business interests with his father.
Today the Lewis family’s substantial wealth, which is held via trusts and offshore companies, is 
managed by Michael Lewis and his business associate David Sable, a fellow South African. Lewis 
and Sable run a London based investment advisory firm, Oceana Investment Partners, which 
manages the approximately £8 million of assets held by the family’s UK holdings company Oceana 
Investment Corporation as well as approximately £38 million worth of assets held by the Jersey 
incorporated Oceana Concentrated Opportunities Fund Ltd. The Jersey Fund has significant 
stakes in the African furniture company, the Lewis Group (founded by Lewis’s grandfather), the 
UK property companies Max Property Group plc and Berkeley Group Holdings plc, and the UK 
merchant bank United Trust Bank, where Michael Lewis serves as a director.454 The Fund has also 
committed £5.9 million to Synova Capital, a private equity fund in which Poju Zabludowicz is the 
main investor.455
The Oceana Concentrated Opportunities Fund formerly invested approximately a third of its funds in 
the pro-Israel German media company Axel Springer, where Michael Lewis is still a member of the 
Supervisory Board.456 The shares were purchased from Friede Springer, the widow of the company’s 
founder who is friends with Michael Lewis and with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.457
The Lewis family has supported other pro-Israel organisations in the UK in addition to BICOM. 
The family’s charitable foundation, the Stanley & Zea Lewis Family Foundation, donated a total of 
£193,239 to the United Jewish Israel Appeal between April 2009 and March 2011458 and in 2011 
pledged £3 million to the University of Oxford to fund the appointment of a Professor of Israel 
Studies.459 Michael Lewis, who is a trustee of the family foundation, was a director of the United 
Jewish Israel Appeal from September 2001 to October 2007.
Michael Lewis is also chairman of the London-based think tank, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
(ISD), having joined as a trustee in 2005.460 The ISD was founded by its President, the veteran 
Zionist Lord Weidenfeld. It grew out of the Club of Three, an elite policy forum bringing together 
powerful figures from business and politics in France, Germany and the UK. The Institute jointly 
organises an annual event called the European-Israeli Dialogue with Axel Springer, the Jerusalem 
Foundation and the Portland Trust. It also sponsors research on ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’.461
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David Menton – director and donor
David Menton is a close business associate of Zabludowicz’s and a director of, and donor 
to, BICOM.462 Menton’s official CV states that he ‘spent a number of years’ at the advertising 
company WPP plc before joining Zabludowicz’s Tamares Capital in 2000. There he says he 
spent seven years ‘leading its private equity activities and developing UK investment strategy’.463 
Menton’s role at Tamares has been described variously as ‘property advisor’, ‘investment 
manager’, ‘corporate affairs advisor’ and ‘communications director’. In 2007 he launched the 
private equity fund, Synova Capital, with his brother-in-law Philip Shapiro. The launch was 
backed by funds from Zabludowicz who was appointed the firm’s chairman. Synova Capital 
operates out of Tamares’s London office and Tamares Capital Corporation Ltd is a partner in the 
firm. 
Menton was a campaigns organiser for the Union of Jewish Students (UJS) in the late 1990s 
during which time he organised campaigns ‘combating extremism’464 and lobbied the Home 
Secretary to ban Islamist groups on campus.465 He attended the annual Herzliya Conference 
as a representative of the Zabludowicz Trust in 2003 and as a representative of Tamares in 
2004, 2007 and 2009. He chaired a panel on the media at BICOM’s 2011 We Believe in Israel 
conference and has attended a number of fundraising dinners for BICOM and the UJIA.
Menton has provided political donations in the US and the UK. In June 2007 he made two 
donations of $2,300 to Hilary Clinton’s Presidential campaign and in May 2008 he made two 
donations of $2,300 to the election campaign of Nevada representative Shelley Berkley, one of 
which was returned in August that year (Zabludowicz owns substantial property interests in Las 
Vegas, in the state of Nevada). 
In 2008 Menton donated £1,000 to the UK Labour Party in John Spellar’s constituency of Warley 
and in 2010 donated £3,000 to Oona King to support her challenge to Ken Livingstone as the 
Labour Party’s candidate for London Mayor. In 2011 he donated £2,477 to the Labour Party in 
Michael Dugher’s constituency of Barnsley East.
Edward Misrahi – vice chair
Edward Solomon Misrahi, an Italian national, was born in Spain on 26 December 1969, the 
son of Henri and Astrid Misrahi. His father was a businessman in Madrid where his mother was 
national president of the Women’s International Zionist Organization (WIZO).466 Misrahi studied 
economics at Princeton University in the United States and after graduating joined the investment 
bank Goldman Sachs in New York. He worked at the bank for 13 years, first as an associate in 
equities arbitrage467 and later as a Latin America expert and head of proprietary trading.
During his time at Goldman Sachs, Misrahi donated several thousand pounds to various US 
politicians and candidates including Republicans George W. Bush, Dick Cheney and John McCain 
and several Democrat candidates. More recently his wife donated a total of $6,900 to John 
McCain and Sarah Palin’s 2008 electoral campaigns.
Misrahi left Goldman Sachs to join the multi-billion dollar hedge fund Eton Park, which was 
founded in 2004 by former Goldman Sachs partner Eric Mindich. Misrahi became a Senior 
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Managing Director at the firm where he headed the Europe and emerging markets team. In 2012 
he left Eton Park with several members of his team.468 Since 2009 he has been an investor in 
the private equity fund Synova Capital, in which BICOM chair Poju Zabludowicz is the major 
investor.469 He joined the board of BICOM in September 2011 and at the end of 2012 was vice 
chair and chairman of the ‘We Believe in Israel’ initiative.470 
Misrahi is involved in various other charities and not-for-profit organisations. In July 2011, he 
was appointed co-chairman of the Board of Governors of Immanuel College, a private Jewish 
school in Hertfordshire originally funded by the right-wing Zionist philanthropists Stanley Kalms 
and Gerald Ronson. With his wife Janet he has hosted fundraising dinners for the Women’s 
International Zionist Organisation (WIZO). They have also donated to the Centre for Jewish Life, 
OneFamily, an Israeli organisation that supports victims of political violence, as well as supporting 
several other charities such as the Old Vic theatre and the International Rescue Committee. 
Misrahi lives with his wife Joyce and their three sons.471 They have a home in St John’s Wood, 
North London, as well as homes in Manhattan and the Hamptons in the US.
Figure 4. The business interests and connections of the main BICOM funders
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Business delegations and 
fundraising dinners
In June 2005 BICOM organised a trip to Israel 
for 20 British businessmen and financiers, 
raising a reported £1 million. Members of 
the group met with Israeli Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon, his deputy Shimon Peres 
and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas.472 
Present on the fundraising mission were 
Goldman Sachs banker Michael Sherwood, 
hedge funder and former Goldman Sachs 
Partner Ron Beller and his wife Jennifer 
Moses, a former adviser to Gordon Brown, 
multi-millionaires Edward and Celia Atkin and 
Conservative Friends of Israel chairman Richard 
Harrington.473 BICOM was reported to be 
organising a similar fundraising trip to the US 
for that September, for which delegates were 
expected to donate a five-figure sum.474
In January 2008 BICOM held its first fundraising 
dinner at Gallery 176 in London. The dinner 
raised £800,000 and was attended by around 
100 guests including Lord and Lady Weidenfeld, 
Lord and Lady Mitchell, David Lewis, Isaac Kaye, 
Sir Trevor Chinn, Brian Kerner and David and 
Claire Menton.475 In late 2009 it held a fundraising 
dinner at the Berkeley Hotel in Knightsbridge. 
The dinner was attended by around 160 people 
and raised £800,000 for BICOM. Guests 
including Israeli Ambassador Ron Prosor, former 
US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, investor 
Oren Peleg, Howard Shore, London property 
magnate Vincent Tchenguiz, David Menton and 
Philip Shapiro, businessman Joe Dwek and 
property investors Edna and Peter Goldstein.476
In September 2010 it was reported that 
Netanyahu would be a guest at the BICOM 
annual dinner, which was scheduled for the 
evening of 1 November.477 Netanyahu however 
later cancelled his appearance and was replaced 
by his deputy Dan Meridor, only for Meridor to 
cancel at the last minute after being warned by 
the Israeli Justice Ministry that he might face 
arrest for alleged war crimes.478 The dinner was 
attended by Liam Fox, Michael Gove, Hazel 
Blears and Tony Blair’s former political director, 
Matthew Doyle. Gove gave a speech saying that 
he thought the use of the term ‘disproportionate’ 
– notably used by Foreign Secretary William 
Hague as well as human rights groups – to 
describe Israel’s attack on Lebanon in 2006 had 
been wrong.479
On 1 November 2011 BICOM held its 10th 
anniversary dinner, sponsored by El Al. The 
French intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy gave 
an after dinner speech in which he claimed 
Israel was facing a ‘new form of anti-Semitism’ 
and ‘delegitimisation’.480 Political guests at 
the dinner including the Labour MPs Luciana 
Berger, Michael Dugher, John Spellar and John 
Woodcock.481
The influence and interests of 
BICOM donors
BICOM is completely dependent on these 
donors for its continued support.  This in itself 
means that their donations bring with them a 
considerable degree of influence. Moreover it 
appears that major donors exert direct influence 
over BICOM through the board of directors, 
which is chaired by BICOM’s main donor, Poju 
Zabludowicz.  Understanding the interests and 
motives of BICOM’s donors is therefore important 
to understanding its institutional raison d’être.
In her sociological study of New York 
philanthropy, Francie Ostrower notes that 
not-for-profit institutions serve as ‘focal points 
around which upper-class life revolves’ and 
that fundraising events ‘provide exclusive 
settings for elite interaction’. ‘Through their 
philanthropy,’ Ostrower writes, ‘wealthy donors 
come together with one another and sustain 
a series of organizations that contribute to the 
social and cultural coherence of upper-class 
life’.482 Financial donations, she notes, tend to 
come from individuals who are actively involved 
in, and closely identify with, the grantee 
organisation, as well as from members of their 
wider social networks.483 This would seem to 
be born out in the case of BICOM, which has 
one major donor, who appears to be closely 
involved in its activities and connected to a 
number of its other donors.
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What motivates Zabludowicz and BICOM’s other 
supporters? No doubt its donors, both major and 
minor, feel a genuine commitment to Israel and to 
Zionism and supporting organisations like BICOM 
is a way of expressing these commitments. But 
at the same time such philanthropy brings with it 
significant prestige and networking opportunities, 
a fact made clear by BICOM’s fundraising trips 
have explicitly offered access to politicians. In the 
case of Zabludowicz, we have suggested that 
BICOM’s pro-Israel PR activities may be useful 
for protecting his business assets, many of which 
are in Israel. Perhaps more important though, this 
involvement in high level Israel advocacy brings 
with it opportunities to develop connections 
with Israeli state officials and likeminded elites in 
Europe, Israel and the United States, as well as 
the ‘cultural capital’ to facilitate such networking. 
Zabludowicz’s support for BICOM then, 
represents an opportunity for him to strengthen 
his power, prestige and status amongst his peers 
and relatedly to expand his transnational political 
and business network. BICOM’s fundraising 
dinners perhaps offer something of the same, 
presenting more minor, or at least less regular, 
donors with networking opportunities, as well 
as conferring a sense of importance and status 
through their sense of occasion and exclusivity.
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Chapter Seven – BICOM’s views and arguments
Sensible centrists?
BICOM was established in 2001 following 
the demise of the British Israel Public Affairs 
Committee (BIPAC) in 1999. According to its 
head, Helen Davis, BIPAC lost the support of its 
donors because it maintained a hard-line stance 
on the Oslo peace process.484 Business figures 
with money to bankroll pro-Israel lobbying in the 
UK – such as Poju Zabludowicz, the primary 
funder of BICOM – had a financial interest in 
preserving the impression that progress towards 
stability was being made because the peace 
process paved the way for increasing economic 
ties with Israel.485
Describing BICOM’s activities in 2011, 
Zabludowicz stated:
We have learnt over the last 10 years, 
through the research work BICOM has 
undertaken, that the key to creating a more 
supportive environment for Israel in Britain is 
convincing people in this country that Israel 
seeks a lasting peace with its neighbours. 
As long as this argument remains credible 
then people will generally forgive mistakes 
and difficulties even if peace continues to be 
elusive. [our emphasis]486 
These comments by Zabludowicz help us to 
understand BICOM’s strategy. Its interest is in 
presenting the appearance of a peace process 
regardless of the actual outcome. Over the years 
it has taken steps to refine its message and 
appear more reasonable. 
In 2002 BICOM’s website was reportedly 
‘peppered…with statements such as “Jerusalem 
was never the capital of any Arab entity” and 
“no Palestinian would risk injury if they were not 
attacking Israelis”’.487 Such assertions, no longer 
appear on the site. Similarly, internet archive 
holdings show that from 5 December 2002 (or 
earlier) until at least 7 May 2005, the ‘About’ 
section of BICOM’s website read:
BICOM’s objective is, over time, to bring about 
a significant shift in opinion in favour of Israel 
amongst the general public, opinion-formers 
and the Jewish community.488
These days its self-description is lengthier 
and more bipartisan-sounding: dropping talk 
of shifting opinion and instead emphasising 
‘a more supportive environment’ for, and a 
‘more complete understanding’ of, Israel. This 
ostensible even-handedness is also underscored 
by reference to a Palestinian state:
We believe in the right of the State of Israel to 
live in peace and security, just as we believe in 
the rights of the Palestinians to statehood.489
The existence of a broad international consensus 
in support of Palestinian statehood is enough 
to explain why BICOM, to maintain its own 
credibility, pays lip service to the abstract idea.
However BICOM’s commitment is devoid 
of detail. In fact, BICOM was outspoken in 
opposing the Palestinian bid for ‘non-member 
state’ status at the UN in 2010, with its Director 
of Research Toby Greene claiming it was likely 
to ‘undermine prospects for reviving the peace 
process’.490 Close examination of BICOM’s 
positions suggests that in practice it opposes 
key aspects of international law and several 
prerequisites of the internationally recognised 
fundamentals for a Palestinian state – suggesting 
that its professed support may in fact be little 
more than a rhetorical device deployed to foster 
an environment in which people will – in the 
words of Zabludowicz as cited above – ‘forgive’ 
Israel for its ‘mistakes’. 
Despite BICOM staffers links to the right wing of 
the Labour Party, and attempts to reach out to 
left-leaning bloggers,491 its spokespeople have 
showed staunch support for even the most right-
wing Israeli governments. Brian Kerner, BICOM 
vice chair, described as ‘a conservative in British 
politics but liberal left in the Israeli context’, told 
the Guardian he thought Ariel Sharon had ‘not put 
a foot wrong’.492 Lorna Fitzsimons, former BICOM 
Chair and Blair-era Labour MP, has defended 
Benjamin Netanyahu as ‘forward thinking’, a teller 
62 •  Public Interest Investigations
of ‘inconvenient truths’ and a supporter of two 
states.493 Importantly, Netanyahu and other right-
wingers have, in recent years, made statements 
to this effect.494 But there is considerable distance 
between the Likud vision of ‘a’ two state solution 
and ‘the’ two-state solution long advocated 
by the majority of the international community 
grounded in international law. BICOM’s stance, 
when examined in detail, resembles that of even 
the most hawkish Israeli leaders – not the latter.
What kind of peace?
While BICOM seeks to appear moderate, its 
‘Frequently Asked Questions’ – the text most 
closely resembling a statement of policy – 
shows that it supports Israeli rejectionism on 
the four key issues of the conflict, contrary to 
an overwhelming international legal and political 
consensus: 
1.  the idea of withdrawing to pre-1967 borders 
2. the status of Jerusalem 
3.  the need to dismantle all settlements in the 
West Bank
4. the right of return for Palestinian refugees.
While making much of its support for a 
Palestinian state, BICOM, following the Israeli 
government, chooses to interpret the wording 
of UN Security Council resolution 242 – passed 
unanimously after Israel occupied the West Bank 
in 1967 – in a way which allows it to argue that 
it is not required to withdraw to pre-67 borders. 
BICOM claims:
The resolution deliberately avoided obligating 
Israel to withdraw from all the territories it had 
captured, leaving open the question of future 
borders for negotiation.495
Such an argument rests on the absence of either 
the word ‘the’ or the word ‘all’ from the English 
language version of the resolution which called 
instead simply for withdrawal ‘from territories 
occupied’. Others argue that the semantic 
ambiguity of this is rendered irrelevant by the 
clear assertion in the resolution’s preamble of 
the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory 
by war’,496 but supporters of Israel like BICOM 
tend to overlook this principle. Israel is in clear 
violation also of UN Security Council resolution 
338, which in 1973 called again for resolution 
242 to be implemented. But BICOM gives voice 
exclusively to the uniquely Israeli viewpoint 
that the West Bank is ‘disputed territory’497 
rather than occupied territory and expresses 
opposition to the idea of dismantling the biggest 
and most entrenched illegal settlements and in 
particular relinquishing its control of annexed 
East Jerusalem. If any clearer statement were 
needed to show that BICOM does not in fact 
support the Palestinians’ widely accepted right to 
a state within 1967 borders, it is provided in this 
succinct dismissal:
If Palestinian demands to return to pre-1967 
borders were taken literally, it would result in 
the redivision of Jerusalem and the loss of 
Israeli sovereignty over the Old City, which 
is something that most Israelis would not be 
willing to contemplate.498
The fact that BICOM bases its position on what 
Israelis are ‘willing to contemplate’ rather than 
on legal principles, shows that when it seeks to 
present itself as reasonable and moderate by 
saying it supports ‘the rights of the Palestinian to 
statehood’, this should not be ‘taken literally’, to 
use BICOM’s phrase.
BICOM refers to Jerusalem as ‘the capital of 
Israel’. This statement is highly controversial and 
runs counter to the position repeatedly endorsed 
by the international community. Although in 2008, 
when campaigning for his first Presidential term, 
Barack Obama stated at an AIPAC conference 
that ‘Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel’499, 
no country officially recognises Jerusalem as 
Israel’s capital and even the United States 
maintains its embassy, for this reason, in Tel Aviv 
rather than Jerusalem. 
A brief survey of the relevant international law 
and United Nations resolutions upon which the 
international community base their positions 
is useful at this point. UN General Assembly 
resolution 181, designated Jerusalem a corpus 
separatum in 1947 and the plan for the city to 
be administered under a special international 
regime was reinforced by resolution 194 and 
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resolution 303, respectively endorsed by the 
General Assembly in 1948 and 1949500, the 
latter even after the Israel occupied ‘modern’ 
(West) Jerusalem in the 1948-9 war.501 In the 
1967 war, Israel occupied and annexed East 
Jerusalem including the Old City. A second set 
of resolutions serve as the basis for labelling 
Israel an occupying power in East Jerusalem: 
these include UN Security Council resolution 
242502 and resolutions 476 and 478 which 
condemned violations of the Geneva Convention 
and proclaimed Israel’s 1980 Jerusalem Law 
(which declared that Jerusalem was Israel’s 
capital) to be ‘null and void’.503 These and other 
resolutions were reiterated more recently in the 
2009 General Assembly resolution 63/30. The 
Palestinian leadership considers East Jerusalem 
the capital of a future Palestinian state and the 
British government unambiguously considers 
East Jerusalem to be occupied territory.504 
While BICOM does not explicitly challenge the 
broad international consensus based on the 
above, or offer an explanation of its reasons for 
labelling Jerusalem ‘the capital of Israel’, its use 
of such language with regard to such a vital issue 
seems highly unlikely to have been casual or 
careless and more likely to have been deliberately 
deployed, indicating that it accepts and supports 
Israeli exceptionalism on this point. 
There is a similar international consensus on 
the issue of the illegality of settlements. UN 
Security Council resolutions 446505 and 452,506 
adopted in 1979, affirm the applicability of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention outlawing the 
occupying power from transferring its civilian 
population into the occupied territories. The UN 
General Assembly resolution 39/146, adopted 
in 1984, reiterated a host of other resolutions 
and again condemned the settlements.507 In 
2004 the International Court of Justice stated its 
unanimous opinion that settlements had been 
constructed ‘in breach of international law’.508 
Despite the weight of the world’s political and 
legal opinion asserting their illegality, the Israeli 
government continues to construct properties 
for Israeli settlers in occupied territory – for 
example announcing it would build 3,000 new 
homes in East Jerusalem settlements and pursue 
development in the highly strategically sensitive 
‘E1’ area, directly following the vote upgrading 
Palestine’s United Nations status in November 
2012. BICOM stands with the Israeli government 
in its unilateral rejection of the international 
consensus on settlements and as such is 
advocating a position far from the centre ground.
BICOM often refers euphemistically 
to settlements as ‘communities’ or as 
‘neighbourhoods’ and states: ‘There is a broad 
consensus in Israel that the larger settlement 
blocs around Jerusalem and on key strategic 
points protecting Israel’s narrow coastal plain 
should remain part of Israel.’509 As with its 
stance on Jerusalem, it pays heed to the Israeli 
perspective while obscuring by omission the 
extent to which this perspective runs counter 
to both legal principles and longstanding 
international consensus. Continuing by pointing 
out that ‘The Clinton Parameters in 2000 
and the unofficial Geneva Accords in 2003 
accepted this principle and suggested some 
form of land swap’510, BICOM lends legitimacy 
to and implicitly endorses this plan. Elsewhere, 
it even offers a defence of extremist settler 
groups, saying that ‘independent Jewish right-
wing organisations have worked to acquire 
houses in Arab neighbourhoods like Silwan 
and Jabel Mukaber’ and noting that ‘the Israeli 
government contends that there is no legal 
basis to prevent Jews from acquiring homes in 
eastern neighbourhoods of the city’ 511 without 
mentioning the existence of international law 
proscribing the transfer of a civilian population 
into occupied territory, against which the Israeli 
government makes its counter-claim. 
BICOM does invoke international law to point to 
violations on the Palestinian side. For example, 
it correctly notes that the refusal of requests by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross to 
visit Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (captured and held 
by Hamas from June 2006 until October 2011) 
were ‘contrary to the demands of international 
humanitarian law’. Its assertion of international 
law is highly selective, however, and rather than 
engage with and dispute the widely accepted 
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illegality of settlements, in the ‘FAQs’, BICOM 
simply ignores it. However, BICOM’s Luke 
Akehurst, has elsewhere disputed the illegality 
of settlements by arguing that the Geneva 
Convention does not apply. He states that it was 
designed to stop ‘forced deportations of the 
type perpetrated by Hitler and Stalin’, and while 
‘Israel has not “transferred” its civilian population, 
some of them have moved voluntarily’.512 The 
International Committee of the Red Cross, 
the United Nations and the International Court 
of Justice all say, however, that the Fourth 
Geneva Convention does apply to the Occupied 
West Bank, article 49 of which means Israeli 
settlements are illegal.513 
Akehurst’s explicit challenge to the international 
community’s interpretation of the foundational 
treaties of international law governing conduct 
during warfare, again highlights the extreme 
views underlying BICOM’s moderate and 
reasonable presentation. 
Before examining BICOM’s stance on the issue 
of refugees, we should first look at its account 
of the 1948 conflict. Its narrative concedes 
that the conflict ‘was a disaster for the Arab 
population of Palestine’ who are said to have 
‘left in large numbers for neighbouring Arab 
states’. The number of refugees created is not 
mentioned here and, more importantly, no room 
is left for any alternative versions of the history 
of this period. BICOM offers the traditional 
Israeli account of the war. But elsewhere it feels 
compelled to issue an explicit denial – ‘There 
was no deliberate, co-ordinated Jewish policy to 
expel the Arabs’.514 This is a sign of the influence 
of the so-called New Historians, such as Ilan 
Pappe, who have argued influentially that the 
contrary is in fact true.515 
However, whether the approximately 700,000 
refugees were expelled or fled is immaterial 
to the principle upholding their – and their 
descendants’ – right to return to their homes 
as innocent civilian victims of a conflict. The key 
United Nations resolution on the issue is General 
Assembly resolution 194, reaffirmed every year 
since its original adoption in 1948516, article 
11 of which resolves that ‘refugees wishing to 
return to their homes and live at peace with their 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the 
earliest practicable date’.517 Those who dispute 
the right of return often point to the qualitatively 
different nature of General Assembly resolutions, 
194 being a recommendation and therefore non-
binding. Claims and counter claims based on the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
sources are also made by opposing sides.
But BICOM’s take on the refugee issue appears 
to ignore international law and UN resolutions 
and instead merely states the Israeli view:
Israel does not believe it is responsible for 
resettling the refugees, believing their plight 
to be the responsibility of the Arab states 
that rejected the 1947 Partition Plan, started 
the war, and then refused to resettle the 
refugees created by that war in their own 
territory. In any case, no Israeli government 
will accept a solution that would allow millions 
of Palestinians to settle in Israel. This would 
effectively spell the end of the Jewish majority 
and the viability of Israel as a democratic 
Jewish state. Israel proposes that refugees be 
compensated with the help of the international 
community, and be resettled either in the 
new Palestinian state or in their country of 
residence. This is the principle of two-states 
for two peoples.518
Here BICOM, without using the phrase, touches 
on what Benjamin Netanyahu and others have 
called the ‘demographic threat’519, namely the 
risk that population growth among Arab Israelis 
(let alone the return of millions of Palestinian 
refugees) would compromise the ethnic balance 
required by Zionism to define Israel as ‘the 
Jewish Homeland’; a Jewish majority. This 
underlying ethnic exclusivism, highlights the 
discriminatory approach of both the Israeli state 
and BICOM. Along with Israel’s self-professed 
and legally insubstantial belief that the refugees’ 
‘plight…[is] the responsibility of the Arab states’ 
since they ‘rejected the 1947 Partition Plan [and] 
started the war’, it forms the basis for another 
of BICOM’s assertions, that ‘Israel absorbed 
hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants and 
refugees from Arab countries after 1948. But in 
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most cases, the Arab leaders made no effort to 
absorb Palestinian refugees.’520 This comparison 
is disingenuous, since many Palestinians did 
not want to be absorbed into any other country, 
and once more illustrates BICOM’s toeing of the 
rejectionist Israeli government line.
Former CEO Lorna Fitzsimons has herself penned 
articles explicitly denying the right of return of 
Palestinian refugees, saying ‘there cannot be a 
mass return of Palestinian refugees to [present-
day] Israel’.521 In a leaked email, Fitzsimons 
boasted that she had ‘briefed’ Financial Times 
leader writer Jonathan Ford, the day before an 
editorial by him on the Israeli-Palestinian issue 
appeared in that paper.522 Whether or not she 
influenced what he otherwise would have written 
is unclear, but the piece was certainly friendly 
to the BICOM line, suggesting for instance that 
Palestinian refugees should be bought off in 
return ‘for not exercising the right to return’.523
Sins of omission
BICOM’s narrative, as well as citing international 
law and UN resolutions selectively, also ignores 
some of the systematic human rights abuses 
of which Israel stands accused. Its ‘Frequently 
Asked Questions’ web page fails to address a 
number of questions regualarly posed a range 
of human rights. These include issues like 
Israel’s system of administrative detention which 
allows indefinitely renewable six month periods 
of imprisonment without charge or trial;524 land 
confiscation525 and access to water;526 forced 
evictions527 and house demolitions;528 settler 
violence;529 torture;530 military impunity;531 532 
suppression of freedom of expression533 and of 
protest.534 On discrimination against Palestinians 
inside Israel,535 the closest BICOM gets is to say 
that ‘as in other societies, minority groups still 
suffer from inequalities’.536 
BICOM states that Israel ‘has a strong legacy of 
independent judicial and state inquiries into the 
conduct of military and political leaders in times 
of conflict’. It cites the Israeli raid on the Mavi 
Marmara flotilla and killing of nine Turkish activists 
in May 2010 as an example of Israel holding its 
own security forces accountable, because in the 
wake of the global outrage it ordered a public 
inquiry called the Turkel Commission. Yet BICOM 
fails to mention that Amnesty International 
labelled this commission a ‘whitewash’537 and 
even the Israeli newspaper Haaretz described the 
investigation as a ‘farce’.538
Conclusions
Under the microscope, BICOM’s political 
positions, although very carefully worded and 
delivered in a tone that sounds reasonable, 
are far from moderate. Policies and practices it 
advocates or defends frequently run counter to 
international law and United Nations resolutions, 
inevitably so, given that it frequently attempts 
to justify actions of the Israeli state which are 
in contravention of international law. BICOM 
says it supports a two state solution but in 
practice opposes the elements that constitute 
it: withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, relinquishing 
control of East Jerusalem, the removal of 
settlements and a just resolution to the refugee 
question. Instead, the thrust of its arguments 
imply that it believes Israel should be required 
only to negotiate some degree of land swap, 
should be allowed to retain control of the whole 
of the city of Jerusalem, should not have to 
evacuate all illegal settlements – and should be 
able to prioritise the preservation of an ethnically 
Jewish majority in Israel over the rights of 
Palestinian refugees. These are not compatible 
with the two state solution as envisaged by the 
international community.
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Chapter Eight – The Fox-Werritty scandal and the 
decline of democracy
When the Werritty scandal brought down 
Defence Secretary Liam Fox in October 2011, 
it exposed a complex web of political and 
economic connections, some with direct 
relevance for this report.
For almost a decade, Adam Werritty’s 
consultancy interests closely tracked the 
evolution of his close friend Fox’s career as a 
Shadow Secretary of State, first for Health and 
later for Defence, until he eventually became 
director of Fox’s charity Atlantic Bridge.
The scandal had three, interconnected aspects:
1.  Sri Lanka. As Fox’s unofficial adviser, 
Werritty had extensive contacts in the Sri 
Lankan government, a regime which was 
heavily armed by Israel during its civil war 
with the Tamils. Although the Foreign Office 
attempted to rein in this relationship during 
Fox’s time in office, earlier contacts may have 
emboldened the Sri Lankans in resisting 
attempts by the previous Labour government 
to broker peace talks. 
2.  Iran. Of even greater geopolitical significance 
was Werritty’s role in a range of contacts 
related to the standoff over Iran’s nuclear 
programme.
  Fox and Werritty travelled to Iran in 2007, 
after which Werritty continued to visit 
the country and to meet with opposition 
supporters in the Iranian diaspora. He was 
debriefed about these contacts by MI6 
in early 2011. Around this time Fox and 
Werritty met on the sidelines of the Herzliya 
conference in Israel, with senior figures from 
Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency, which 
like MI6, was heavily involved in attempts to 
halt Iran’s nuclear programme.
  While it has been suggested that these 
contacts were intended to assist preparations 
for an early military strike against Iran, many 
policymakers in both Britain and Israel were 
wary of this course, preferring an aggressive 
programme of covert action instead. While 
the British Government sought to distance 
itself from Werritty’s activities, there is some 
evidence that his contacts with officials were 
greater than initially acknowledged.
3.  Lobbying. It was the third element of the 
scandal, involving the more mundane world 
of political lobbying, that precipitated Fox’s 
downfall. Venture capitalist Harvey Boulter 
used his contacts with Fox to attempt to 
pressure US conglomerate 3M in a business 
dispute.
Individuals linked to BICOM featured in all three 
strands of the Werritty affair: Boulter’s meetings 
with Fox and Werritty were facilitated by Lee 
Petar, a former BICOM communications director, 
while Adam Werritty’s Sri Lankan and Middle 
Eastern contacts were funded by Pargav, a 
vehicle which shared backers with BICOM. 
(See Figure 5.)
Pargav’s BICOM donors
When the Werritty scandal broke, Prime Minister 
David Cameron asked the head of the Civil 
Service, Sir Gus O’Donnell, to report on the 
Liam Fox. © Chatham House
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allegations against Liam Fox. O’Donnell’s report 
identified a number of donors who gave money 
to Pargav Ltd, a company formed in June 2010, 
which Werritty described as ‘a not for profit 
organisation which has funded his work in the 
Middle East’. These included two entities linked 
to prominent supporters of BICOM: Tamares and 
Oceana Investments.539
The Tamares Group links a number of companies 
owned by BICOM chairman Poju Zabludowicz, 
who acknowledged a donation of £3,000 to 
Pargav, reportedly from Tamares Real Estate. His 
spokesman told The Times:
‘For many years, Poju Zabludowicz has 
helped fund not-for-profit organisations, 
not individuals, due to his passion for the 
promotion of peace and understanding 
between peoples in the United States, Europe 
and the Middle East,’ he said.
‘These organisations arrange private 
discussions between, sometimes opposing, 
parties, which are designed to promote 
this goal.’540
Oceana Investment Corporation, chaired by 
Michael Lewis, a former deputy chairman of 
BICOM, donated £30,000 to Pargav.541 542 Lewis 
had reportedly previously donated £13,832 
to Fox’s Atlantic Bridge charity.543 In 2005, five 
Conservative MPs who accompanied Fox on a 
trip to the United States declared in the Register 
of Members’ Interests that Lewis had funded 
their costs. Lewis said he had made no donation 
for that purpose, but had donated £5,000 
to Fox’s campaign for the leadership of the 
Conservative Party.544
Figure 5. The role of key BICOM supporters in Adam Werritty’s funding network.
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A third donor named in O’Donnell’s report 
was Mick Davis, the chief executive of Xstrata, 
who donated £30,000 to Pargav in a personal 
capacity.545 Davis is linked to BICOM through 
the Jewish Leadership Council, which he chairs, 
and of which BICOM is a member organisation, 
represented by Poju Zabludowicz.546 547  
The Werritty blame game
Details of Pargav’s funding came into the public 
domain after a meeting between Michael Hintze 
and The Times, arranged by Lord Tim Bell. 
Pargav was registered at the offices of Hintze’s 
hedge fund CQS, and Hintze aide Oliver Hylton 
was its sole director. The Times revelations 
nevertheless demonstrated that Hintze had not 
funded Pargav. However by pointing to new 
donors, some of whom had potential conflicts 
of interest, they also rendered Fox’s position 
untenable, precipitating his resignation.548
Press attention then moved on to the newly 
revealed donors, including those linked to 
BICOM, who also sought to play down their 
links with Werritty. A few days after The Times 
story broke, the Jewish Chronicle reported that 
the initiative for the donations came from the 
Conservative Party.549 
However, the only Conservative fundraiser 
identified in the story as soliciting donations was 
Howard Leigh, himself a member of the Jewish 
Leadership Council.550
Following the Jewish Chronicle story, 
a Conservative spokesperson told the 
Guardian: ‘Howard Leigh introduced donors to 
Liam Fox’s office during the 2005 leadership 
campaign. Some of them subsequently 
maintained contact with Dr Fox’s office. Mr 
Leigh had no knowledge of Pargav and has not 
introduced donors to Dr Fox for some time.’ 
the Guardian also quoted a Conservative Party 
source as stating that rather than Leigh soliciting 
the donations, it was the donors who had 
approached him seeking to support Fox.551
In the absence of any evidence as to why the 
Conservative Party would direct funds towards 
Pargav rather than itself, the Conservative version 
of events is more convincing. Some of the 
donors clearly had views about why they were 
supporting Pargav that went further than support 
for Fox or the Conservatives. The Mail reported 
that all three were ‘furious that the money was 
not used to promote peace and reconciliation 
projects as they had been led to believe but to 
fund Mr Werritty’s globetrotting’.552
As already noted, Poju Zabludowicz’s 
spokesman stated in response the Pargav 
revelations that Zabludowicz funded non-
profit organisations which ‘arrange private 
discussions between, sometimes opposing, 
parties’ to promote peace and understanding 
between the US, Europe and the Middle East. 
Werritty travelled extensively in the Middle East, 
but his ‘area of expertise’ was reportedly Iran 
and a number of his activities suggest this was 
a key focus of a discreet private diplomacy 
effort.553 
Before looking in detail at Fox and Werritty’s 
activities in the Middle East, it is worth looking 
at what their activities in Sri Lanka over a similar 
period reveals about their modus operandi.
Sri Lanka: Rajapaska’s Fox gambit
Fox’s links to Sri Lanka date back to the mid-
1990s, when as a junior Foreign Office minister 
he brokered the ‘Fox accords’, an unsuccessful 
attempt to end the conflict on the island. 
This formed the basis for renewed contacts 
prompted by a chance meeting with Foreign 
Minister Rohitha Bogollagama in 2007.554 Fox 
visited Sri Lanka in November 2007 and March 
2008, on both occasions at the invitation of 
the government, which paid for his flights and 
accommodation.555
By 2009, the Sri Lankan civil war was entering 
its final phase, with a government offensive that 
saw thousands of civilians held in detention 
and widespread human rights violations on 
both sides.556 In February that year, Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown nominated former 
Defence Secretary Des Browne as his envoy 
to the country. The appointment was quickly 
withdrawn when it was rejected by Sri Lanka with 
Foreign Minister Bogollagama warning of ‘major 
repercussions’. As Shadow Defence Secretary, 
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Fox claimed the episode showed Brown was 
‘making a complete mess of relations with 
friendly countries overseas’.557 
The Sri Lankan government paid for a further visit 
to the country by Fox in March 2009 and shared 
the cost of a second in August with an entity 
called the Sri Lankan Development Trust, which 
also paid for a visit in November 2009.558
Lord Tim Bell, whose lobbying firm Bell Pottinger 
represented the Sri Lankan government until 
December 2010, told the Financial Times that 
there had been discussions with the Trust about 
future work in the country, but operations had 
not yet begun. Fox’s entries in the Register of 
Members Interests for 2009 listed the Trust’s 
address as 40 George Street, the address 
of a private security consultancy, Good 
Governance Group (GGG).559 In June 2010, the 
same company would become one of the six 
contributors to Adam Werritty’s Pargav vehicle. A 
spokesman for GGG told the Telegraph that the 
company’s donations ‘were made in good faith 
that they would go to support the reconstruction 
work of the Sri Lankan Development Trust in the 
northern areas of Sri Lanka. Our involvement with 
the Sri Lankan Development Trust was not done 
for profit or at the behest of any clients.’560 The 
Financial Times noted that the chairman of Good 
Governance Group, Chester Crocker, sat on the 
US board of Bell Pottinger, but quoted an ‘ally’ as 
stating that he had no involvement with Sri Lanka 
and no knowledge of the Trust.561
According to the Guardian, Sri Lankan journalists 
recall Werritty accompanying Fox on visits to 
the country from early 2009. ‘Others said they 
believe they saw him on trips earlier, possibly 
from the middle of the decade, but that certain 
identification is impossible.’562 In August 2009, 
Werritty met Sri Lankan opposition MP Ravi 
Karunanayake in Colombo.563 Jason Burke 
reported:
The funding of Werritty’s own travel expenses 
is unclear. In November 2009, during a trip 
paid for Fox by the trust and the Sri Lankan 
government, Werritty is believed to have 
stayed at the Hilton, where rooms cost from 
£100 a night. 564
Fox and Werritty’s Sri Lankan activities continued 
after the 2010 general election returned Fox to 
office as Defence Secretary. Werritty was present 
at a meeting between Fox and Sri Lankan 
Foreign Minister, Gamini Lakshman Peiris during 
the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 4-6 
June, a few weeks after the election.565
Werritty also arranged and attended a meeting 
between Fox and Peiris at the Ministry of Defence 
on 20 October 2010. According to the Cabinet 
Office, an official was present but ‘no official 
matters were discussed and hence no record 
was produced’.566
Werritty and Fox met Sri Lankan 
president Mahinda Rajapaksa, in a suite 
in London’s Dorchester hotel around early 
December 2010.567 On 15 December, the 
Guardian reported that Foreign Secretary William 
Hague was ‘appalled’ at the prospect of a visit 
to Sri Lanka by Fox, because of human rights 
concerns in the wake of the offensive against the 
Tamil Tigers, and was considering an appeal to 
the Prime Minister.568 Nevertheless, the Sunday 
Leader of Sri Lanka would later report that the 
‘personal aide’ to Liam Fox, Adam Werritty, 
had arrived in the country on 16 December to 
Rajapaska. © Commonwealth Secreteriat
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coordinate arrangements for a speech by Fox at 
the Kadirgamar Institute. 
During this visit, British restrictions on arms 
exports were raised with Werritty.  Discussions 
also included Israeli exports, responsible for 
equipping a substantial proportion of the Sri 
Lankan navy and Air Force.569 One Sri Lankan 
official told the Independent:
it was inevitable that we would turn more 
towards China because that country has 
supported us through bad times as well 
as good. We have also good relations with 
Israel as well although there have been some 
difficulties over technology transfers. Mr 
Werritty has many contacts in the political and 
defence field in Israel and people here could 
talk about mutual acquaintances.570
Werritty’s interlocutors included Foreign 
Minister Peiris and Sachin Waas Gunawardene, 
the country’s Parliamentary Monitor for External 
Affairs.571 Gunawardene had previously been 
described by the US ambassador in a leaked 
2008 cable as ‘a Presidential aide and family 
friend with a track record of involvement in shady 
procurement deals’.572 After news from the UK 
that Fox’s trip had been called off, Peiris and 
Gunawardene asked that the cancellation be 
reduced to a postponement.573
According to the Guardian, ‘Fox had been 
forced to cancel his voyage as it had coincided 
with the WikiLeaks release of diplomatic cables 
revealing American diplomats’ concerns over 
the Sri Lankan government’s human rights 
record.’574 The Sunday Leader reported that 
the Rajapaksa administration had used Liam 
Fox and Bell Pottinger to smooth relationships 
between the two countries:
The failure of this strategy was seen during the 
President’s recent visit to London. Public funds 
are spent to meet the bills of Bell Pottinger 
as well as the cost of Liam Fox’s visits to Sri 
Lanka and the results of these expenses have 
not yet borne fruit.575 
On 17 March 2011, Werritty attended a meeting 
on Sri Lanka at the Ministry of Defence at which 
Fox was present along with officials.576
Fox finally delivered the Kadirgamar Memorial 
speech during another visit to Sri Lanka on 
8-10 July 2011. Werritty was in the audience as 
a guest of Mrs Suganthi Kadirgamar, but was 
not present at official meetings.577 Werritty met 
with former Sri Lankan foreign minister Rohitha 
Bogollagama and opposition MP Wijedasa 
Rajapakse at around the time of the visit.578 
Sir Gus O’Donnell’s report concluded:
As the Foreign Secretary has separately 
made clear publicly, Dr Fox’s relationship with 
Mr Werritty did not impact on UK foreign or 
security policy. That is agreed by the National 
Security Council and the Cabinet. He also 
said of Dr Fox that ‘If I asked him not to go 
to Sri Lanka, then he didn’t go. Or if I asked 
him when he went to convey messages of the 
UK Government, messages from me, then he 
conveyed those messages’. However, for the 
future we should strengthen the safeguards 
around this, making clearer who is or is not 
a member of a Ministerial team/delegation, 
and that official members of delegations 
accompanying Ministers to meetings overseas 
must respect HMG’s foreign policy positions.579 
The Foreign Secretary’s comment underlines 
that the government had to rein in Fox’s Sri 
Lankan activities within months of taking 
office.  Yet perhaps the most disturbing 
question concerns Fox’s time in opposition. 
Did the Sri Lankan government’s donations to 
Fox encourage the Rajapaksa administration to 
reject the British Government’s peace envoy in 
the belief that they had established a channel 
of influence over an incoming Conservative 
administration? 
Although O’Donnell’s report concluded that 
Werritty did not influence British government 
policy, it did find that Fox’s relationship with him 
was in breach of the Ministerial code.580 Whitehall 
sources reportedly suggested that the role of 
G3, (the private security company that is part of 
the Good Governance Group), was the ‘smoking 
gun’ that led to this outcome, according to the 
Independent.581
One source in the private security industry told 
Channel 4 News: ‘It was always going to stink. 
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The only reason G3 would have set up the Sri 
Lankan trust would have been for commercial 
reasons.’582 A similar source told the Telegraph: 
‘G3 had defence clients but wanted to get more,’ 
adding ‘The deal with Fox was kept quiet even 
within the company’.583
G3 told the Sunday Times it had paid £60,000 
into the Sri Lankan Development Fund and 
Pargav, money that had been solicited by 
Werritty on the basis would be used for charitable 
purposes in Sri Lanka. A G3 spokesman said: 
‘We are doing our own investigation, working 
with our legal advisers [to establish] how the 
money paid into Pargav was spent.’584
G3 was not, however, the only company whose 
donations to Werritty were linked to Sri Lanka. 
According to the Independent both ‘Tamares 
Real Estate and [G3’s parent] the Good 
Governance Group stressed they had paid Mr 
Werritty to promote peace and reconciliation 
between adversaries in Sri Lanka’.585
Given that Fox had supported the Sri Lankan 
government in its rejection of Des Browne as 
British envoy, Tamares’ support for Pargav 
could be seen as counter-productive for 
promoting peace.
What emerges clearly from the Sri Lankan 
episode is that Fox and Werritty were prepared 
to significantly blur the line between interstate 
diplomacy and private lobbying. This fact may be 
significant for their activities elsewhere.
Werritty’s Iranian connection
Fox and Werritty’s activities in Sri Lanka raise 
serious questions about their impact on British 
policy towards the conflict in that country. Their 
activities in the Middle East raise issues of global 
significance concerning the regional struggle 
between Israel and Iran.
According to the Independent on Sunday, 
Werritty visited Iran alongside Fox in the summer 
of 2007, and separately on a number of other 
occasions, he also had meetings with Iranian 
opposition activists in London and Washington, 
during Fox’s time in opposition: 
... an associate said that Mr Werritty, who 
can speak some Farsi, would act as a 
‘facilitator’ and ‘take messages’ between 
various opposition figures, although the source 
insisted he was not a ‘freelance spy’.586 
The Guardian also reported that a number of 
Iranian exiles had meetings with Werritty, one of 
whom claimed to have met him in 2005-06.587 
At some point ‘in 2009 or 2010’,588 Werritty 
organised a panel discussion on Iran in 
London at which BICOM chief executive Lorna 
Fitzsimmons was among the speakers.589 In 
February 2009, he attended the Ninth Herzliya 
Conference in Israel as a guest of BICOM, which 
paid for his flights and hotel bill. He was listed 
in the conference proceedings as ‘Dr. Adam 
Werritty, Advisor, Office of Shadow Defense 
Secretary; UK Executive Director, The Atlantic 
Bridge’.590 Werritty was reportedly invited by 
conference organiser, Tommy Steiner.591 
Fox also attended the conference, speaking in a 
session entitled ‘Can European-Israeli Relations 
be Decoupled from the Palestinian Issue?’592 
Immediately preceding this panel was a speech 
by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni who argued 
that Arab countries shared Israel’s view of the 
Iranian nuclear threat.593 
The conference conclusions, issued by 
the Institute for Policy and Strategy at the 
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, identified 
the ‘developing nuclear threat from Iran’ as 
the central strategic threat to Israel.594 This 
conclusion was also cited as the Herzliya 
conference series’ foremost achievement in 
influencing Israeli national discourse.595 
In New York the following month, Werritty met an 
Iranian exile who later told the Guardian:
The person who introduced me to Werritty 
said he was working on a report about Iran. 
He was introduced to me as an influential 
person with good access to British authorities, 
therefore I was asked to share my views with 
him about Iran and tell him what I think about 
the current situation.596 
In May 2009, Werritty reportedly arranged 
a meeting in Westminster between Fox and 
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an Iranian lobbyist for President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s regime.597 Their willingness to do 
so only a few weeks before an election in which 
Ahmadinejad retained the presidency suggests 
a recognition that a victory for the opposition 
might not in itself have helped a resolution of the 
nuclear issue.
Indeed, in the wake of the result, Mossad chief 
Meir Dagan warned that Israel would have had 
a bigger problem if Mousavi had been elected 
since he was perceived as a moderate. ‘It is 
important to remember that he is the one who 
began Iran’s nuclear program when he was prime 
minister’, he told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and 
Defence Committee.598
On 8 September 2009, Werritty held a meeting 
with Matthew Gould, the principal private secretary 
to then Foreign Secretary David Miliband.599 
Gould had previously served as deputy head of 
mission at the British embassy in Tehran from 
2003 to 2005.600 In an interview with the Jewish 
Telegraph, Gould said of his time in Iran: ‘There 
is actually very little anti-Semitism on the ground 
in Iran and the people are much less hostile than 
the government. In fact, they cannot understand 
why they give so much money to Hezbollah rather 
than to its citizens.’601 He added, however, that 
there was more hostility to Britain. ‘There is a view 
that the Revolution and the ascent of Ayatollah 
Khomeini was a British plot. I remember having 
lunch with various ayatollahs in Qom, which is a 
very holy city, and they even believed it.’
In December 2009, Fox discussed Iran with US 
ambassador to Britain, Louis Susman. According 
to Susman’s account of the conversation, later 
released by Wikileaks: 
Fox stated that he had recently met with a 
group of wealthy, Iranian expatriates, most of 
whom expressed support for Iran’s obtaining 
a nuclear bomb. ‘Persian nationalism’ more 
than Islamic fundamentalism is the basis 
of Iranian popular support for a nuclear 
weapons program.
The US and UK need to work together to 
prevent a nuclear arms race in the Middle 
East, Fox said. He expressed support for the 
establishment of a US nuclear umbrella in the 
Middle East.602
On 16 June 2010, Werritty had a second meeting 
with Gould, by then the principal private secretary 
to incoming Foreign Secretary William Hague.603 
Gould had already been named as the next 
British Ambassador to Israel, and in that capacity, 
he again met Fox and Werritty in September 
2010, this time at the Ministry of Defence. In his 
report on the Werritty Affair, Cabinet Secretary 
Gus O’Donnell said of this meeting:
I understand that this was a general 
discussion of international defence and 
security matters to enable Mr Gould better to 
understand MOD’s perspective of the security 
situation in the Middle East. Mr Werritty was 
invited to attend as an individual with some 
experience in these matters. As a private 
citizen, however, with no official locus, it 
was not appropriate for Mr Werritty to have 
attended this meeting. Dr Fox has since 
acknowledged this.604 
On 6-7 February 2011, Fox and Werritty attended 
the Eleventh Annual Herzliya Conference in Israel. 
During the visit, Werritty arranged a dinner at 
which he, Fox and the new ambassador Gould 
met with senior Israeli officials.605 The Cabinet 
Secretary’s report concluded that Fox’s private 
office should have attended this meeting, but the 
offer of their presence was declined by Fox.606 
According to the Telegraph, Israeli intelligence 
officers were present at this meeting, at which 
sanctions against Iran were discussed. The 
Telegraph also reported that Fox and Werritty had 
met the head of Mossad, although whether at this 
meeting or separately is not clear.#  The relevant 
Mossad chief would have been either Meir Dagan, 
who stepped down in January 2011, or his 
successor and former deputy, Tamir Pardo.607 
Interestingly, Fox expressed public differences 
with Dagan in the weeks leading up to the 
conference. A few days after leaving office, 
Dagan told the Israeli daily Yediot Ahronot that 
there should be no hurry to attack Iran because 
unspecified measures taken by Israel meant that 
it would not be able to acquire a nuclear bomb 
before 2015.608
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When this assessment was raised with Fox in the 
Commons on 31 January 2011, he responded:
Despite his long experience, I think that Mr 
Dagan was wrong to insinuate that we should 
always look at the more optimistic end of the 
spectrum. We know from previous experience, 
not least from what happened in North Korea, 
that the international community can be 
caught out assuming that things are rosier 
than they actually are. We should therefore be 
clear that it is entirely possible that Iran may be 
on the 2012 end of that spectrum, and act in 
accordance with that warning.609
Fox reiterated this position in almost the same 
words a week later in his speech to the Herzliya 
conference itself.610 This public debate was also 
the subject of private conversations according 
to Israeli officials who told The Times that in 
three years leading up to Fox’s resignation, 
‘Werritty pressed them on how close Israel was 
to launching a military strike against Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions, while himself expressing a hawkish 
world view.’ As a result, the Israelis reportedly 
shared sensitive intelligence with him.611
Such disclosures may help explain why British 
intelligence was interested in Werritty. The 
Guardian reported on 17 October 2011 that 
MI6 had debriefed Werritty on his Israeli and 
Iranian contacts in order to obtain ‘any privileged 
information from foreign countries Werritty had 
access to’.612 While this account suggested that 
MI6 was more sympathetic to Werritty than the 
Foreign Office, later stories distanced the agency 
from his activities. On 23 October 2011, the 
Telegraph reported that Werritty had been called 
in by MI6 the previous February to dissuade him 
from his Iranian activities, which William Hague 
had raised with Liam Fox. The paper quoted a 
Whitehall source as stating:
The risk was that he was being too muscular. 
There was a worry that the Iranians might 
misunderstand that there was a British 
government regime-change agenda.613 
Foreign Office sources appear to have tipped off 
Craig Murray, the ex-diplomat who uncovered 
many of the meetings between Fox, Werritty and 
Gould. Murray would later quote one such source 
as stating that ‘co-ordinating with Israel and 
the US on diplomatic preparation for an attack 
on Iran was the subject of all these meetings’. 
However, this does not necessarily imply Murray’s 
conclusion that Gould ‘had got himself wrapped’ 
in an agenda for a strike on Iran.614
Since his resignation, it has become increasingly 
clear that Fox’s approach to the Iranian nuclear 
issue was not necessarily shared by Werritty’s 
interlocutors, or their principals. Gould’s former 
boss David Miliband is a case in point.
In December 2011, the former Foreign Secretary 
co-authored an op-ed warning against a strike on 
Iran in 2012. While arguing that a nuclear-armed 
Iran was a serious and unacceptable prospect, 
the piece warned that ‘private mutterings about 
the best “window” for such an attack’ risked 
increasing ‘the chasm of distrust to new and 
dangerous levels’. 
Among the reasons for delay, Miliband and 
co-author Nader Mousavizadeh suggested, ‘it 
is clear that sanctions, cyberwar and covert 
operations have impaired Iran’s progress 
towards a nuclear weapons capability, with most 
estimates holding that the regime is at least two 
years away from achieving it.615
In July 2012, the head of MI6, Sir John Sawers 
also suggested that Iran was two years away 
from a bomb, but added that without the 
freedom for MI6 to take risks, it would have 
achieved a weapon in 2008.616 He suggested 
that it was up to MI6 to ‘delay that awful moment 
when the politicians may have to take a decision 
between accepting a nuclear-armed Iran or 
launching a military strike’.617 Sawers reportedly 
visited Israel in August 2012 to dissuade Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence 
Minister Ehud Barak from an early strike.618
As already noted, senior Israeli intelligence chiefs 
were also opposed to a military strike. In 2009, 
Mossad chief Meir Dagan had his term extended 
for a year because of his central role in Israel’s 
covert campaign against the Iranian nuclear 
programme.619 In mid-2011, he suggested an 
attack ‘would mean regional war, and in that 
case you would have given Iran the best possible 
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reason to continue the nuclear program’. His 
views were reportedly shared by a number of 
former security officials critical of Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, including former Chief of 
Staff Gabi Ashkenazi; the former head of the 
Shin Bet security agency, Yuval Diskin; and Amos 
Yadlin the former head of military intelligence.620
The debate on Iran in the policymaking circles 
to which Werritty had access appears to have 
been divided into two camps, neither of them 
drawn-up along national lines. The first of these, 
which might be considered liberal interventionist 
or realist in foreign policy terms, has been 
predominant in the US and UK governments, 
and within the professional security leadership 
in Israel. This camp regards the Iranian nuclear 
programme as a serious threat that may be 
realised in the next few years.  It sees this threat 
as justifying the retention of a military option, but 
regards war with trepidation, and favours as an 
alternative a combination of diplomacy, sanctions 
and covert action as an alternative.
The second, neoconservative, camp has sought 
an ultimatum for military action in a much shorter 
timeframe. It is most clearly represented by Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who argued 
in September 2012, that Iran was six or seven 
months away from being able to build a nuclear 
bomb. Former US Republican presidential 
candidate Mitt Romney also demanded more 
urgency on the Iranian nuclear issue, prompting 
allegations that the neoconservative position was 
driven by US electoral considerations.621 The two 
men share many of the same backers, with more 
than half of the major donors to Netanyahu’s 
2012 Likud leadership campaign, also funding 
either Romney or the Republican Party.622 Liam 
Fox has himself been close to Romney, while 
his former adviser at the UK MoD, Luke Coffey, 
moved onto the Romney campaign via the 
Heritage Foundation.623
Both the realist and neoconservative camps sit 
within a broader interventionist consensus, within 
which more aggressive measures are seen as 
the only alternative to war. BICOM’s analysis sits 
firmly within this consensus. In a September 2012 
briefing the organisation stated:
Israel will hope that a further escalation in 
sanctions, backed by the threat of force 
can compel Iran to change course. But 
how long Israel can wait before its window 
of opportunity for a military strike closes, is 
a matter of judgement that only those with 
access to the most sensitive of information 
can make. As a result, the weeks up to and 
beyond the US elections are likely to remain 
fraught with continuing speculation.624
The effect of this interventionist consensus has 
in practice been to promote alternatives to war 
that are in themselves increasingly aggressive 
and dangerous. The de-listing of the Iranian 
MEK as a terrorist organisation by the Obama 
administration is a notable recent example.625 
Such moves have led some analysts to warn 
of the danger that both sides could become 
trapped in an out-of-control escalation.626
The clearest indication that Adam Werritty 
played a significant role in the debate within this 
interventionist consensus is his relationship with 
Matthew Gould. In this respect, the focus by 
MP Paul Flynn on Gould’s Jewish background 
during questions on the Werritty affair at the 
Public Administration Select Committee was an 
unjustified and unfortunate distraction.627 The 
Foreign Office stated in the wake of the affair 
that: ‘The FCO has total confidence that Matthew 
Gould has acted appropriately at all times 
and at no stage was he acting independently, 
or out of line with government policy.’ Thus, 
the real significance of Gould’s role is that 
he was carrying out the policy of successive 
governments in his meetings with Werritty, 
meetings that seem to have been focused on 
Iran. The British government’s reluctance to 
acknowledge these meetings underlines the 
sensitivity of this subject.
William Hague has ridiculed the suggestion 
that Fox and Werritty were running a parallel 
foreign policy as ‘a fanciful idea’.628 Yet Hague’s 
predecessor and his MI6 chief have been 
relatively open about British support for covert 
action, which is by definition a parallel foreign 
policy. Indeed, running a parallel ‘deniable’ foreign 
policy is arguably a significant chunk of what MI6 
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exists to do, although such operations are not 
always run through official intelligence agencies, 
as the history of parallel diplomacy exemplified in 
the 1980s Iran-Contra affair attests. 
Covert action theorist Roy Godson wrote of 
that episode: ‘When the United States needed 
a human infrastructure to exert its influence in 
Iran in the mid-1980s, the resources were not 
there. The White House and CIA had to rely on 
the Israelis, who had their own agents in place 
in Iran, and on private citizens who were not 
experts on Iran and lacked a range of reliable 
connections there.’629 Such precedents suggest 
that dilettantism has not always been a bar to 
official support.
It is unlikely that Werritty could have played the 
role of Iran expert without the entree provided by 
his Pargav backers, a fact which raises similar 
concerns to those about his Sri Lankan activities, 
albeit of wider international significance. Were 
Pargav’s Middle Eastern reconciliation projects 
more substantial than its Sri Lankan development 
projects? Or was Pargav a vehicle for influencing 
British policy towards the Israeli-Iranian 
confrontation as well as the Sri Lankan civil war?
Tetra Strategy and the Werritty 
endgame
Fox and Werritty’s activities irretrievably entangled 
public and private interests, and it was one 
such thread that ultimately helped to expose 
the nature of Fox’s relationship to Werritty. A 
key figure in this denouement was Lee Petar, a 
former communications director of BICOM, and 
later a lobbyist at Tetra Strategy, a firm whose 
clients included Tamares, the company owned by 
BICOM chairman Poju Zabludowicz.630 
In March 2011, Petar introduced Werritty to the 
venture capitalist Harvey Boulter, whose private 
equity firm, the Porton Group was engaged 
in a legal dispute with US conglomerate 3M 
over technology developed by the Ministry of 
Defence.631 This led to a controversial meeting 
between then Defence Secretary Liam Fox and 
Boulter in Dubai in June 2011.632 Shortly after this 
meeting, Boulter sent an email to William Brewer 
of 3M, which read in part: 
Of course a settlement might not be possible, 
but as a result of my meeting today you 
ought to understand that David Cameron’s 
Cabinet will very shortly be discussing the 
rather embarrassing situation of George’s 
knighthood. It was discussed today. 
Government’s [sic] are big and sometimes 
decisions in one part are not well coordinated. 
[Capitals in original.]633 
According to the Guardian, Boulter had 
discussed the issue of the proposed knighthood 
for 3M head George Buckley with Werritty, but 
not with Fox.634  In a response to the Guardian on 
the episode, Tetra stated: 
Tetra Strategy was retained in 2010 to 
provide litigation PR assistance to the Porton 
Group in connection with its ongoing High 
Court claim in England against 3M. The case 
concerned the development of new MRSA 
testing technology developed by the MoD. 
Tetra introduced its client to Adam Werritty in 
March 2011, who was widely believed at the 
time to be an official adviser to Dr Liam Fox. 
The purpose of the introduction was to brief 
the MoD on the litigation. The suggestion by 
the Guardian that Tetra was paid to arrange 
a ‘secretive’ meeting with Dr Fox is not true 
and is expressly denied. Tetra is referring this 
matter to the PCC.635
This statement begs the question why competent 
lobbyists would not have known the identity 
of Fox’s official advisers, a matter of public 
record, if they had wished to approach them. 
The Cabinet Secretary’s report concluded on 
the Boulter meeting: ‘Dr Fox has acknowledged 
that conducting this meeting without a private 
secretary present was unwise and inappropriate.’ 
According to the report, Fox had been offered 
and declined to have private office representation 
at the meeting.636
Boulter’s threat to 3M led directly to the exposure 
of Werritty’s relationship with Fox and their other 
activities precipitating Fox’s resignation.637 It also 
led to the exposure of Pargav’s donors, many of 
whom disassociated themselves from Werritty, 
alleging that his extravagant spending was a 
misuse of their funds. It is difficult to judge how 
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far this is true without a clearer account of the 
intended purpose of the donations.
The Werritty affair shone a brief light onto the 
murky world of private influence over British 
politics, a light that was effectively snuffed out 
once again with Liam Fox’s resignation. The 
Pargav donors linked to BICOM were only one 
of a range of actors to emerge from the affair. 
Nevertheless, their role demands particular 
scrutiny because of Werritty’s involvement in the 
debate about western policy towards the Middle 
East, and particularly Iran.
Fox’s role in Sri Lanka provides a powerful 
illustration of the damaging effects that such 
private lobbying can have on British foreign 
policy. That danger can only be compounded 
when foreign policy is carried out through covert 
action, which inherently strengthens the potential 
influence of unaccountable private networks. 
The Sri Lankan episode underlines how private 
networks can become proxies for state actors. 
The extent to which this was true of Werritty’s 
Iranian activities, is perhaps the most significant, 
but also the most obscure, question of the whole 
scandal. The potential consequences of a new 
conflict in the Middle East are too grave, to allow 
those demanding a more aggressive policy to 
escape scrutiny.
In concluding this section we can note that the 
entanglement of a number of BICOM personnel 
and funders in the Fox-Werritty affair, shows that 
an agency like BICOM must be examined both 
in its own terms and in terms of the functions 
that it plays in relation to the other activities of its 
main principals.  BICOM is a kind of PR agency 
for Israel in the UK.  But its backers, directors 
and staff have other interests that shape the 
conception of the Israeli national interest which 
informs BICOM’s work.
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Chapter Nine – Conclusions
BICOM’s views and strategy
BICOM positions itself as the moderate 
mouthpiece of a badly misunderstood state. It 
aims to defend Israel by encouraging a skewed 
perception of the conflict amongst elites and 
insulating them from pressure to support 
Palestinian rights. This is done in four main ways:
• building and sustaining a network of elite 
supporters; 
• attempting to influence media coverage of 
the conflict;
• attempting to undermine critics of Israel, 
especially activists arguing for Boycott, 
Divestment and Sanctions. This includes 
many British Jews who are discouraged from 
criticising Israel (at least in public);
• mobilising grass roots support for Israel 
– especially amongst the UK Jewish 
community – and, to some extent, 
positioning itself as a spokesperson of the 
UK Jewish community on Israel.
Whilst undertaking these activities, BICOM wants 
to suggest that it favours a fair resolution to the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. Our findings suggest 
this is a façade. Whilst its ostensibly reasonable 
discourse aims to appeal to the political centre 
ground, it masks an underlying apologism for 
Israeli exceptionalism. BICOM says it supports 
a two state solution but on each of the four 
main issues of the conflict – Jerusalem, borders, 
settlements and refugees – it endorses a position 
out of step with the international community and 
international law. It envisions a two state solution 
that fails to meet standards of international law or 
restore Palestinian rights.
The Israel lobby of conservative 
business interests
We have suggested that BICOM maintains the 
pretence of being moderate for distinct material 
reasons. As we have seen, the interests of Poju 
Zabludowicz, BICOM’s Chairman and main 
donor, are transnational in character, yet closely 
tied to the Israeli corporate-state nexus. This 
carries with it contradictory pressures. A close 
relationship with the Israeli state may present 
significant business opportunities, yet increasingly 
it also carries a reputational risk, which may 
impact on dealings with potential partners in 
Europe and elsewhere. Whilst most people are 
at liberty to criticise or defend Israeli policies 
in whatever terms they like, super-rich Zionists 
like Zabludowicz are more vulnerable. They are 
potentially threatened by a greater awareness of 
Israel’s policies (which could undermine business 
relationships), yet they cannot adopt too liberal 
or pro-Palestinian a position since that might 
undermine their relationship with the Israeli state.
We can see where BICOM fits into this picture. 
By seeking to present even illegal actions by the 
Israeli state in a favourable light, it simultaneously 
strengthens its backers’ relationships with 
state officials whilst minimising any harm that 
they might bring. This helps us understand its 
particular approach to pro-Israel advocacy, which 
as we have seen is intended to preserve elite 
support for Israel in Europe and North America, 
and particularly to neutralise pro-Palestinian 
activists advocating boycotts and sanctions 
against businesses. The threat from the latter 
to the Israeli corporate-state nexus would seem 
to be the primary concern of BICOM’s backers. 
It is a key reason why BICOM in particular, as 
opposed to other more conservative Israel lobby 
groups such as the Zionist Federation, have tried 
to appear more moderate and reasonable.
Whilst accepting that BICOM is dedicated to 
defending the reputation of the Israeli state, we 
have departed from other studies of pro-Israel 
lobbies by suggesting that BICOM should not be 
understood primarily through the lens of national 
interest. Instead, we have suggested that BICOM 
and other lobby groups should be understood in 
the context of the transnational elite networks that 
dominate politics in the 21st century. This is not 
simply a question of ‘Israeli’ power (and certainly 
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not of ‘Jewish’ power) but rather a nexus of 
interests incorporating players from big business, 
finance, politics, PR and the media.
The need for transparency 
Thus the existence and activities of BICOM 
cannot be separated from issues of undemocratic 
governance in the UK and elsewhere, and 
any solution to the problems we highlight here 
must necessarily entail significant political 
reforms. The Fox-Werritty affair did not attract 
an independent investigation and thus a chance 
was lost to look at the bigger picture and address 
underlying problems of which the scandal was a 
symptom. This, and the lacklustre response from 
government to the damning findings of some 
recent official enquiries, suggests there is little 
appetite for any improvements to transparency 
and ethical standards in public life among the 
political class. Nevertheless, what is needed is 
a systematic overhaul of ethics rules in Whitehall 
which would at the very least strengthen the 
powers of the independent adviser on ministers’ 
interests, as well as develop much more serious 
rules on conflicts of interest, the revolving door 
and lobbying.638639 A statutory lobbying register 
is an essential ingredient of any such reforms.640 
Such transparency however should not be limited 
to state officials. Lobby groups, think tanks and 
media organisations all wield considerable political 
influence and they too should be transparent and 
accountable to the public. BICOM, as we have 
seen, is highly secretive about its activities, funding 
and governance, and is not accountable to the UK 
Jewish community, let alone to the general public. 
We believe that the public should have the right to 
know how much funding groups like BICOM get, 
from where and for what purpose. We also believe 
that journalists too should be obliged to disclose 
gifts in kind and trips paid for or organised by 
agencies like BICOM which have a direct interest 
in managing media coverage.
It is clear that what worries BICOM’s backers 
most are campaigns for the boycott of settlement 
goods, Israeli academia or wider measures. The 
attempt to mobilise British Jews and to dissuade 
critics in the Jewish community (and elsewhere) 
from speaking out is also very important for them 
as it helps to identify Jews [en masse] with Israel 
and to head off criticism of Israel from non-Jews.
BICOM wants to suggest that it is in favour of 
a two state solution and of the peace process 
in the Middle East. Our findings suggest, on 
the contrary, that it supports the rejectionism 
of an Israeli state which refuses to give peace 
a chance.
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